These draconian measures, employing unprepared specialists, began to break up the infrastructure of some divisions, further reducing their effectiveness in the line. General Balck explained the penalty of committing artillerymen, tank crews and resupply troops forward as infantry. ‘Where you simply have to insert these people,’ he said, ‘the losses among them are terrible if they are not trained.’ Because, he explained, ‘the “hero” of the communications zone is rarely a front-line hero.’ It was an impractical measure. ‘People who could do their maintenance or supply tasks perfectly in the midst of the heaviest bombing or artillery attacks failed miserably.’ In short, Balck pointed out, ‘the results were quite shocking.’(16) Problems already apparent in September were getting worse. As the Ostheer ‘victored itself to death’, the very fabric of its Blitzkrieg structure, the synergy and coherence of the specialist organisations that had previously given it a battlefield edge, were coming apart.
As the final advance gathered momentum in the middle of November, units became increasingly aware of an intangible yet icily apparent foe, the Russian winter. ‘We hadn’t been deployed as regiments or companies for quite a while,’ revealed Panzer commander Karl Rupp with Hoepner’s Panzergruppe 4:
‘My battle group consisted of two PzKpfwIII medium tanks, three PzKpfwII light tanks, about 40 or 50 riflemen and one 88mm. We were all dog-tired. The young men slept in any position whenever they got a chance. For weeks, we only got out of the tank for minutes at a time. Our breath condensed on the metal, so that everything you touched inside the tank was covered with ice. It was −40° to −50°C outside. Most of the time even the rations were frozen. At night we had to start up the tanks every two hours to keep the engines from freezing up.’(17)
Snow and ice conditions changed the nature of the fighting on the Eastern Front. Both sides were subjected to the same conditions but the Ostheer was disadvantaged by the unfamiliar environment. Paradoxically the intensity of fighting, and as a consequence casualties, diminished, due to the physical difficulties of manoeuvring and fighting in adverse weather. Formations on both sides had, in any case, been much reduced by attrition. Flexible and mobile operations were no longer achievable, further blunting the Auftragstaktik-based leadership edge the Ostheer enjoyed relative to its more inflexibly led foe in the summer months. The Ostheer was neither trained, equipped nor psychologically prepared for winter operations. These, by physical necessity, were degraded to man-against-man frontal attacks, as conditions denied flanking options, favouring the Russian defender more conditioned to the climate in which he lived. German tactical expertise could no longer compensate for the technological superiority of heavy Russian tank types. German casualties, likewise, meant fewer experienced officers and NCOs available to exploit rapid-moving situations, leading to an imperative to control and centralise assets in the hands of the few who could.
By the end of October von Bock was complaining about serious officer shortfalls in the army group. ‘More than 20 battalions are under command of lieutenants,’ he lamented. Battalions, traditionally led by majors and lieutenant-colonels, were being led by lieutenant platoon commanders. Despite their combat experience, these men were trained to lead a few score men, not hundreds, and operate in close co-operation with tanks, artillery and aircraft – a demanding task. On 16 November von Bock informed his commanders he was down to a single division reserve and as a consequence ‘they would have to get by with their own forces’. Freedom of action, in particular taking operational ‘risks’, was reduced. Units would have to fight their own way out of difficulties individually. ‘I further reminded them,’ von Bock emphasised, ‘that the forces were to be held together and not jumbled up – as is the case with Fourth Army, which admittedly is fighting under very tough conditions.’(18) These were not fertile conditions to practice Auftragstaktik, which depended upon personal initiative in order to flourish.
In summary, these German raiding formations had limited physical options as they sought to grasp Moscow in a double envelopment. The former tactical and technological superiority conferred by Blitzkrieg was constrained, having to deal with superior and heavier Soviet tanks, often frontally without the benefit of Luftwaffe air support, much degraded by the weather. By contrast, the Soviet air force, served by permanent air bases in and around Moscow, was increasing its activity.
Karl Rupp, commanding a light PzKpfwII with the 5th Panzer Division with the northern envelopment moving toward Moscow, recalled the most important addition to these small battle groups of five to six tanks was the inclusion of one or two 88mm anti-aircraft guns. ‘These alone could measure up to the Russian T-34 tanks, which were shooting up our tanks like rabbits,’ he said. ‘We were powerless to do anything about it with our light guns.’(19) One PzKpfwIII crew reported striking a T-34 four times at 50m and again at 20m with special upgraded 50mm Panzergranate 40 projectiles which ‘did not penetrate but sprayed off the side’. By contrast, a strike from the 76mm T-34 gun could be devastating. ‘Time and time again our tanks have been split right open by frontal hits,’ complained a Panzer commander. Commanders’ cupolas on both PzKpfwIIIs and PzKpfwIVs ‘have been completely blown off’, read a report, ‘proof that the armour is inadequate and the attachments of the cupolas faulty’.
German tank crews felt increasingly vulnerable. The Panzer officer reflected that the former elan of the Panzer force ‘will evaporate and be replaced with a feeling of inferiority, since the crews know they can be knocked out by enemy tanks while they are still a great distance away’.(20) They were reduced to firing carefully aimed shots against the rear drive sprocket, along with chance strikes on the turret ring, rather than a rapid shot into the centre of mass. German tank crews had to light fires beneath their hulls in order to cold-start engines. A T-34 driver had a pair of compressed air bottles at his feet to help turn the diesel engine in particularly cold weather. Continuing German success against these superior tanks, despite the need to confront them head-on, was maintained primarily because of the fifth additional crew man, the radio operator. Every German tank in the division had a radio. ‘As a result,’ concluded one senior Panzer officer, ‘our tanks were able to defeat tanks that were quite superior in firepower and armour.’ A communications system was provided which enabled a German division commander to direct operations from any point on the battlefield within the division – an option not available to their Soviet opponents.
German infantry anti-tank vulnerability was officially recognised at the end of the French campaign, but not resolved. Shortfalls became apparent again in front of Moscow. The previous effective combined arms support, which had compensated for weaknesses during the summer, was annulled by the onset of winter weather. Infantry felt naked when faced with tanks, as one graphic veteran assessment testified:
‘Use your rifle? You might as well turn round and fart at it [the tank]. Besides it never comes into your head to shoot; you just have to stay still as a mouse, or you’ll yell with terror. You won’t stir your little finger, for fear of annoying it. Then you tell yourself you may be lucky, perhaps it hasn’t spotted you, perhaps its attention has turned to something else. But on the other hand perhaps your luck’s right out and the thing is coming straight for you, till you lose sight and hearing in your hole. That’s when you need nerves like steel wire, I can tell you. I saw Hansmann of the Ninth get under the tracks of a T-34, and he hadn’t dug his hole deep enough; he had been too bloody tired to shovel. The tank just turned a bit off its course, that skidded just enough of the ground away. It had him. The next minute there he was flattened out like a bit of dog-shit you accidentally put your foot in.’(21)