There is some controversy over possible Soviet offensive intentions in the summer of 1941. One view, based upon the massive rail deployment of troops under way, totally absorbing the rail network and to the possible detriment of the harvest, was that Stalin foresaw a full concentration of Soviet troops on the frontier by 10 July. Prior to the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact, only divisions and corps had existed in Soviet frontier districts. Between August 1939 when it was signed and April 1941, the number of armies on the Soviet western border increased from none to 11. Three more arrived during May together with five airborne corps. Stalin could have assembled 23 armies and more than 20 independent corps if Hitler had not invaded on 22 June.(7)
Whatever the outcome of the debate, what is clear is that the Soviet build-up of forces on the western frontier by June 1941 was following a distinct and planned development. Third Soviet Army in the Grodno region, following reinforcement by the XXIst Soviet Rifle Corps, had an army boundary only 80km wide, with seven rifle divisions with an average divisional frontage of only 6.6km, when 10km might be considered normal. Apart from being the strongest unit compared to its sister formations along the western border, it had, unusually, a self-sufficient independent tank brigade in addition to its mechanised corps.
This army was clearly configured in an offensive stance. In essence Third, Tenth and Fourth Soviet Armies, numbering 36 divisions with 10 armoured, did present a possible offensive threat to East Prussia. Tenth Army’s air force units were located near the border, while all the logistic bases and camps of the entire Western Special Military District were located well forward. Ten million litres of petrol were cached forward in Brest-Litovsk alone,(8) directly on the new German/Russian demarcation line.
Part of this apparent Soviet offensive stance is explainable by the practicalities and difficulties of deploying Soviet forces from the interior to the west, compared to the German build-up, capable of more rapid achievement because of the denser road and rail network on their side of the border. Soviet military doctrine from the 1930s considered that future conflict would involve armies numbering millions of men. Offensives need not necessarily await the complete mobilisation of these millions. There should be troops on the frontier, able to enter enemy territory on the first day of war. These would disrupt enemy mobilisations while covering their own. Marshal of the Soviet Union M. W. Tukhachevski, instrumental in formulating this doctrine before his execution during the Stalinist purges, advocated ‘invasion armies’ stationed near the frontier. These forces should cross the border immediately following mobilisation. Mechanised formations ought to be deployed within 50–60km of the belt to enable this. Factors such as these were influencing the form-up and deployment of the First Strategic Echelon near the border, well under way by June 1941.
Stalin’s personal experience serving with a military district during the German advance into southern Russia in 1918 suggested to him that any future German blow would be delivered in the same region. A number of indicators supported such a premise, encouraging and probably accounting for much of the intense military activity between the Russian interior and the frontier in May–June 1941. It appeared unlikely to the Russians that Germany was sufficiently equipped at this time to attack the Soviet Union along her entire western border. Germany would be dependent upon and desire the economic resources of southern Russia. To seize them would require the capability to engage in deep operations maximising space, and penetrating with massive forces. Russia would need to block this move and attack elsewhere. A particularly favourable jump-off point might be the Bialystok salient in the Western Military District in Belorussia and possibly from Lithuania. Occupying such option areas in force would enable the pursuit of Russian realpolitik, applying the politics of pressure in future relations with Germany.(9)
As the Red Army deployed towards the western frontier in June 1941, it did not dig trenches and anti-tank ditches, neither were obstacles and barbed wire barricades erected. There was no perception of immediate threat. Divisions secreted themselves in woods near the frontier, exactly as the German units were doing on the opposite side. The crucial difference was that the massive force the Germans had assembled was ready for action. The Soviet force was not.
Even now German units positioned in woods across the frontier were striving to assess and gauge their future opponents. Officer observation posts were set up to observe the border area using scissor telescopes. Hauptmann Heinz-Georg Lemm, a company commander in the 12th Infantry Division, poised to advance with Army Group North, scanned Soviet positions near Gumbinnen in East Prussia. He commented:
‘We received only poor information on the enemy and terrain in the area of attack… we had been able to recognize that the Russians had high wooden guard-towers, and had been able to observe the relief of the sentries and their supply procedures.’
Trenches were visible 800–1,000m behind the border. Information was sketchy. Aerial photographs revealed some Russian field artillery. The German assessment was they could anticipate a delaying action from two Soviet regiments from prepared positions. ‘The maps we received,’ Lemm complained, ‘were poorly printed and provided hardly any information on altitudes, road conditions and forest vegetation.’(10) Likewise, Hauptmann H. J. von Hoffgarten, training in east Poland with a motorcycle infantry company from 11th Panzer Division, recalled that, even when training ceased on 19 June, ‘there was no information on the Russian Army or on the impending campaign’.(11)
Despite the apparent lack of information available to troops at the front, the Wehrmacht’s appreciation of Soviet strength facing it, two days before the offensive, was reasonably accurate in outline. Abteilung Fremde Heer Ost des Generalstabes des Heeres [the General Staff section analysing eastern theatre enemy forces] had identified a total of 154 rifle divisions, 25.5 cavalry, 10 tank and 37 motorised divisions in Europe. There were, in addition, seven or eight parachute brigades. In Asia it identified a further 25 rifle divisions, eight cavalry, and five tank or motorised brigades.(12) The location of staff headquarters and, in particular, mechanised units was generally known. The assessment, however, lacked depth, and rough assumptions concerning the potential effectiveness of German unit organisations versus Red Army formations were wide of the mark. Figures were broadly accurate, perceptions were not.
The Wehrmacht was to assault with a strength of 3.6 million men – just over three million German soldiers, the remainder Romanians, Finns and Hungarians. In support were 3,648 tanks and self-propelled guns, 7,146 artillery pieces and 2,510 aircraft. Opposing them in the Western Military District were 2.9 million Soviet soldiers with 14,000–15,000 tanks with at least 34,695 artillery pieces and 8,000–9,000 combat aircraft. Of the German Panzers, 1,700 were completely inferior to Russian tank technology. Only 1,880 German tanks within the armoured spearheads were capable of combating the mass of even the older types of the 14,000–15,000 Russian tanks they expected to meet. Soviet industrial potential to make good losses was also grossly underestimated by Wehrmacht planners. Innate superiority in qualitative, racial (ie belief in racial superiority), combat experience, military organisational and technological terms was deemed to be sufficient to deal the required crushing blow in a short campaign. So confident was the Wehrmacht that after September, based upon a reckoning of anticipated casualty levels, there would be no reserves of manpower available in October.(13) Serious consideration of possible withdrawals or the likelihood of a winter campaign was not contemplated or assessed. The Wehrmacht was about to attack its most heavily armed opponent to date with fewer misgivings than when it had launched its western offensive, then with some trepidation.