The ‘moral’ component of fighting power – willpower and motivation – lies at its core. At the outset of’Barbarossa the Ostheerwas committed to its duty to the Reich, and confident of achieving its objectives. Large segments were convinced of National Socialist ideals in a loose peer pressure’ sense. Casualties and the morally corrupting influence of officially sanctioned violence against the Russian Army and populace began to erode this core. Momentum was sustained despite losses during the battles at Smolensk and Kiev because the Panzers were always winning up ahead. The infantry instinctively realised from its French experience that heavy casualties may result in the short term, but the long-term result is cheaper if the momentum is sustained.
They fought on. Battles at Kiev and Vyazma and Bryansk during Operation ‘Taifun’ were appreciated for the gambles they were, but the men had faith in their Führer. Those at the top’ had yet to be proven wrong in this war. Cynicism, however, developed in tandem with losses. Domestic pressure increased from anxious relatives at home, questioning the cost and mistrustful of propaganda. A frustrated feeling of betrayal arose after the successful encirclement battles at Vyazma and Bryansk. The German press crowed that Soviet capitulation would follow, but it was not delivered.
It is interesting to observe the extent to which SS Secret Service reports focused on the opinion of women in the Reich. During an era of male dominance, only beginning to change with the increasing employment of women in industry required in Total War’, their opinion was canvassed and accorded immense respect. Their views were totally uncompromising and voiced like lions, as they gradually perceived the extent of the suffering of their menfolk at the front. From Smolensk onwards, women in the Reich expressed concern at casualties and the likely impact of the approaching winter.
Excesses committed by the Einsatzgruppen and other state-sponsored terror committed against Russian prisoners and civilians had a cumulative moral impact on German soldiers. Although orders were not overtly questioned, many became increasingly uncomfortable at the ‘justness’ of their cause. Complicity was variable and depended upon individual standards of human decency. More recent conflicts in Europe, notably the Balkans, reveal the extent to which complicity, viewed through nationalist, UN, NATO and political-ideological filters is not clear-cut. Vernichtungskrieg in Russia was becoming increasingly transparent.
A string of campaign setbacks created further unease. One had lived with the disappointment of the ‘half result at Dunkirk because it had been followed by the French Armistice. They were to be followed, however, by reverses at Leningrad, Rostov and finally the débâcle before Moscow. The totally unexpected Soviet counter-offensive crashed into an Ostheer, which saw the cream of its generals abruptly removed in the throes of a crisis. Faith in the Führer remained, but ‘those at the top’ had badly let the men down. The German General Staff, whatever the political pressure, was equally mesmerised by the ultimate prize to be had at Moscow. Its fall came to symbolise a likely end to the war. With the veterans dead and the chalice of victory snatched dishearteningly from its lips, there was a real crisis of confidence. The Ostheer subsequently fought almost to the death in front of Moscow, not for Hitler or duty, but to survive.
The final theme to emerge is a failure of German command, a lack of OKW perception. This was firstly its misappreciation of the Russian foe, and secondly its inability to recognise the effect the campaign was having on the very fabric of the Ostheer itself. Russian casualties during the first six months, at three to four millions, dwarfed the imagination. Stupendous though they were, they were never sufficient to persuade the Soviet regime to sue for peace. As a consequence, Russia had only to weather the initial shock of invasion to survive. In time it could exploit its superior demographic and economic resources to win. Cities tended to be avoided by the Führer and the General Staff for tactical not ethical reasons. It was decided at Leningrad to starve the metropolis into submission. But they were equally significant as Communist Party centres, the focal points from which it extended its power and influence into the immense interior of the state. They were, therefore, strategic targets. Hitler’s acute perception of what was ideologically important influenced his judgement on objectives such as Leningrad, Moscow and, later, Stalingrad – ‘Stalin’s City’. Russia may not have been militarily defeated, but the Communist Party power base resided in the cities, which were vulnerable to military action but whose vulnerability was not exploited. The consequences of racial war were to prove a salvation for the Communist Party, enabling it to harness Russian nationalism as a panacea to the crisis.
The second failure of German Command was OKW’s inability to recognise the extent to which German fighting power had actually eroded by September. The force fighting on the approaches to Moscow was tangibly different from the one that had crossed the demarcation line in June 1941. Expanding the number of new Panzer divisions using the same number of equipments but with manpower increases diluted the quality of the Wehrmacht instrument that had Blitzkrieged its way through Western Europe. None of the fundamental shortcomings that emerged from the French campaign, notably insufficient motorised vehicles and effective infantry anti-tank defences, were properly addressed during the pause between operations. ‘Mot’, the German military abbreviation for ‘motorised’, was replaced by ‘Hot’, a sardonic Landser label describing the extent to which motor vehicle losses were replaced by horse power.
As the German armies ‘victored’ themselves to death, all the negative aspects of linkage between the three identified components of fighting power came together. The very ‘Verdun’ that von Bock sought to avoid at the gates of Moscow occurred before he arrived. The Ostheers momentum was halted within 20km of the Kremlin. Blind faith in the invincibility of the Wehrmacht, maintained during every campaign in this war to date, was finally shattered in the snow-covered fields and forests of the western approaches to Moscow. They had sacrificed the seed-corn of Blitzkrieg to get this far. Many of those responsible for the planning and conduct of the advance were removed from command as part of the price. The cream of the army the last vestiges of Weimar influence and the majority of World War 1 veterans had disappeared, dead or broken men. The German soldier had now ostensibly to fight for the Führer, the man to whom they swore allegiance as the Head of State and now Commander of the Army. Most, having witnessed the depredations visited on the civilian population and prisoners of war, whether they were accomplices or not, feared an inevitable retribution. They would reap the whirlwind. The war, all sensed, had reached a turning point. They would now have to fight for their comrades, their families and, above all, themselves.
Between 9 and 11 May 1942 the 7th Panzer Division was relieved in the line and sent back to France to recuperate. In June 1941 one of its units, Infantry Regiment 6, had been transported from the Cologne area to East Prussia in 12 trains in preparation for the invasion. One train was sufficient to achieve the move less than one year later.(3)
Germany’s borders might one day be under threat. Now, it was a matter for survival. This imperative was to become corrupted with further setbacks and the passage of time to a sardonic Landser motto, adopted during the eventual retreat of the German armies. ‘Enjoy the war while you can,’ it enjoined, ‘because the peace will be terrible.’