There was no alternative but to move forward and lie in the trenches. ‘There they waited until someone was killed,’ Yangchuk soberly testified, ‘before they got their rifles.’(21)
The initial German assaults profoundly shocked the garrison. Grigori Makarow, a driver in a Soviet infantry division, said:
‘I felt in the first moments what war meant. All around me were dead and wounded friends and dead horses… German infantry came from the railway and began to penetrate into the fortress.’
Georgij Karbuk in Brest town said that ‘after a few hours the first tanks drove through the town, followed by motorcycle troops, then the infantry’.(22) The Panzers were beginning to move.
The 45th Infantry Division sent a stream of optimistic situation reports to XIIth Corps headquarters. At 04.00 hours, 45 minutes into the attack, it was claimed: ‘Thus far, still no enemy resistance’. A number of bridges were secured: the key railway bridge and another bridging the southern entrance to the citadel. Yet ‘still there was no noteworthy enemy resistance’. At 04.42 hours ‘50 prisoners of war were picked up dressed only in shirts, because they had been surprised while asleep’. Momentum built up, additional bridges and fort emplacements fell into German hands. Three hours after H-hour, XIIth Corps was informed ‘that the division believes it will soon have occupied the North Island’. Resistance was becoming more apparent with ‘enemy armoured attacks between the bridge and the citadel’ but the situation was in hand. Within five hours bypassing Panzer spearheads announced good progress, supported by effective Stuka dive-bombing attacks on ‘Rollbahn 1’, the main axis of advance.
At 08.35 hours, however, a more sober appraisal admitted that, ‘there was still hard fighting going on in the citadel’. By 08.50 hours XIIth Corps began to realise that the 45th Infantry Division thrust into Brest was not mirroring the pace of flanking formations bypassing the built-up area. It was decided to commit the corps reserve – Infantry Regiment 133 – to alleviate a situation where ‘thus far two battalion commanders and a company commander have been killed, with one regimental commander seriously wounded’. By 10.50 hours the pessimism was more pronounced. ‘The fighting for the Citadel is very hard – many losses,’ it was reported. ‘We are going to try and lay smoke on the objective.’ The attack against the citadel was bogging down.(23)
Gefreiter Hans Teuschler crossed the River Bug as part of the second wave with the 10th Company, Infantry Regiment 135. His unit advanced through the West Island ‘without noticeable difficulty’ across gardens, through isolated enemy positions, and soon reached the inner Citadel Island. They crossed over the bridge dominated by a huge gate, the entry to the inner keep of the fortress. Directly opposite was a long extended building with four great gates ‘which were defended by Soviet machine gunners and riflemen who had now overcome the first shock of surprise’. Fighting began in earnest. Each gate had to be grenaded into submission. ‘The square in front’ of the building, Teuschler observed, ‘was cloaked in thick smoke, punctured by fresh shell bursts and covered with rubble, which at least offered some possibility of cover.’ Attacks by light Russian armour were beaten off. The 10th Company advanced to a further gate where other assault groups and battalion support elements were assembling, concentrating for the next phase of the attack. They filed onward, picking their way around the massive garrison church. III/IR135 was now deep within the citadel and on the point of achieving its objective.(24)
To its left I/IR135, forming the other prong of the northern attack axis, had traversed the North Island and was attempting the break into the citadel from the east. The southern advance was doggedly clearing routes through the South Island and bypassing the town of Brest even further south. The pitchfork thrust into Brest-Litovsk had impaled itself deeply into the enemy’s defences on both axes. All indications suggested that the harm inflicted was mortal. No suggestion of any setback was apparent to XIIth Corps commander until 11.00 hours; 45th Infantry Division staff were, however, expressing misgivings within three to four hours of H-hour.
‘It soon became clear between 05.30 hours and 07.30 hours that the Russians were bitterly fighting especially hard behind our forward attacking companies. Infantry operating with the 35 to 40 tanks and armoured cars based inside the citadel began to form a defence. The enemy brought his sharp-shooting skills to bear, sniping from trees, rooftop outlets and cellars in multiple engagements, which soon caused us heavy losses among officers and NCOs.’(25)
Having penetrated the citadel, III/IR135 was pinned down in the vicinity of the church and partly surrounded by Russians. Reinforcements attempting to follow up through the West Island were slowed to crawling pace, picking their way forward with extreme difficulty. Commanders were being struck down by snipers with depressing rapidity. Hauptmann Praxa and his artillery battery commander, Hauptmann Krats, were killed attempting to coordinate the move forward. Major Oeltze, commanding I/IR135 trying to break into the citadel from the eastern side, was struck down alongside his artillery forward observer Leutnant Zenneck. The advance was steadily denuded of its leadership. The Terespol bridge leading into the citadel became impassable. Russian infantry, having overcome their initial shock, were now manning the citadel walls. Anyone moving in the open was shot.
As the day wore on the sun grew increasingly hot. Russian resistance around the church and officers’ mess inside the citadel perceptibly increased. Walking wounded soldiers began to stumble back across the bridges, many bandaged and half undressed, always under fire. By midday the division’s attack was visibly faltering. The subsequent post-action report explained:
‘During the early morning hours it became clear that artillery support for close quarter fighting in the citadel would be impossible because our infantry were totally enmeshed with the Russians. Our own line was in a tangle of buildings, scrub, trees and rubble and could hardly be identified as it ran partly through Russian resistance nests or was in places surrounded. Attempts to engage the enemy directly with individual heavy infantry weapons, anti-tank guns and light artillery often failed due to poor visibility, the danger to our own troops and primarily the thickness of the fortress walls.’
A passing battery of self-propelled guns was commandeered and employed to no effect. Infantry Regiment 133, the corps reserve, was moved forward after 13.15 hours to the South and West islands, but was unable to influence the situation because:
‘New forces reappeared after a short time, where the Russians had been driven or smoked out. They emerged from cellars, houses, pipes and other hiding places, shooting accurately, so that our losses rose even higher.’(26)
Gefreiter Hans Teuschler, near the church inside the citadel, was directing the fire of a light machine gun from an abandoned Russian anti-aircraft position. Using binoculars, he had barely discerned muzzle flash from a casemate 300m away when the number two on the gun shouted urgently ‘Get down!’ The sniper round slammed into Teuschler’s chest as he attempted to do so. Spun around by the massive force of the impact, he remembered drowsily trying to squeeze the hand of the machine gunner lying alongside him, to give an indication of life that might be ebbing away. Thoughts of God and home welled up in his mind before blacking out. On regaining consciousness later he was confronted with a bleak scene: