The guns were skilfully manhandled by their crews through close terrain up to within 600m of their intended target. Three red-hot tracer-based shells spat out at 823m/sec, smacking into the tank with rapid and resounding ‘plunks’ one after the other. At first there was cheering but the crews became concerned as these and another five rounds spun majestically into the air as they ricocheted off the armour of the unknown tank type. Its turret came to life and remorselessly traversed in their direction. Within minutes the entire battery was silenced by a lethal succession of 76mm HE shells that tore into them. Casualties were heavy.
Meanwhile a well-camouflaged 88mm Flak gun carefully crept forward, slowly towed by its half-track tractor, winding its way among cover provided by the 12 burnt-out German trucks strewn about the road. It got to within 900m of the Soviet tank before a further 76mm round spat out, spinning the gun into a roadside ditch. The crew, caught in the act of manhandling the trails into position, were mown down by a swathe of coaxial machine gun fire. Every shell fired by the Russian tank appeared to be a strike. Nothing moved until nightfall when, under the cover of darkness, it was safe enough to recover the dead and wounded and salvage some of the knocked-out equipments.
An inconclusive raid was mounted that night by assault engineers who managed to attach two demolition charges onto this still, as yet, unidentified tank type. Both charges exploded, but retaliatory turret fire confirmed the tank was still in action. Three attacks had failed. Dive-bomber support was requested but not available. A fourth attack plan was developed involving a further 88mm Flak gun, supported this time by light Panzers which were to feint and provide covering fire in a co-ordinated daylight operation.
Panzers, utilising tree cover, skirmished forward and began to engage the solitary tank from three directions. This confused the Russian tank which, in attempting to duel with these fast-moving and fleeting targets, was struck in the rear by the newly positioned 88mm Flak gun. Three rounds bore into the hull at over 1,000m/sec. The turret traversed rearward and stopped. There was no sign of an explosion or fire so a further four rounds smashed remorselessly into the apparently helpless target. Spent ricochets spun white-hot to the ground followed by the metallic signatures of direct impacts. Unexpectedly the Soviet gun barrel abruptly jerked skyward. With the engagement over at last, the nearest German troops moved forward to inspect their victim.
Excited and chattering they clambered aboard the armoured colossus. They had never seen such a tank before. Suddenly the turret began to rotate again and the soldiers frantically scattered. Two engineers had the presence of mind to drop two stick grenades into the interior of the tank, through one of the holes pierced by the shot at the base of the turret. Muffled explosions followed and the turret hatch clattered open with an exhalation of smoke. Peering inside the assault engineers could just make out the mutilated remains of the crew. This single tank had blocked forward-replenishment to the 6th Panzer Division vanguard for 48 hours. Only two 88mm shells actually penetrated the armour; five others had gouged deep dents. Eight carbonised blue marks were the only indication of 50mm gun impacts. There was no trace at all of the supporting Panzer strikes, many of which had clearly been seen to hit.
The nature of the enemy armoured threat had irretrievably altered. General Halder wrote in his diary that night:
‘New heavy enemy tank!… A new feature in the sectors of Army Group South and Army Group North is the new heavy Russian tanks, reportedly to be armed with 8cm guns and, according to another but untrustworthy observation from Army Group North, even 15cm guns.’(6)
This was the KV-1 (Klim Voroshilov) which mounted a 76.2mm gun. Its sister variant, the KV-2, although more unwieldy, did have a 15cm gun. In 1940, 243 of the former and 115 T-34 tanks had been produced, rising to 582 and 1,200 respectively by 1941.(7)The Russian-German tank balance was grossly distorted to the Soviet advantage in both quality and quantity. There were 18,782 various Russian tank types versus 3,648 German in 1941.(8) German Panzers in weight, main armament, operating distances and speed were generally inferior to Russian tanks.
The prelude to a Blitzkrieg advance was the shattering of the enemy front at the main German point of effort, preceded by a joint artillery and air bombardment with an infantry break-in battle. The Panzers were then passed through to strike deep into the enemy rear, intimately supported by tactical air sorties and motorised artillery to overrun headquarters and break up logistic support areas. These armoured units moving at best speed would form pincer ‘arms’ which would then encircle and cut off retreating Russian forces, penning them into pockets to be subdued later by following marching foot infantry.
The appearance of the 34-ton T-34 caused much consternation to the German Panzerwaffe. Developed in relative secrecy six years before, its 76mm gun was the largest tank armament (apart from the 15cm KV-2) then mounted. Its 60% sloping armour was revolutionary in terms of the increased armoured protection it offered against flat trajectory anti-tank shells, which often simply ricocheted off. Josef Deck, a German artilleryman with Regiment 71 in the central sector, complained that the 37mm standard antitank fire ‘bounced off them like peas’.(9) Adapting the American Christie suspension system, the T-34, with extra-wide tracks and a powerful lightweight diesel engine, possessed an enormous relative power-to-weight ratio, conferring superior mobility on the Russian vehicles. It was to prove the outstanding tank design of the war, and was a formidable adversary, even in the hands of a novice. Alexander Fadin, a T-34 commander, remarked:
‘As soon as you start the motor it begins throbbing, and you feel part of this powerful machine. You pick up speed and no obstacle can stop you. Nothing, not even a tree.’(10)
The vast majority of Soviet tanks, some three-quarters, were the T-26 series (approximately 12,000) while BT-2s, 5s and 7s made up a further 5,000. The remainder consisted of 1,200 T-34s and 582 heavier KV-1s and KV-2s. As a consequence 17,000 Soviet tanks were on an equal fighting footing or inferior to 979 PzKpfwIIIs and 444 PzKpfwIVs and superior to 743 PzKpfwIIs and 651 PzKpfw38(t)s, based on a captured Czech chassis. Other generally technically inferior or command variants made up the German difference with the notable exception of 250 Sturmgeschütz IIIs assault guns made up of 75mm guns on a PzKpfwIII chassis – that operated in independent units. They were heavily armoured, with a low hard-to-target profile; they proved lethal Russian tank killers, normally employed in close support of infantry. German armoured superiority stemmed not from technology but from the combat edge conferred by their trained crews. German crews were larger: five within the PzKpfwIII and IV and even four inside the small PzKpfw38(t). Russian crews numbered four in heavy tank prototypes or less. Panzers operated within a comprehensive radio net whereas the Russians had few radios and hardly any below battalion level. Control was executed using signal flags. Responsiveness in rapidly changing circumstances was therefore cumbersome.
German Panzer crews were well versed in battle drills developed over several recent campaigns and many of their junior commanders had combat experience. Russian tank crews, by contrast, tended laboriously to follow crest lines to aid visibility and control, presenting themselves as easy targets. The Soviet tank arm caught unprepared in the middle of reorganisations and major operational redeployments to frontier areas was presented with conflicting tactical and command dilemmas. Many of the older Russian tanks, estimated at 29%, required total overhaul on the eve of the invasion and 44% were due routine servicing.(11) A key factor further bedevilling Soviet armour was the lack of air parity. Russian armoured columns were consistently and destructively harassed by the Luftwaffe while denied the accurate air intelligence freely available to their Panzer adversaries.