German tactical ingenuity began to level the odds. ‘Despite their thick skin,’ Ritgen explained, ‘we succeeded in destroying some by concentrating fire on one tank after the other. “Aim at the hatches and openings!” we ordered.’
Grimm, the war correspondent, observed by 16.00 hours that afternoon ‘the black smoke over the battlefield became ever thicker’. PzKpfwIV tanks had already ceased firing because they were being resupplied with ammunition. Panzer tactics varied according to crew initiative. ‘Some enemy tanks were set on fire and others blinded,’ Ritgen pointed out. ‘If they turned around we found it was possible to knock them out from the rear.’ Such lessons were being learned throughout the new Russian theatre.
Hauptmann Eduard Lingenhahl serving with Panzer Regiment 15 explained the heavy PzKpfwIV companies ‘found mainly by chance’ that quarter-second delayed action HE shells fired into the back of T-34 tanks either set the fuel or engine on fire, as blazing fuel poured through the air induction grating.(4) By 21.00 hours the battle was over. The 11th Panzer Division destroyed 46 tanks on the heights south-west of Radciekow village alone. Contrary to the later propaganda coverage there was little complacency. Three days later Major Kielmansegg spoke to his 6th Division commander about the first encounter with heavy Soviet tanks at Rossieny. ‘Herr General,’ he said, ‘this is a totally different war from that we have experienced with Poland or France.’ It had been ‘a hard battle with hard soldiers’ and a number of officers had been badly shaken. ‘Early panic,’ Kielmansegg declared, ‘was mastered finally only by the attitude and discipline of the officers.’ He stated soberly:
‘At the division level we saw, for the first time in the war, the danger of a serious defeat. This was one of the heaviest strains I experienced during the war.’
The only comfort he could derive was a report that one of the ‘monster tanks’ he had seen had been immobilised by a Leutnant placing a mine under its track.(5) Arthur Grimm’s Signal report, not unexpectedly, ended on a high note.
‘The Soviets left the battlefield after a duel lasting eleven hours. More than 40 Soviet tanks were destroyed. The pursuit continues. Only five of our own tanks were disabled.’(6)
Hard fighting near the frontier was followed by a relatively ‘smooth’ period of spectacular Panzer advances towards Minsk and later Smolensk. The pattern of these days, although less eventful, remained gruelling. Hyazinth Graf von Strachwitz – an Ober-leutnant with Panzer Regiment 15 – declared, ‘we hardly had any sleep because we drove through both day and night.’(7) The enemy was given time neither to rest nor regain the initiative. Anotoli Kruzhin, a Red Army captain facing the German onslaught opposite Army Group North, said:
‘In the first days of the war the German Army was advancing very quickly. The state of shock, as it were, stayed with us for quite a long time. As far as I know the Soviets were not organised to fight until July or even the beginning of August. This was in the region of Staraya Russa, west of Novgorod. But before that, in July, the Soviet Army was retreating in such chaos that reconnaissance for the North-West front had to be provided by a special detachment. Not to find where the enemy was positioned, but Soviet units – their own army!’(8)
On the outskirts of Lvov, a similar picture was evident in the Russian 32nd Tank Division sector. Stephan Matysh, the artillery commander, had seen that superior T-34 and KV tanks had exacted many casualties. Russian tank crews were well aware of their superior armour, ‘sometimes even ramming [German] tanks’, but cumulative pressure was beginning to tell.
‘The incessant gruelling marches and the continuous fighting over several days had taxed the tank crews to the utmost. Since the beginning of the war the officers and men had not had a single hour’s rest and they seldom had a hot meal. Our physical strength was leaving us. We desperately needed rest.’(9)
Colonel Sandalov, the Soviet Fourth Army Chief of Staff, had established the Army HQ in a forest grove east of Siniavka. With no radio communications whatsoever, he was reliant on messenger traffic alone. He reported the outcome of consistent and crushing blows inflicted on his forces by Guderian’s Panzergruppe 2 and Fourth German Army following its central route. Sandalov’s 6th and 42nd Rifle Divisions had already withdrawn eastwards with ‘remnants [which] do not have combat capability’. The 55th Rifle Division, having unloaded from motor transport, was quickly pushed from its rapidly established defence line, ‘unable to withstand an attack of enemy infantry with motor-mechanised units and strong aviation preparation’. No word had been heard of the 49th Rifle Division since the invasion. The XIVth Mechanised Corps, ‘dynamically defending and going over to counter-attacks several times, suffered large losses in material and personnel’, and by 25 June ‘no longer had combat capability’. Paralysis afflicted the Soviet defence:
‘Because of constant fierce bombing, the infantry is demoralised and not showing stubbornness in the defence. Army commanders of all formations must stop sub-units and sometimes even units withdrawing in disorder and turn them back to the front, although these measures, despite even the use of weapons, are not having the required effect.’(10)
A diagramatic representation of the Panzer advance. The vanguard – a light mixed force of Panzers and motorised infantry – would seek the line of least resistance. Once battle was joined, this lead element would ‘fix’ the objective while following heavier elements would manoeuvre, bypass, destroy or surround enemy resistance, relying upon later echelons to subjugate stay-behind elements. Fighting was generally in the form of meeting engagements shown top right) whereby junior commanders would exercise iniative to retain the tactical and operational momentum of the advance.
Konstantin Simonov, on the Minsk highway under German air attack, remembered a Soviet soldier shell-shocked by the bombing fleeing down the road shrieking: ‘Run! The Germans have surrounded us! We’re finished!’ A Soviet officer called out, ‘Shoot him, shoot that panic-monger!’ Shots began to ring out as the man whose ‘eyes seemed to be crawling out of their sockets’ fled.
Village clearance would occur once Panzer forces had isolated the settlements. Panzer-grenadier infantry would be committed with tank fire support shooting them in from the flanks, at an acute angle to advancing troops. Artillery and Luftwaffe air support might be employed to precede the attack, prevent the insertion of Russian reinforcements and harrass the eventual retreat. Achieving tactical momentum was of paramount importance.
Legend
1. Panzers and infantry split. Infantry lead attack on village.
2. Infantry dismount.
3. Panzers bypass and give fire support.
4. Panzer and anti-tank gun in direct fire support.
5. Infantry fight through village with man-handled anti-tank gun support.
6. Surviving Russians surrender or flee.
7. Grenadiers remount and with Panzers continue the advance.
‘Evidently we did not hit him, as he ran off further. A captain jumped out in his path and, trying to hold him, grasped his rifle. It went off and, frightened still more by this shot, the fugitive, like a hunted animal, turned round and with his bayonet rushed at the captain. The latter took out his pistol and shot him. Three or four men silently dragged the body off the road.’(11)