The German press was jubilant. The Völkischer Beobachter crowed: ‘An Army of One Million Wiped Out!’ and ‘End of the Kiev Catastrophe’. The Frankfurter Zeitung declared simply: ‘Five Soviet Armies Annihilated’.(26) For over a month there had been no Sondermeldungen relayed to the population since the heady days of Smolensk. The third anniversary of the start of World War 2 had passed, bringing with it an inevitable questioning of what had been achieved and, more significantly: what remained to be done? Interest in the Russian War had not been attracting the previous banner headlines. Secret SS situation reports briefed to Himmler at the beginning of September stated, ‘the already overlong campaign in the east is viewed by much of the population with a certain disquiet.’(27) Victory at Kiev changed all this. Attention once again focused on Russia. Popular interest surged to the previous ‘Barbarossa invasion levels. ‘Recently held convictions that static positional operations had developed and that a severe winter campaign is in the offing have slipped into the background,’ observed reports.(28) A German housewife living near Nuremberg wrote:
‘Another public announcement was issued today saying the Russians appear to be breaking up around Kiev and 50 divisions have been destroyed. Father said that would be an even greater blow because of the amount of material taken there as well. The Russians with their great masses are impervious to human losses, but they will not be so quick to replace all the equipment.’(29)
German infantry with Army Group South were less sanguine. It was they who had to mop up the mortally wounded Soviet armies, easily written off by the press, as if surrounding them was all that was required. Finishing off the Kiev pocket had been a hazardous enterprise. Thirty-five German divisions, including six Panzer and four motorised, had been required to execute this Cannae. They represented about one-third of the strength of the original ‘Barbarossa’ invasion force – a massive effort. Soldiers felt and recognised the immense strain. An Obergefreiter with the 98th Infantry Division wrote, ‘we have had 75% losses in our company’. He anticipated the arrival of replacements in a few days. ‘But I believe if they do arrive sooner, as is invariably the case, we will already have been relieved and moved on before they even get here.’ Replacements never seemed to arrive.(30)
Another Unteroffizier, with the 79th Infantry Division, wrote he ‘had got through the pocket fighting east of Kiev well enough’. He hoped ‘that after this battle they would be taken out of the line, but, even though we have shrunk to a tiny band, sadly, it was out of the question’. They were already marching toward Kharkov. ‘I have strong reservations,’ he confessed, ‘whether we will see an end to the war in Russia this year.’ The outlook appeared pessimistic. ‘Russia’s military might is certainly broken, but the land is too big, and the Russians are not thinking of surrender.’(31) His view was echoed by that of a Gefreiter with the 72nd Infantry Division, who declared in a letter that ‘the campaign against Russia began today, three months ago’. He had then surmised ‘the Bolsheviks would be ripe for surrender within at least eight to ten weeks’. German soldiers, he reflected, were more used to a Blitzkrieg – a tempo campaign. Progress had been as rapid as in France when considered in manpower and material terms. ‘Only this morning,’ he wrote, ‘we heard by chance that near Kiev for example, 600 guns were destroyed and 150,000 men taken prisoner… What about those for numbers!… Russia is almost inexhaustible!’ But there was, he pointed out, a fundamental difference between the French and Russian campaigns. In the west:
‘After the penetration of their defensive lines and encirclement, their armies saw further resistance as senseless genocide. They surrendered to save their people. It’s another case here. We’re not fighting against the Russian people but against the Bolshevik world menace, which has enslaved them.’
In short, ‘there would be no armistice forthcoming from the Russians’.(32)
Generalfeldmarschall von Bock became impatient to begin the promised thrust against Moscow as soon as the encirclement at Kiev had been achieved. The move south had been a distraction from his main effort. He had been miserly with resources, husbanding the main forces within Army Group Centre for as long as possible, reluctant to assist Guderian in the tactical possibilities he opened up as operations progressed. As these forces moved further south he became correspondingly geographically removed from what he clearly considered to be the overdue main effort: an assault on Moscow prior to winter. Throughout the Kiev encirclement battles his diary reflected his frustration and concern. On 20 September, the day after the formation of the pocket, he wrote:
‘The build-up in my front lines can’t be concealed from the enemy in the long run. I must reach a decision: should I wait for the bulk of the promised forces or should I not? In spite of the difficulty of the attack, I am leaning toward “risking something” and attacking as soon as the most necessary units are in place.’
On 24 September he observed, ‘it is clear that the Russians are withdrawing forces from in front of my front to prop up their threatened northern and southern wings. It is time!’(33)
As ever, the soldiers in the field were blissfully ignorant of this intent. Panzerjäger Ernst Victor Meyer was enjoying the same sunny day to the east of the Kiev pocket. Writing to friends back home, he admitted his virtual ignorance of the true situation.
‘As always we know practically nothing about objectives and intentions. So for now, we are totally unaware what should become of us. Another “Kessel” pocket [Kiev] has been “finished off” and for the moment our task completed. Now where are we off to?’(34)
Theo Scharf, moving through cornfields with the 97th Infantry Division toward Kharkov, recalled, ‘the yellow ripe cornfields could now be picked out of their own tall, stalky forests.’(35)
It was autumn.
Chapter 12
‘Victored’ to death
‘I considered whether I ought to write a letter to [my wife] Maria, so that it would be in my pocket, should I never get to go home.’
Objective Moscow
Führer Directive Number 35 was issued on 6 September as Guderian’s Panzergruppe 2 battled southward to begin the closure of the Kiev pocket. Code-named ‘Taifun’ (Typhoon), the operation aimed at the defeat and annihilation of the Russian forces blocking the road to Moscow ‘in the limited time which remains available before the onset of the winter weather’. Following the encirclement and destruction of the Red Army facing Army Group Centre, Generalfeldmarschall von Bock would ‘begin the advance on Moscow with [his] right flank on the Oka [river] and [his] left on the upper Volga’.