Army Group Centre was to become the Schwerpunkt (main point of effort) in this last push before the end of the year. Von Bock issued his attack order on 26 September,(1) even as the final blows were being administered to the disintegrating Kiev pocket. In order to provide Army Group Centre with the appropriate force and penetrative power commensurate with its Schwerpunkt role to achieve the objective, Army Groups North and South were directed to transfer important forces to von Bock’s control. Hoepner’s Panzergruppe 4 was to be detached from Army Group North and Panzergruppe 2, fighting around Kiev, from Army Group South. Von Bock would have three Panzergruppen under command: these two and Hoth’s Panzergruppe 3, at that moment supporting von Leeb’s assault on Leningrad. Three marching infantry armies – the Ninth, Fourth and Second – would follow behind the Panzer forces.
The attack plan aimed at a double armoured encirclement which would close their pincers east of Vyazma, bringing the Panzer spearheads to within 160km of Moscow astride the main road leading from the west. Guderian’s Panzergruppe 2 (now renamed Second Panzer Army) was tasked to attempt an envelopment southeast of Bryansk, by advancing north-east from its present position at Kiev to effect a junction with the Second Infantry Army moving due east. Staff preparation now focused on the requirement to amass the necessary force and matériel.
The war in the east was approaching a climax. On the German side Army Group Centre had nearly two million (1,929,000) soldiers at its disposal, facing one and a quarter million Russian defenders. Over one-third of the forces on both sides formed the logistic and rear area security ‘tail’ supporting the operational ‘teeth’ forward. In reality some 1,200,000 German ‘fighters’ were to engage 800,000 Russian, a ratio of broadly eight German to every five Russian soldiers.(2) This was not sufficient for the conventional military wisdom of a ratio of three to one, to ensure a realistic chance of success for attack against defence. Overall figures are less important, however, than tactical and operational excellence, which is required to create the necessary force ratios that ensure success at a given time and place at the front. Surprise is one factor ensuring this, but it becomes subject to an effectiveness ‘fade’ once the operation is underway.
Such a point had arguably been reached in the eastern campaign. The Red Army was configured in a quasi-offensive stance at the outset of ‘Barbarossa’ and was ‘checkmated’ in the wrong place when the German attack began. Massive defeats and encirclements at Minsk and Smolensk bore testimony to the benefits of the surprise achieved. With Leningrad besieged and the armies at Kiev annihilated by a further unexpected move, only one clear German objective remained. This was Moscow. The only remaining conundrum was ‘when?’
Surprise is a two-edged weapon and applies to both sides. Captured Soviet West Front documents give an insight into the tactical and technical surprises inflicted by the German onslaught during the initial invasion phase. ‘Use of infantry forces strongly supported by heavy-calibre infantry guns and anti-tank weapons, with motorcycle troops and the application of deeply echeloned Panzer attacks, in close co-operation with the Luftwaffe’, according to the documents, had considerable impact, ‘thereby deceiving the intent of eventual encirclement, and with good fire control on the move.’ A lesson of the previous short campaigns, which was missed due to the rapidity of the Polish and Balkan operations, but partly reflected in the greater German casualties suffered during the latter part of the French campaign, was that, with experience, Blitzkrieg could be blunted. Shortfalls discerned and commented upon by the German General Staff,(3) following the six-week French campaign, were not identified by the enemy until it was too late.
The Russians, with space to react, were given time to learn. They had already noted the difficulty of matching the infantry pace to Panzers. Night defence was invariably poor, as also the reaction of motorised and Panzer elements to unexpected attacks, especially when they were resting on roads or in villages. These had ‘weakly defended outposts that can be easily overwhelmed during the attack’, the report read. It was deduced that wide-ranging night attacks to harass the Germans, by destroying material and inflicting casualties, was likely to have considerable impact. But German officers arrogantly surmised they held the tactical edge. Generalmajor Nehring, commanding the 18th Panzer Division, calculated from an examination of captured staff maps that he would require a 15-day logistic capability to sustain the forthcoming attack.(4) This would suffice to reach Moscow, or just short of it, when a further decision dependent on the situation would be necessary. Estimates of Russian strength had been 171 divisions prior to the campaign, which was revised to 200 shortly after and then to 360 divisions within six weeks.(5) Surprise had been mutual.
The effectiveness of surprise was diluted over time. New factors started to emerge. Halder foresaw the approaching dilemma as early as 11 August:
‘The time factor favours them, as they are near their own resources, while we are moving farther and farther from ours. And so our troops, sprawled over an immense front line, without any depth, are subjected to the incessant attacks of the enemy. Sometimes these are successful, because too many gaps must be left in these enormous spaces.’(6)
In mid-September he wrote to his wife that ‘the shame of it is that time is frittering away, and time is the stuff of victory.’(7) Time, distance and the unexpected ferocity of resistance had a cumulative impact upon the Ostheer. Commanders retained confidence because the Wehrmacht had yet to lose a battle during this war. Two factors, however, interacted in reducing the qualitative impact of a barely sufficient attack-to-defence ratio. They were faltering logistics and an army that was, in its own words, ‘victoring itself to death’ (Totsiegen).(8)
A logistic ‘trip-wire’
The original ‘Barbarossa’ concept surmised that the Russian field armies would have to be defeated in western Russia, within 500km of the border, to realise the plan. OKH calculated that the distance from the frontier to Smolensk should be covered in one mighty leap, followed by a pause, during which time the rail network would be extended to catch up. Covering the resupply gap, meanwhile, would necessitate a balance of tracks, wheels and rail transport. The reality was that tracks – the Panzers – rapidly outstripped the marching armies which were reliant upon horse-drawn transport.
Logistics was based upon the army’s Grosstransportraum (lorry carrying capacity), which was truck columns supplying the 33 ‘fast’ divisions and their supporting troops and headquarters. There were 144 divisions to be supplied in total. The sanguine expectation was that the 300km drive to Smolensk could be covered by a six-day 600km round-trip by lorries, including loading and unloading. Each division would receive only 70 tons per day through this method, of which well over one-third would consist of rations. Concentrating only on the ‘fast’ divisions would denude the remaining 111 divisions. ‘Fast’ divisions encircled the pockets, but the slower divisions still required substantial logistic support to reduce them. Potential for problems existed even before the 300km intermediate Smolensk objective was reached. The 500km line (from the frontier) beyond it represented a form of intangible ‘tripwire’ that would snag any offensive and cause it to falter. At worst case it might collapse. German field-post letters home had already frequently alluded to shortages of equipment, food and manpower replacements at the front.