A fundamental tenet creating a 500km logistic check was the technological inferiority of lorried transport compared to rail in 1941. The French Blitzkrieg, despite the convincing perception given by newsreels of powerful motorised German columns portrayed in the propaganda film Sieg im Westen (Victory in the West), was not reality. Indeed, the earlier campaigns had irretrievably damaged the motorised lorry fleet, now reliant upon captured stocks. Even if these fleets had existed, they would have been inferior to rail. No fewer than 1,600 lorries were needed to equal the capacity of one double-track railway line over the 500km distance. Motorised transport further devoured material in its own right, requiring fuel, drivers and personnel, spare parts and maintenance. Consumption relative to the payload carried placed railways in the ascendancy as the most efficient primary carrier at distances in excess of 320km. Lorry columns were a tactical rather than strategic asset.
Some 40% of Wehrmacht divisions were equipped with captured French motorised vehicles at the outset of ‘Barbarossa’.(1)
The Logistic ‘trip-wire’ was the limit of the Ostheer’s strategic logistic sustainability, beyond which an offensive aimed at Moscow could not be achieved unless supported with a rail-based transport network. The lorried tactical carrying capacity, Grosstransportraum, was the only element able to keep up with the fighting spearheads. The lorry fleet, as also combat vehicles within the fighting formations, had been decimated by the eve of Operation ‘Taifun’ at the beginning of October 1941.
Panzer division reorganisations prior to the campaign created more units from virtually the same number of tanks, forming 19 Panzer divisions from nine. The creation of the additional ‘fast’ divisions resulted in a corresponding demotorisation of units and services in infantry divisions, which had meanwhile expanded from 120 to 180. The newly created motorised units were experiencing enormous difficulties by late summer, due to wear and tear.
Technical transport reports from the SS Panzergrenadier Division ‘Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler’ (LSSAH) offer an instructive snap-shot of the problems experienced by a relatively well equipped motorised unit. The LSSAH started the eastern campaign with an inventory of 3,403 vehicles, 240 of which were captured. Many of the same vehicles had already been used for campaigns in Austria, the Sudetenland and Bohemia-Moravia, and most of them had been employed in Poland, France, Greece and the Balkans, and now Russia. No regular or complete refurbishment of vehicles occurred between the French and Balkan campaigns before ‘Barbarossa’. OKH simply ruled that fairly worn parts – those with an assessed 5,000km of life – were to be reinstalled. By the autumn most vehicles had averaged 8,000km and supply and special-duty variants had surpassed 12,000km. Fine dust on all roads caused numerous break-downs. There were no new filters to remedy the situation, so cylinders and pistons wore out early. Reliance on low-grade oils caused piston-rod failures requiring a complete overhaul to repair damage. Shortage of spare parts resulted in ‘junking’ otherwise repairable vehicles, which were cannibalised to keep the remainder of the fleet moving. By 10 October the Motor Transport Officer was predicting catastrophic fall-out rates: 493 vehicles had broken down, 160 were immobilised awaiting spare parts and, he assessed, 250 more vehicles would likely break down within the next 500km.(2) This was the situation on the eve of the final German offensive at the end of the year.
The IIIrd Panzer Corps, part of Generaloberst von Kleist’s Panzergruppe 1, reported only 142 of 338 Panzers available for action on 17 October, and 3,100 of a total of 4,300 vehicles in running order. The report complained, ‘the vast majority of vehicles are worn out’. By the time the corps reached Dnepropetrovsk:
‘Units had clearly reached the high point of their technical performance capacity. Instead of refurbishment, patching took place! Five hundred kilometres have been added in the meantime, not counting the trips on the battlefield and the rides back for supplies.’(3)
German advance routes and Russian avenues of retreat were carefully combed for usable parts from wrecked trucks. The LSSAH Division Engineer claimed only 50% of his motor transport fleet was fully serviceable at the end of August. Search groups seeking vehicle parts actually fought engagements with their Soviet counterparts for possession of burned-out vehicles.(4)
The Ostheer’s motor-vehicle fleet was experiencing serious difficulties. Only 1,000 trucks were allocated to Wehrmacht land forces each quarter to make up losses. This was insufficient to replace those lost through normal wear and tear, never mind enemy action. Fuel was in short supply, and could not be procured as in France by filling up at civilian petrol stations. Russian petrol had a high octane content and could only be used in German vehicles after the addition of benzol, mixed at specially constructed installations. Provision of spare parts was critical. German units in Russia used no fewer than 2,000 different vehicle types. Army Group Centre, the Schwerpunkt for the coming offensive, needed over one million spare parts to support it.(5)
The Eastern Army lacked homogeneity because its motor vehicles were concentrated within a small number of units. Priority was given to these ‘fast’ Panzer and motorised divisions for breakthrough and exploitation. Infantry forces normally opened the attack paving the way for Panzer break-ins following along afterwards to subjugate enemy units encircled by the fast forces. Ironically this required 75 infantry divisions to be issued 200 Panje horse-drawn carts to supplement their Grosstransportraum. Fast units were checked at about 500km from their start point due to the requirement for lorries to return empty to reload. They had also to carry their own fuel. On average they were driving 2km (because of the need to manoeuvre tactically) for every kilometre of enemy territory conquered.
Technical problems were exacerbated by the absence of metalled roads. Few were anticipated, and these were expected to be low-grade. The reality was even worse, as the small number of metalled roads became degraded within three days of the campaign start, through the volume and pressure of traffic. Heavy rain transformed them into quagmires, and deep sand and dust pushed fuel expenditure up by 30% in dry weather. Raids by groups of cut-off Russians also exacted a considerable toll. Losses were approaching 25% within 19 days of the invasion, rising to one-third within Army Group Centre alone a week later.(6) Columns of marching infantry moving up to relieve the Panzers complicated the problem by bringing resupply convoys to a complete standstill. Junkers Ju52 transport airlifts of petrol had to be substituted within 48 hours of the beginning of the campaign to keep Panzer spearheads moving.
Some of the reality of these statistics is revealed through the diary of a German driver with a transport unit at the end of September. He was often away from his company for three to four days at a time. His 6-ton (French) Renault ‘was very good up to a point,’ he wrote, ‘but not for these roads’. Accidents were common. He carried rations, petrol or ammunition as cargo. On one occasion:
‘…transporting munitions we were under fire all day, from 05.00 until 19.00. It was a real “pleasure” with whistling bullets and exploding shells. One man was killed and eight wounded in our ammunition column, but our “blue-eyed [ie lucky] boys” got through.’
Mud and the danger were all pervasive. ‘It is forbidden to drive at night,’ he explained, ‘because there are too many ambushes.’(7) Driving conditions were harsh. Kanonier Mutterlose, serving with the SS ‘Leibstandarte’s 2nd Artillery Regiment, complained: