The jump-off point for the projected final German assault on Moscow was over 600km from Brest-Litovsk, and little over halfway to Moscow. The German railway network was labouring even at this distance. Generalfeldmarschall von Bock, commander of Army Group Centre, estimated he needed 30 trains per day during August to replenish current consumption and build up stocks for the forthcoming Moscow attack. On average only 18 arrived, although he was promised 24. Even after the conversion of the railway gauge to Orscha and Smolensk by 16 August and other improvements, the objective of 30 trains per day was never achieved. Von Kluge, the commander of Fourth Army, declared on 13 September that ‘with growing distances, the army is almost completely dependent on the railways’. Although current consumption was met, the build-up of offensive stocks was less certain. ‘The army lives from hand to mouth,’ he admitted, ‘especially as regards the fuel situation.’ The Ninth Army commander was less compromising, commenting the following day that its transport ‘was insufficient to support the coming operations’.(14)
Some progress was achieved in September but only limited stocks of Verbrauchssatzen (logistic ‘units’) could be amassed to support the pending offensive. It was not possible to amass the ‘buffer’ stocks desired: 27 trains were needed daily in September to shunt units into place and locate material forward. Only 16 could be mustered before 22 September, although 27 delivered up to 30 September, producing a limited build-up of stocks. OKW estimated 29 trains would be needed daily during October but could only confirm 20. It was anticipated that November and a cessation of activity due to winter conditions would lessen the requirement to a much reduced three trains daily in order to move winter clothing and equipment.(15)
In any event it was not enough. Material shortages constantly featured in letters sent home from the front. Secret SS Home Front situation reports, monitoring the impact of these letters, referred to the concerns mothers and wives were expressing about the harsh conditions endured by their menfolk at the front. Supply shortages were a feature of correspondence during August and September, together with apprehension at the approach of winter. Observers reported Feldpost letters revealed ‘soldiers had to endure enormous difficulties because resupply, and with it the supply of combat troops, appeared very difficult’. Within weeks of the final offensive it stated, ‘relatives of soldiers serving in the east are much preoccupied today with the accommodation and supply difficulties of German soldiers for the coming winter’. This, in contrast to the very optimistic views expressed at the beginning of the campaign, was now having a cumulative impact. ‘Growing difficulties with resupply’ was a recurring theme, along with the ‘unimaginable huge reserves the Soviet Army possessed in men and material’. There was pessimism over ‘the almost certain likelihood of not achieving a decisive outcome in the foreseeable future’.(16)
Army Group Centre was teetering on an intangible logistic tripwire extending some 500–600km east of the German border from north to south. Motorised transport was designed to keep the ‘fast’ Panzer and motorised divisions replenished, filling the supply vacuum created as railway construction units sought to close the gap and catch up. Generalmajor Gereke, the Chief of Army Transportation, estimated one railway battalion could change Russian to German track gauges at a rate of 20km per day. Smolensk had been reached, but not the capacities required to stockpile for the coming offensive. Army Group North, able to capitalise on the more sophisticated Baltic rail network, had already reported 84 combat incidents between its railway construction troops and stay-behind Russian troops, suffering 162 casualties in the process.(17)
Overland vehicles, tracked or wheeled, did not offer a solution. The new offensive would start in the autumn with the prospect of worse weather than that already experienced during the closing stages of the battle of Kiev. OKH announced a deficit of 38,000 vehicles on 16 August. Panzer units were on average 50% short, with corps troops and headquarters already 25% down. Infantry divisions with comparably fewer vehicles, and mainly horse-drawn at that, had lost one-quarter of their motorised fleets. The mobile columns required to spearhead the final Blitzkrieg were between one-quarter and one-third below their previous capacity. This time there would be no surprise; the remaining vehicles were worn out and weather prospects were bleak.
The Panzer situation was serious by late summer. At the beginning of September 30% had been destroyed and 23% were under repair. About half of the Panzer divisions foreseen for Operation ‘Taifun’ had only 34% of their tanks in service. Panzergruppe 1, reduced to 50%, was to continue the advance in the south. Von Bock retained the three remaining Panzergruppen. Generaloberst Guderian’s renamed Second Panzer Army had been reduced to a 45% average even before the Kiev encirclement battles. Its 10th Division was at 83% but its 18th was down to 57%. After the battle Guderian’s force was reduced to 25% in addition to being badly located some 200km south of the Smolensk-Moscow axis. Its 9th Division – having begun the campaign with 157 Panzers – had only 62 tanks with 67 under repair. Overall the three Panzer corps forming Second Panzer Army (with five Panzer divisions) mustered 252 tanks. General Hoth’s Panzergruppe 3 was down to an average of 45% of its strength at the beginning of September and Hoepner’s Panzergruppe 4 to between 50% and 75%.(18)
A feverish period of repair and transfer of reserve Panzers forward to the front was undertaken (125 of the 181 tanks available were already positioned at Orscha and Daugavpils). Repair was slow because major overhauls were still being conducted in the Reich. This necessitated a two-way additional journey to and from the front. Logistic difficulties further stymied the transfer process, so that the readiness states of the severely pressed Panzer force could only be raised a further 10%. Guderian’s Second Panzer Army, for example, had been promised 100 new Panzers: it received only 50 in time; the remainder were despatched to Orscha, 200km away, by mistake.(19) By 15 September, Army Group Centre had 1,346 serviceable tanks for the forthcoming operation; this was from the 2,609 the divisions theoretically had at their disposal at the outset of the campaign.(20)
Mal-location did not just affect Second Panzer Army, obliged now to advance north-east, an additional 100–200km, instead of due east along the Smolensk–Moscow road. Panzergruppe 3 had to relocate 600km from Leningrad via Luga, Pskov and Nevel to join Army Group Centre south-east of Velizh. Large numbers of Panzers and self-propelled guns broke down during the rapid three to four-day administrative march. Service support vehicles were obliged to move northward from the Panzergruppe assembly area to recover many of these vehicles, denying vital last-minute support to the remainder prior to the offensive. Artillery gun numbers were reduced as a result of half-track prime movers breaking down and a shortage of spare parts.
The logistic brake was applying remorseless attrition. ‘Panzergruppe 3’s main supply point in the Ribshevo area in no respect carried sufficient supplies to feed a far-reaching attack later on,’ admitted Oberst Hans Röttiger, the Chief of Staff of XXXXIst Panzer Corps. Fuel and ammunition were particularly short, as also spare parts for Panzers and artillery towing vehicles. On the eve of battle the corps possessed between 50% and 75% of its strength, about one to one and a half divisions. Its 1st Panzer Division was down to 90 Panzers, having begun the campaign with 154 tanks.(21) Army Group Centre was about to embark on the last thrust on Moscow, although it was over half way with 340km to go, with under half (48%) of its serviceable Panzer strength and without the benefit of surprise.