‘Terrible, friends and then colleagues went missing and nothing was ever heard of them again… There was no patriotic “gung-ho” hurrah feelings like in World War 1 over how the war was going. It never happened like that.’(29)
Observations of home front morale assessed ‘the population is beginning to take the view that the war in the east will not end as quickly as was anticipated following early successes’. Rumours fuelled by numerous Feldpost letters quoted high casualties among certain identified units. ‘Death notices in the newspapers,’ read one report, ‘in particular a number of publicly known personalities who have died, exacerbate the extensive public concern over German losses in the east.’ The 1st SS Division ‘Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler’ had reportedly ‘lost 60% of its strength’; another rumour claimed ‘officer casualties in all units were way beyond all expectations’. In one town it was alleged 23 men had perished from a community of only 3,000. SS Home Front reports observed, ‘the population is becoming increasingly convinced from front reports that Soviet resistance appears not to be decreasing and that clearly the enemy has further huge reserves of matériel available.’(30)
The handling of death notices attracted intense criticism, as revealed by one lengthy SS Home Front survey. It criticised an insensitive and inefficient bureaucratic system responsible for gross errors. Probate wills were being returned stamped ‘Fallen for Greater Germany’, before families had even been officially informed by the Wehrmacht Army Office. Suffering was, in any case, unavoidable. Hildegard Gratz in Angerburg recalled ‘the first “black letter” for our family’ came with the advent of the Russian war. Her brother-in-law had perished on the very first day of the campaign.
‘Suddenly everything changed. The radio carried on broadcasting news of victories. But the daily papers carried endless columns of death notices.’(31)
Such inconsistencies were not lost on the population. Rumours intensified as black stories abounded. A wake organised at St Ingbert on the basis of a witness report sent by letter from a comrade who had witnessed the ‘death’ was cancelled after a hospital notification that the ‘deceased’ had survived. Some ‘killed in action’ letters of condolence were thoughtlessly composed, graphically describing the wounds that led to death and sometimes even the duration and extent of suffering. ‘Two particularly crass cases were reported from Düsseldorf,’ noted the SS Home Front survey. A death notice inserted through a letter box with normal mail when there was no answer resulted in a housewife discovering her husband had died as she sorted through routine correspondence while her children were present. Another unfortunate mother was handed her tragic news at the tram stop, with her children, while the unsuspecting postman continued on his round. She screamed and fainted in the street. The SS report recommended numerous humane changes to procedure.(32)
‘Being a postman suddenly became an unpleasant occupation,’ commented Hildegard Gratz. ‘He became the bringer of bad news.’
‘There were these terrible letters, and the postmen told stories of pitiful scenes of grief. The postman came to dread his round if ever there was one of those black-edged letters to be delivered. It wasn’t just a question of witnessing grief and suffering. The official line was that women were bearing their news “with proud grief” but many of the women in their despair screamed out curses on this “damned war”. This was a risky business, such people were supposed to be reported.’
The war was sucking the very vitality from normal life. ‘Three young women went around our village in black that autumn of 1941,’ said Frau Gratz. ‘I had danced at their weddings, and they at mine.’(33)
On 18 September the press announced the death of Generaloberst Ritter von Schobert, the commander of the Eleventh Army, killed six days before when his Fieseler Fi156 Storch light aircraft force-landed in a minefield. ‘Just imagine how high casualties among officers and men must be,’ was the public perception, ‘if even an army commander is killed’.(34) Casualties produced a nagging unease throughout the Reich during August and September. Rumours were temporarily allayed on 22 September when the ‘Announcement of Eastern Campaign Losses’ was revealed: about 86,000 had died and almost 22,000 were missing. The figures were reasonably accurate (87,489 and 19,588 respectively). Conjecture had varied from 200,000 at the low end of the scale to one million as the worst case. The figures ‘have in one blow,’ according to the official assessment, ‘settled the uncertainty’. Although viewed as costly at first, they were eventually accepted as an inevitable expense for ‘the harshness of the battle against Bolshevism’. People temporised, claiming they were lower than World War 1 losses with far greater success to show for it. Interestingly, the ‘wounded’ totals were not given: they numbered 302,821. Soviet casualty figures were, in any case, calculated as far higher, with 1.8 million prisoners taken and reportedly 3–4 million dead.(35)
The impact of German losses was tearing away at the very fabric of the Ostheer. The cream had likely already perished. Even the SS, who had begun this battle supremely confident and motivated, were expressing doubts. The commander of the 4th SS Infantry Regiment ‘Der Führer’ wrote:
‘The campaign in the east had begun with unspeakable harshness. We were all firmly convinced of the necessity of this battle, all believed in our leaders and in our own strength and were in no doubt that we would emerge victorious from this confrontation.
‘But in spite of all the confidence, in spite of all our self-confidence, a feeling of isolation crept over us when we – following the army’s armoured spearheads – advanced into the endless expanses of Russia. We did not share the unfounded optimism of many who hoped that they might spend Christmas 1941 at home. For us the Red Army was the big unknown, which we had to take seriously, which we could not underestimate. The goal of this struggle lay in the unforeseeable future.’(36)
Army Group South, which would support the right flank, had similar misgivings. The commander of its IIIrd Panzer Corps reminded the commander of Panzergruppe 1, Generaloberst von Kleist, that ‘it is psychologically wrong to drive a unit that has proven its fitness’. More than half of his combat leaders had fallen in some units and his Panzers were reduced from 338 to 142. ‘The vast majority of all vehicles are worn out,’ he lamented. His comments concerning the fighting power he was able to muster were more significant. ‘Morale,’ he explained, ‘is weighed down’ by the increasing frequency of Russian air raids and the apparently inexhaustible reserves of Russian ammunition. Both factors ‘will only increase as the Russians move back to their unattacked positions and reach their stocks of ammunition and matériel’. His men were depressed ‘by the fact that the final goal seems out of sight’. Moreover ‘the number of men out of commission proves that the Russians are by no means “beaten” as it might appear in the big picture’ – a statement all the more significant coming, as it did, three weeks after the annihilation of several Russian armies in the Kiev pocket. The men were worn down. ‘Readiness for action for the personnel can only be achieved with a few days of rest outside the area of Russian fire.’ So far as ‘material’ was concerned, ‘no full readiness can be expected anymore’.(37)