The 3rd SS-Panzer-Division “Totenkopf” found itself under a sustained enemy attack that showed no signs of letting up. On August 30, 1944, the 96th and the114th Rifle Corps from the 70th Army attacked Radzymin simultaneously from both the north and the east. As on the previous day, the attack was accompanied by relentless waves of Soviet air attacks. The Germans were forced to withdraw from the villages of Mokre and Dybowo. The retreating SS-soldiers set up a new defensive line taking advantage of the destroyed buildings in Radzymin. But not even the devastating fire-power of their machine guns and mortars could hinder the Soviet infantry from entering the city. By that evening, when it had become evident that heavy counter-attacks supported by tanks had not improved the situation; the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division “Totenkopf” was finally forced out of Radzymin.
The day after; both corps from the 70th Army and one corps from 47th Army launched attacks along the Radzymin-Marki road and in the direction of Wólka Radzymińska. After the loss of Radzymin; Gille set the 5th SS-Panzer-Division “Wiking” in positions to defend attacks from the north, and the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division “Totenkopf ” from southerly attack, including the road towards Marki. Despite both merged Waffen-SS divisions (together with parts of the Panzergrenadier-Regiment 73 and the 1131st Grenadier-Brigade) being exhausted, they nonetheless continued to fight stubbornly and carried out almost daily counter-attacks with combat units drawn from the companies and battalions and with the support of armoured weapons. The Soviet soldiers also displayed great bravery and apparent unconcern with death. The fighting was therefore both hard and drawn out. The rate of advance for the 28th, the 70th, and the 47th Armies, as well as the 8th Guards Tank Corps, never exceeded more than 1 to 2 kilometres per day. On August 31, the 70th Army Corps together with the 47th Army’s 129th Rifle Corps only exerted the energy needed to clean up Radzymin’s southern suburbs and occupy the village of Cegielnia.
On September 1, however, the pressing Soviet forces resumed the fighting in earnest. The terrain favoured the defenders because, in village after village, building structures rested on both sides of the main road to Marki, and between Wólka Radzymińska and Struga spread a forest (which before the war had belonged to the village of Nieporet), small marshes, and a number of hills (heights numbered 104, 100 and 97 in the vicinity of Słupno village). Early in the morning, after a heavy pre-assault artillery bombardment and air attack, the Soviet infantry commenced an offensive supported by tanks. After an entire day of heavy fighting, SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 10 “Westland” halted the enemy amidst the ruins of Wólka Radzymińska and on the muddy roads within the aforementioned forest, while units from the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division “Totenkopf” did the same thing along the line stretching between the villages of Struga and Nadma. The fact that the SS-soldiers reported — just in the area surrounding the village of Słupno — a total of 24 destroyed enemy tanks can serve as proof of just how hard these battles were fought.
The pressure exerted by the Soviet troops against the IV SS-Panzer-Corps’ left flank began to slowly taper off. Yet, on the 2nd and 3rd days of September, the 70th Army, and the 47th Army’s 129th Rifle Corps renewed their attempts to attack and breakthrough the German positions between Wólka Radzymińska and Nadma, albeit without success.
In August, the Russians sought to broaden the front by circling around Warsaw south of the city and building a bridgehead at the town of Magnuzew. The “Hermann-Göring” Division, together with other units, was pulled out of the fighting in Praga and re-deployed to meet this new threat. Here they were confronted by the 1st Free Polish Tank Brigade. The result of this battle was a “draw” and the Russians succeeded in holding onto this location throughout the autumn of 1944.
All attempts to pierce the defence were immediately met with counterattacks by improvised Kampfgruppe from the 5th SS-Panzer-Division “Wiking” and the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division “Totenkopf ”. Tanks wound up in long-distance artillery duels in which the Soviet side proved to be without chance. This was the case because the warring Soviet infantry’s main support came from outdated, model “Valentine” tanks, while their modern tanks had been placed in other armoured entities, as for example, in Guards units. In addition, the relatively few German tanks and tracked assault-guns, fought from ambush positions in the forest where they were at least camouflaged from the ever present threat of the Ił-2’s bombers.
A more difficult situation for the IV SS-Panzer-Corps had developed, instead, around Wołomin itself. After the enemy had reached the nearby village, Nadma, the German troops occupying Wololmin were fighting half-encircled and only had contact with the corps along the railway line to Zielonka. Finally, subsequent to the 129th Rifle Corps ending its assault of Wołomin; the situation became temporarily stabilised. Despite this, and with the aim of improving his troops’ situation, Gille received permission to shorten the defender’s line. On September 6, the German and Hungarian troops left Wołomin and withdrew to the suburbs of Zielonka. This was the final clever feint in the new Soviet offensive phase of the war which had begun on August 10. Beginning on September 3, SS-Gruppenführer Gille’s frontline troops experienced a welcome period of relative calm.
However, the intense fighting having let up against the frontline at Warsaw did not mean that the crisis in Heeresgruppe “Mitte’s” sector was over. The German forces defending Praga’s suburbs were extremely weak. General von Vormann had quite correctly foreseen that the Soviets side’s aim was to renew carrying out its assault strategy as soon as possible, particularly in the direction of Warsaw. Therefore he sent reminders to von dem Bach and General Hans Schirmer, (Schirmer had replaced General Stahel as commandant of urban warfare on August 25, who was dispatched in all haste to Bucharest) concerning the quashing of the Uprising and protecting the bridges across the Wisła and along Warsaw’s left river bank. He then presented these concerns in very striking terms to the 9th Army’s chief of staff, General Städke — and in a telephone conversation to von dem Bach, he stated that: “Not a single tank shall be allowed to pass!”