At the same time, the 9th Army, which had been burdened with the responsibility of defending the middle section of the Wisla, was suddenly weakened — because now it was General Weiß’s 2nd Army, fighting in the northern zone, that began the final retreat over the Narew and, among other locations, withdrew from Wyszków. Weiß reported: “During that day the situation became so grave that the order was given directing the XX and XXIII Army-Corps to withdraw to the other side of the Narew and the EastPrussian defence line.” But the 48th Army, the 65th Army, and the 1st Guards Tank Corps, all components of the 1st Belorussian Front’s right flank, succeeded in reaching the Narew at several points parallel to the retreat of the Germans and set up strong bridgeheads on its western bank. The 28th Army, positioned on the Bug’s southern bank where it ran out close to Wyszków, was also active here. The 128th Rifle Corps from this army pursued the XX Army-Corps and crossed over the Narew by Wierzbica, two kilometres north of Serock. The Soviet troops also seized the important bridgehead at Różan (the 48th Army) and at Pułtusk (the 65th Army with the 1st Guards Tank Corps).
This course of events caused General Reinhardt, as soon as the temporarily stabilised situation outside of Praga was made known to him by von Vormann , to decide in favour of strengthening the 2nd Army at the expense of the 9th Army. He rescinded the order he had given two days earlier concerning the redeployment of the new 542nd Grenadier-Division to Warsaw, and despatched it instead to the area around Pułtusk, where it was to operate together with the 35th Infantry-Division and the Panzer-Abteilung 104.
Thereafter, he further strengthened this formation with the 1131st Grenadier-Brigade that had been pulled away from its co-operation with the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division “Totenkopf” and the Panzergrenadier-Regiment 73 which had been assigned to the 5th SS-Panzer-Division “Wiking.” Over the course of two days, he even decided to commit the rest of the SS-Panzer-Regiment 5 to the stretch between Serock and Pułtusk. Meanwhile, in accord with decisions made by the OKW and OKH, the commander of Heeresgruppe “Mitte” was, at the same time, expecting that the 24th Panzer-Division, along with a Kampfgruppe from the 25th Panzer-Division, to arrive at the bridge emplacement from southern Poland (the Dukla-Pass). It was Reinhardt’s contention that a powerful Kampfgruppe should be assembled as soon as possible outside Pułtusk, because according to reconnaissance — by September 8, four days after the bridge area had been seized — the enemy had already found time to mass two rifle corps and a tank corps there. Confronted with the prospect of such a drastic reduction in his own force strength, General von Vormann naturally opposed these orders, though to no avail. On the other hand, the German command’s quick decision did make it possible for the 2nd Army to check the expansion of the Soviet bridgeheads. What particularly contributed to this success were the few model PxKpfw V “Panther” tanks from SS-Panzer Regiment 5 which provided support to the 35th Infantry-Division and the 542nd Grenadier-Division. Between September 6 and 9, they eliminated scores of tanks belonging to the 1st Guards Tank Corps.
The commander of the 9th Army had no illusions that the cessation of attacks against Praga on September 3 was anything other than for the purpose of regrouping Soviet combat forces in preparation for new assaults. His immediate superior shared this view and reported the following to the OKH on September 6:
“In the 9th Army’s zone the enemy till now has limited itself to small-scale, localised combat activities inside the 1st DKaw […]. When the enemy is now strengthening their combat forces, it is clear to the 73rd DP (Panzer Division?) that this enemy, beyond any conceivable circumstance or doubt, has not given up its plans to attack Warsaw’s bridge area.”
Despite this, on September 8 General Reinhardt gave orders to von Vormann to transfer command of the XXXXVI Panzer-Corps, together with the rest of the 19th Panzer-Division at Magnuszew, to the 2nd Army. General Lüttwitz’s staff would coordinate the counter-attack against the bridgehead at Pułtusk and the time-point was set for September 13. When the panzer corps’ officers set off on September 9, the 8th Army-Corps again overtook command of the forces blockading the mouth of the Pilica, while the area between Warsaw and Góra Kalwaria was taken over by the improvised Gruppe “Sickenius” (General Sickenius’ staff from the 391st Sicherungs-Division z.b.V and the Hungarian 5th Reserve Division). The 19th Panzer-Division’s columns also set off towards the north during the evening of September 9. General Källner’s subordinates still had no idea that instead of marching towards Pultusk, they would wind up in the middle of the battle for Praga.
