1 : 5 · The Storming of Praga
September 18–19, 1944
Throughout the month of August, Stalin, as has already been mentioned, deliberately held back the storming of Praga since it clearly risked hindering the Germans from pacifying Warsaw, despite the unspeakable brutality of their methods. Nor did he, notably enough, make a secret of this reasoning which he wrote of in his letters to the leaders of the western powers. The dictator’s wording concerning “the public distancing from the Warsaw-disturbance” — together with his order concerning the denial of allied landing rights — was an openly hostile policy towards the Uprising. However, such a clearly spelled out perspective, which also served as clear evidence of his capacity for grim and mercilessly cold calculation, came to provoke strong exception in the western press. Political relations with Great Britain became extremely strained and the USA’s ambassador in Moscow talked about his “serious concerns regarding the Soviet government’s position.”
In this sensitive atmosphere, Stalin consulted with the officers at headquarters toward the end of August about near-term operational plans. STAVKA at this time had its attention primarily focused on the Romanian front and the planned new offensive in the Baltic States which was to be carried out in the very near future. Zjukov asserted that the 1st Ukrainian Front and the 1st Belorussian Front had already exhausted their resources with respect to offensive warfare, which was also reflected in the order dated August 29, directing a tactical shift to defensive warfare and consolidation. This order, in practice, merely sanctioned the prevailing situation. Zjukov’s order encompassed not only the right flank in Marshal Rokossovskij’s front, which should make every strain necessary to reach the Narew and take the well defended bridgeheads on its west bank (this was the purpose of the fighting between Wyszków and Radzymin). According to the commander’s representative, one of the considerations behind this operation was the necessity of also storming Praga itself, primarily to even out the front and improve the tactical connection between the flanks of Marshal Rokossovsk’s forces. STAVKA already possessed information concerning the stubborn defence mounted by the IV SS-Panzer-Corps and consequently wanted to eliminate any possible threat from the enemy panzer corps. And lastly, the prospect of success for the fighting along the Narew was partly dependent on the continued presence of the German’s 9th Army along the Wisła — a factor that materially hindered it from being used as a support force to the 2nd Army,
Stalin approved Zjukov’s plans. Marshal Rokosovskij, after regrouping his troops, would storm Praga, clear the area surrounding the Narew’s entry into the Wisła, from this join to Modlin, and then shift from attack to defence of the river’s eastern bank. Help to the crumbling uprising was not a consideration in the planning. The attack, scheduled to commence September 10, was to be carried out by the 70th and 47th Armies, along with the 8th Guards Tank Corps. With regard to the 28th Army, the decision was made that it would no longer be a part of the 1st Belorussian Front. Instead, it would be moved north to join the planned fighting in East Prussia. The 28th Army was finally relieved on September 8, and left the outskirts of Warsaw as late as the evening prior to the storming of Praga.
On September 4, the British War Cabinet communicated its special decision to Stalin, where, among other items, it read:
“The War Cabinet wishes to inform the Soviet government that public opinion in this country is deeply outraged over the events taking place in Warsaw and the terrible suffering of the Poles […] The British people cannot understand the motive for not sending relief with aid and materials to the Poles of Warsaw. The fact that this material could not be sent because You refused to grant Your permission for American aircraft to land on airfields within Russian areas is on the threshold of becoming a matter of general public knowledge. […] The War Cabinet, itself, cannot understand Your government’s refusal […] Your government’s actions in hindering aid assistance, we regard as not being consistent with the spirit of cooperation required between allies, in which You, as do we, today, and in the future, place such a considerable measure of weight.”
In diplomatic terms this was a serious warning, a threat of sanctions. Stalin was, of course, dependent on military aid from the west, particularly with regard to modern industrial equipment. He had also approved the original concept of storming Praga and, at first, had ordered the reinforcement of the 1st Infantry Division’s 47th Polish Army (according to the operational order issued on September 5) and then, on September 11, the withdrawal of the entire 1st Polish Volunteer Army from Magnuszew and its re-deployment, in the 47th Army’s wake, towards Warsaw. The dictator sought in this way to show his goodwill towards the Uprising, and by having engaged the use of Polish troops even indicate that the capital should indeed be freed by the Poles themselves. On September 10, he also withdrew his order not to grant allied planes landing rights on Soviet airfields, and ordered the Soviet Air Force to take complete control over Warsaw’s airspace. On September 13 1944, the first airborne weapon delivery was parachute-dropped to the resistance men.
On September 9, Marshal Rokossovskij received reports from Generals Popov and Gusiev that their armies were ready to conduct further attacks on Warsaw. On the same day, the Soviet bomber wing launched heavy raids on positions held by the 73rd Infantry-Division and the Hungarian 1st Cavalry Division. Intensive reconnaissance of German positions in the IV SS-Panzer-Corps area was carried out, with the intent of disorientating the opposition with regard to the main direction of attack. This succeeded because, even as late as September 7, von Vormann reported that “—an attack is expected from the 70th and 28th Armies against the 9th Army’s left flank, as well as from the 47th Army against Praga.” The German High Command thus perceived the greatest threat to be in the north, although the 8th Guards Tank Army on September 6 was re-deployed from the 70th to the 47th Army. It wasn’t until September 9 that German reconnaissance flights observed this Soviet troop movement and then noted it in reports. The following day the offensive was launched.
Early September 10, the two sides were deployed as follows. On the German side along the Zbytki — Międzylesie — Stara Miłosna — Wesoła line stood the 73rd Infantry-Division: Between Wesoła and Zielonka stood the Hungarian 1st Cavalry Division: In the forests between Zielonka and Słupno, the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division “Totenkopf” was stationed, and in the terrain stretching from the village of Sieraków to Rynia, the 5th SS-Panzer-Division “Wiking” — less SS-Panzer-Regiment “Wiking.”
The list of all the units comprising the IV SS-Panzer-Corps included:
• Eisenbahn Panzerzug Regiment 1
• The II and IV Batteries from the 102nd Werfer-Regiment (from the 300th Festung-Werfer-Brigade),
• Kommando 9th Army Sturm-Battalion (except the 1st Company)
• The 9th and 421st Festung-Pionier-Battalions
• The 2nd and 4th Companies, 737th Festung-Pionier-Bataillon