The table displayed above was compiled by General Radzjijevskij’s staff on August 28, 1944 and may not be entirely accurate.
It is not clear if the report overlooks certain independent units who operated under the direction of the army commander. In addition, there is some question as to whether any of the tanks were otherwise occupied or undergoing repair. The list includes a total of 568 tanks and tracked assault guns (among them 19 SU-57s). According to other sources, which are also based on Soviet records (T. Sawicki, W. Wołoszyn), the 2nd Tank Army on July 17, 1944 was composed of a total of 810 armoured vehicles; (665 tanks, 145 tracked assault-guns) while on July 27, 1944, reports indicated they still possessed some 680 armoured vehicles.
1 : 3 · Tank warfare outside Praga
July 29 — August 6, 1944
On the morning of July 29, tanks from the 3rd Tank Corps under the command of General Nikolaj Vjedjenjejev resumed their northward offensive. From the east, they had gone around elements of the 73rd Infantry-Division, which were retreating towards Warsaw, and cut off the main roadway towards Siedlce between Mińsk Mazowiecki and Kałuszyn. This accomplished, the corps’ tank brigades once again headed west and reached the Stanisławów-region. General Vjedjenjejev then sent out reconnaissance patrols in the direction of Tłuszcz. That evening, the 3rd Tank Corps’ advance troops cut off the railway line between Warsaw and Białystok.
East of the 3rd Tank Corps along the Wisła, units from General Ivan Dubovoj’s 16th Tank Corps went on the offensive. These were probably the same tank troops from the corps who had, on or about this time, destroyed the German armoured train nr. 74 along the stretch between Otwock and Pogorzel Warsaw (It may also have been tanks from the 109th Tank Brigade). But following immediately behind the 3rd Tank Corps, General Aleksiej Popov’s 8th Tank Guards Corps also rolled northwards and, at the same time, secured the tank army’s right flank. On July 29, this corps reached Mińsk Mazowiecki.
The Germans tried to assemble their combat forces as quickly as possible for Generalfeldmarschall Model’s counter-attack. That day, responsibility for the defence of Praga was placed on Lt. General Dietrich von Saucken’s XXXIX Panzer-Corps, which had been deployed there from the 4th Army, which at that time was being reconstructed in Lithuania. Under Von Saucken’s command were the 19th Panzer-Division and the Parachute-Panzer-Division “Herman Göring.” His greatest problem was the all too real shortage of combat forces. General Hans Källner’s 19th Panzer-Division had just begun to move in the direction of Warsaw, starting out from the northeast near Wysków. Moreover, this force didn’t mount to a full formation since the transport of the Panzergrenadier-Regiment 73 and the division’s artillery from Holland had not yet been completed. By July 29, only one of these Kamfgruppe had actually arrived in the area around Praga, almost certainly strengthened by a couple of tanks from Panzergrenadier-Battalion “Panther.” The rest of the formation was expected to arrive over the coming days.
The situation for division “Herman Göring” was far from ideal. They were forced to transport General Schmalz’s force in, all told, 72 railway coaches As a result of Soviet bombing raids on the capital city’s railway stations, large sections of the division, tanks included, were off-loaded outside the city in Pruszków and Piastów — after which, these units were reassembled in Warsaw’s western suburbs, from where they then made their way to Praga. The outcome of this, given the limited capacity of the suburbs’ railway stations; was that off-loading became an excessively drawn-out process. The first units from Division “Herman Gorimg” to turn up in Warsaw arrived on July 25, and on the following day they began to demonstratively drive through the city. An intention of this, of course, was to make a psychological impression on the city’s citizens. To a certain extent, this also appears to have been the case.
On July 30, the units of the Fallschirm-Flak-Regiment “Herman Göring”, arrived in Praga, along with elements of the Fallschirm-Panzer-Artillerie-Regiment “Herman Göring”, Pionier-Bataillon and Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung. The march through Warsaw of the most vital force, that is to say — the Fallschirm-Panzer-Regiment “Herman Göring” and two parachute panzer-grenadier regiments, (Fallschirm-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 1&2), was, on the other hand, decidedly disoriented. The panzer regiment had arrived in a weakened state because as late as July 3, on special orders from Hitler, a portion of I Battalion’s personnel had been sent to Holland to equip the forces sent there with the new “Panther” tanks. The result of this was that the first vehicles to roll into battle were the Tiger tanks of the III Battalion, whose 10th Company received support from infantry troops out of the 73rd Infantry-Division, which was retreating from the area around Siennica. The following day, the company covered the infantry’s withdrawal south of Sulejówek, and a portion of the III Battalion became involved in fighting near Pogorzela. At the same time, the Fallschirm-Panzergrenadier-Regiment I, supported by artillery, consolidated with units from the II Panzer-Abteilung outside of Marki prior to the planned counter-attack, while Fallschirm-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 2 was still in route to the front.
General von Vormann was still counting on support from the 6th Luftflotte and two grenadier brigades. The Luftwaffe had at its disposal a vast number of anti-aircraft batteries from the 80th Regiment in the Warsaw region — everything ranging from units armed with light 20mm calibre weapons, to heavy 88mm artillery guns. All told, this mounted to 19 heavy batteries, 3 medium-heavy batteries and 11 light batteries. In addition to these resources, based at nearby airfields were Ju 87D bombers from 1 Gruppe in 1 Staffel out of the SG 1 (Schlachtgeschwader 1) and the 4th Flieger-Division in the 77th StG (Sturzkampfgeschwader), along with Bf 109G fighter planes from the 1 Gruppe from JG 51 (Jagdgeschwader 51). These were not especially impressive combat planes, but — thanks to the extensive distance separating Soviet airfields from the field of battle — the German planes had a local advantage in the air over the battle area outside Warsaw. Now and then, the 6th Luftflotte also took advantage of its greater strength in air battles, but they continued to concentrate most of their air power and superiority on supporting the 2nd Army. This, for the Germans, favourable balance of air power over the Warsaw area was not to change radically until the second week of August.