Among the tools that conflict parties can use in order to enforce the feminization/subjugation of individuals belonging to the “other” side and, by extension, to suggest the feminization of the whole “other” group, sexual violence, against both men and women, occupies a choice position. While it enacts the feminization/subjugation of the victim, sexual violence also entails a parallel masculinization/empowerment of the perpetrator. Such process has been described by Jones in the case of male-on-male rape: “One of the most intriguing elements of male-on-male rape and sexual violence is the gendered positioning of rapist and victim: the way in which victims are feminized while rapists are confirmed in their heterosexual, hegemonic masculinity” (2006, 459). Though I don’t think the concept of hegemonic masculinity applies in cases of perpetrators of wartime sexual violence against men,[1] it is clear that the figure of combatant that is glorified through these practices is that of an extremely violent man, who intends to dominate physically, sexually, but also psychologically all the people, whatever their gender identity, he is in contact with. It is, however, important to underscore that if the gendered performativity of sexual violence contributes to (re-)imposing a certain gender order thanks to the subjugation of its victims, the twin processes of victims’ feminization and of perpetrators’ masculinization are not its necessary outcome. Rather, feminization and masculinization occur because of the existing gendered norms with which sexual violence resonates, and the way they structure gender relations. In other words, sexual violence seems to feminize the victim and to empower the perpetrator only because many of us—including most of the victims and of the perpetrators—adhere to the equation that is often made between, on the one hand, femininity/weakness/passivity/women and, on the other hand, masculinity/power/agency/men.
The gendered performativity of sexual violence highlights the limits of the division usually made between male and female survivors of sexual violence. The enforced feminization of male victims of sexual violence, alongside the fact that some perpetrators are female, demonstrates, as other studies have shown (see, for example, the case of travestis explored by Andrea Cornwall 1994), the absence of a direct link between the fact of being a man—in the sense of living in a male body—and the fact of having a masculine identity. It calls for a renewed understanding of (wartime) sexual violence, which would be more focused on masculinities and femininities than on the sex of its victims and perpetrators. Wartime sexual violence against men is embedded in the same patriarchal principles that underpin sexual violence against women, and both are part of a repertoire of violence that simultaneously produces, and is produced by, a certain social order. As such, wartime sexual violence is an interpersonal type of violence that connects the individual, group, societal, institutional and even international levels.
Further, it appears that wartime sexual violence is not just the product of the war situation but has to be understood as a continuation and an exacerbation of violence occurring in peacetime in various social institutions, and that tightly connects various norms, practices and values that support and legitimize the social order. Vojdik (2014, 927) has notably highlighted how sexual violence is part of a continuum of violence against both male and female bodies that occurs well beyond the specific settings of conflicts and wars. So while conflict-related sexual violence is as much about feminizing/subjugating the victim than about masculinizing/empowering the perpetrator, it is also meant to recast a social order in a context of tensions around who owns the State, the economic resources, etc. As such, it resonates with the structural violence of intersecting gendered, ethnic, racial and socio-economic hierarchies.
Looking at the wider context is thus key for understanding the relations of power from which sexual violence emanates, but also to which it gives birth. Wartime sexual violence usually occurs alongside numerous other types of physical violence, fed by an increased availability and circulation of weapons, and by an extreme militarization of societies. In addition, as shown by Enloe (1983), one of the reasons for the intensification of sexual violence during conflicts relates to the amplified polarization of gender roles, and to the disruption of traditional gender norms. In a context where displays of militarized masculinity become not just widespread, but also normalized, traditional masculinity models, often based on the performance of familial breadwinning functions, are weakened. Further, the destruction of local economies, the unweaving of social, communal and cultural ties entailed by displacement, killings and forced enrolment, considerably hamper the attainment of such masculinity models. And in contexts where traditional means to achieve masculinity are unavailable or extremely difficult to secure, physical violence turns out to be a key resource for enacting masculinity (Messerschmidt 1993). Sexual violence thus becomes one of the means—it is, of course, not the only one, which explains why sexual violence is not perpetrated in all conflict settings, and by all conflict actors—to (re-)assert one’s masculinity and one’s place in the gendered social hierarchy.
How does this all play out in the case of sexual violence against men? Simply put, male sexual victimization effectively undermines the masculinity of the victim, through an attack on what is supposed to epitomize it in most cultures, that is, male sexual organs. Simultaneously, it (re-)asserts the masculinity, power and control of the perpetrator, including when the perpetrator is a woman. As an apparently transgressive act that bears all the characteristics of a “runaway norm that overtakes cultural, religious, or legal thresholds” (Leatherman 2011, 29), wartime sexual violence against men seems to push the limits of horror ever further, with regards to the type of violence inflicted (gang rape, bestiality, castration, mutilation and so forth), to the targets of violence (civilians, helpless prisoners, boys, old men and others), and to the agency of violence (publicity, prisoners forced to rape other prisoners, fathers or sons forced to rape their male and female close relatives, and so on). This is of course not to suggest that wartime sexual violence against women is any less horrible, but that, because of the existing gender norms and representations, the sexual victimization of men is widely seen as more taboo, as more transgressive, and, therefore, as less tolerable. Overtaking thresholds accompanies feminization to (re-)establish hierarchies between masculinities, in a context where violence and sexual violence against women are likely to be widespread, and thus not “enough” as a stand-alone action to signal one’s power and to distinguish oneself. Thereby, perpetrators of wartime sexual violence against men (re-)affirm their masculine domination, and emulate a “new” and more “powerful” model of masculinity. The performativity of wartime sexual violence against men is enhanced by the fact that the conflict context produces, and is produced by, empowered but also highly vulnerable masculinities: in particular, a powerful male soldier can lose his place in the conflict setting if he becomes victim of rape or of other forms of sexual violence, because his status is tightly connected to his ability to enact a strong masculinity model, and to abide by heterosexual norms. So male sexual victimization can be understood both as a masculinization/feminization performance, and as a reiteration of heteronormativity, just like in the case of sexual violence against women (Alison 2007, 77).
1
As we will explore further, the extreme displays of violence, transgression and breaking of taboos entailed in the perpetration of sexual violence against men are not likely to gain broad social acceptance.