Nor was there was any unity of command in Sevastopol during the critical days after Ishun. Instead, the newly formed Sevastopol City Defense Committee (Komitet oborana Sevastopolya or KOS) headed by SimferopolCommunist Party boss Boris A. Borisov concerned itself with local defense measures directed by the party, while the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet (Voyenniy Sovyet Chernomorskogo flota), normally headed by Oktyabrsky, was temporarily headed by his deputy Rear-Admiral Gavrill B. Zhukov, who did little more than proclaim the city to be in a “state of siege.” Yet not everyone in Sevastopol lost their heads. Colonel Pavel P. Gorpishchenko, an iron-willed instructor at the Black Sea Fleet’s Mine Warfare School, formed an ad hoc defense unit from his cadets, then began recruiting sailors from several dry-docked warships in Sevastopol. In short order, Gorpishchenko organized several thousand armed sailors under his command, which was designated as the 1st Naval Infantry Regiment. The 6ft-tall Gorpishchenko was an experienced combat veteran of the Russian Civil War and a charismatic leader who instilled confidence in his sailors-turned-infantrymen. Three other naval infantry battalions, numbered 15, 16, and 17, were formed on October 29 from naval reservists, crewmen from ships under repair, and VVS base personnel. Soon thereafter, 18th and 19th Battalions were formed as well. General-Major Petr A. Morgunov, commander of all the coastal artillery batteries around Sevastopol, did not have the option of running, and put his batteries on full alert to fire on any approaching enemy ground forces.
Just as Oktyabrsky was leaving Sevastopol, the lead elements of Colonel Vladimir L. Vilshansky’s 8th Naval Infantry Brigade were arriving on the cruiser Krasny Krim from Novorossiysk. Vilshansky’s brigade was made up entirely of naval reservists, most of whom had not yet gone through basic training. His brigade had no artillery and very few automatic weapons. Upon arriving at Sevastopol, Vilshansky was met by Rear-Admiral Zhukov, who ordered him to concentrate his brigade at the Mekenzievy Mountain (named after Thomas Mackenzie, who founded Sevastopol in 1783) railroad station 2½ miles north of Sevastopol. By 1600hrs on October 30, Vilshansky had assembled 3,744 sailors from his brigade, and Zhukov ordered him to occupy a position behind the Kacha River near the town of Duvankoi to block the approaches to Sevastopol from the north.[15] Zhukov also dispatched 16th and 17th Naval Infantry Battalions and a training battalion north to form a blocking position at the Kacha River bridge to delay Brigade Ziegler from moving down the Simferopol–Sevastopol road. The black-clad sailors marched to these positions during the night of October 30/31 and by November 1 Zhukov had a thin screen of fewer than 6,000 sailors, armed mostly with rifles, protecting the approaches to Sevastopol. However, many of the sailors were equipped with AVS-36 automatic or SVT-38 semi-automatic rifles, which provided more firepower than standard bolt-action rifles. Ziegler’s troops were surprised when they were assembling to attack the Kacha River bridge and came under fire from Coastal Battery No. 30’s 305mm guns; the Soviets claimed that they inflicted very heavy casualties upon the German vanguard, but German records indicate approximately 35–40 casualties and that five trucks were lost.[16]
Without air or naval support and their command and control gone, the Red Army units in the Crimea scattered like a flock of birds. The only intact unit was Colonel Evgeny I. Zhidilov’s 7th Naval Infantry Brigade, which had marched from Sevastopol to Simferopol. Zhidilov was an experienced combat veteran who had participated in the Soviet conquest of the Crimea in 1920, and his naval infantrymen were among the best Soviet troops in the Crimea. Yet by the morning of October 31, Ziegler’s motorized columns had already blocked the Simferopol–Sevastopol road and captured Bakhchisaray, cutting off Zhidilov’s brigade and Petrov’s Coastal Army. Lieutenant Ivan A. Eaika’s Coastal Battery No. 54, located north of the Kacha River, fired several rounds of 102mm fire at Ziegler’s motorized column, but without effect.[17] On the same day, Aufklärungs-Abteilung 132 captured Yevpatoriya, thereby cutting off most of the 321st Rifle Division. Zhidilov’s brigade put up a brief fight against the vanguard of the 72. Infanterie-Division north of Simferopol but then joined Petrov’s herd of retreating units, trying to evade the German dragnet by heading southeast through the Crimean Mountains to Alushta. The last three T-34 tanks were abandoned in Simferopol due to lack of fuel, as well as many other vehicles. By the end of the day, the 72. Infanterie-Division had occupied Simferopol. Before leaving Simferopol, however, the NKVD executed a number of prisoners, mostly Tatars or people with foreign heritage, who had been rounded up in September as part of the effort to clear the Crimea of “enemies of the people.”[18]
After the fall of Dzhankoy, Sponeck’s XXXXII Armeekorps continued pursuing the 51st Army toward the Kerch Peninsula, while Salmuth’s XXX Armeekorps veered southward to pursue Petrov and clear the Black Sea coast. The Romanian 1st Mountain Brigade succeeded in getting across the Chongar Peninsula and also pushed directly south for the Black Sea. Hansen’s LIV Armeekorps advanced more slowly toward the northern approaches of Sevastopol with just the 50. and 132. Infanterie-Divisionen, while Salmuth sent the 72. Infanterie-Division on a wide sweep through the mountains to seize Yalta and then approach Sevastopol from the east along the coast road. The shortage of water had a major impact in slowing the German pursuit, particularly since the bulk of the artillery and supplies in the infantry divisions were dependent upon horse-drawn transport. Nevertheless, Gottlob H. Bidermann, then serving as an enlisted Panzerjäger in the 132. Infanterie-Division, noted that his division succeeded in marching over 30 miles per day during the pursuit phase.[19]
Although Manstein preferred a rapid descent upon Sevastopol, his forces were simply not structured for rapid-pursuit operations. Neither the 50. nor 72. Infanterie-Division possessed a reconnaissance battalion, which was usually the basis for forming a Vorausabteilung (vanguard battalion) for pursuit operations. Instead, they were forced to form Vorausabteilungen from the motorized Panzerjäger and infantry-gun companies organic to infantry regiments, which barely amounted to 200–300 troops in a few dozen thin-skinned vehicles. Aside from Ziegler’s provisional brigade, Hansen’s only other fast asset was Aufklärungs-Abteilung 132, which was split between clearing the area around Yevpatoriya and advancing toward Sevastopol. At best, an Aufklärungs-Abteilung in an infantry division had about 600 troops in three squadrons, including one mounted on horses and another on bicycles or motorcycles. The battalion’s so-called “heavy squadron” had just three light armored cars, usually Sd. Kfz. 221, and a platoon each of towed 3.7cm Pak guns and 7.5cm infantry guns. These forces were not designed to punch through fortified lines or to operate more than 6 miles forward of supporting infantry and artillery.
It is a sad truth that war is very good to some people. Leutnant Erich Bärenfänger, the 26-year-old commander of 7. Kompanie of IR 123, was enjoying the pursuit. He was part of the Vorausabteilung of the 50. Infanterie-Division, and when the senior officer was wounded on the morning of November 2, Bärenfänger assumed command of the advance guard, which consisted of two rifle companies and a heavy-machine-gun platoon. The blond-haired, blue-eyed Bärenfänger was the prototypical Nazi, who had joined the SA at age 18 and received his commission just before the start of World War II. By the Crimean campaign, Bärenfänger already had three campaigns under his belt and he enjoyed a meteoric rise during the war, going from platoon leader to Generalmajor in six years. Pushing his troops to advance rapidly on their bicycles, horses, and a few captured vehicles, Bärenfänger’s point squad caught up with the rear of one of Petrov’s columns north of the Alma River on the afternoon of November 2. Imprudently, one Russian heavy-weapons column, with five trucks and 80 horse-drawn vehicles, halted to rest near a village without deploying proper security. Once apprised of their location by his scouts, Bärenfänger expertly maneuvered his companies into firing positions without being detected. When Bärenfänger gave the command to fire with all weapons, his heavy machine guns sliced into the enemy column, which disintegrated into chaos. By the end of the short action, Bärenfänger had captured an entire eight-gun artillery battery and 500 prisoners.[20]
15
Vladimir L. Vilshansky, “Na ognyevom rubezhye” [On the Shooting Range] in Petr Ye. Garmash (ed.),
16
Ia, VII, Beilagenheft zum Kriegstagebuch Nr. 4, “
17
F. Perechnev and F. Vinogradov,
18
Alan W. Fisher,
19
Gottlob H. Bidermann,
20
Franz Kurowski,