Hauptmann Werner Streck was a 30-year-old reserve officer who had just returned from home leave in Germany after being wounded for the fourth time, and found himself placed in command of Feldersatz Bataillon 81 (FEB 81); this was a 1,500-man replacement unit divided in four companies and armed only with small arms and light machine guns. Streck’s battalion was holding the west end of the Tatar Wall and he moved quickly to seal off Lebdev’s breakthrough as best he could. A small counterattack even managed to capture a few prisoners at the Tatar Wall, who revealed important details about the Soviet forces en route to Perekop.[8] Streck and a few other replacement battalions managed to patch together a new front around the Soviet breakthrough, while waiting for three battalions from the 50. Infanterie-Division to arrive.
While the Germans had won the race to block the three traditional entrances into the Crimea, they were too late to protect the coastline along the Sivash. Lieutenant-Colonel Polikarp E. Kuznetsov, chief of intelligence of Generalmajor Konstantin P. Neverov’s 10th Rifle Corps, had been tasked by General-Lieutenant Kreizer to find useable fords across the Sivash. Due to wind and tidal conditions, the Sivash was very unpredictable. Gathering up 30 volunteers, Kuznetsov began reconnoitering the coastline, and had the good fortune to find a local fisherman who identified a crossing site from the mainland to Cape Dzhangar. Kuznetsov sent three scouts across the 1½-mile-wide stretch of muddy water, which was ankle deep, and they confirmed the fisherman’s information. The next morning (November 1), Kuznetsov led his small detachment across the Sivash at 1000hrs. It was slow going, and it took the men nearly two hours to cross the muck, but they made it to the opposite shore and Kuznetsov lit a signal fire to alert Neverov’s 10th Rifle Corps to begin crossing. Major P. F. Kaymakova was the first to cross with a battalion of the 1168th Rifle Regiment and the rest of the 346th Rifle Division soon crossed as well, followed by the 216th and 257th Rifle Divisions. Nesterov’s troops could not use rubber boats because the water was too shallow and the soldiers had to cross the Sivash on foot, with linked arms to avoid becoming stuck in the mud. A few heavy weapons were brought across on shallow-draft pontoons, including some 45mm antitank guns, but the troops were mostly limited to what they could carry. There were no Axis troops within 3 miles of the crossing site, and even though it began in broad daylight, the enemy was ignorant of the Soviet crossing of the Sivash for hours.[9]
As Nesterov’s 10th Rifle Corps crossed the Sivash, Kuznetsov pushed on ahead and captured a German officer in his staff car, who had been sent to select positions for the Romanian Gruppe Balan, en route to guard the Sivash coast. By the time that the Romanians began to arrive, Nesterov’s corps had already seized a large bridgehead on the southern side of the Sivash. Two ad hoc German formations, Gruppe Grote and Gruppe Beetz, were detached to reinforce the Romanian blocking force and to seal off the Soviet bridgehead at Cape Dzhangar. Since Nesterov’s troops had no tanks and a small number of mortars, they had only a limited ability to attack until pontoon bridges could be built across the Sivash. The handful of Romanian mountain-infantry battalions, along with a sprinkling of German replacement troops, was able to build a screen around Nesterov’s beachhead for the moment. It would take Nesterov more than two weeks to organize and supply his forces, by which point the German 336. Infanterie-Division had reinforced the Romanians. Colonel Petr G. Panchevsky’s 12th Assault Engineer Brigade was brought up to build a pontoon bridge across the Sivash, but the task proved exceedingly difficult and the bridge was not completed until December 9, 1943.
More Soviet units began to arrive in front of Perekop on November 2, including Colonel Peter S. Arkhipov’s 79th Tank Brigade and the rest of General-Major Boris S. Millerov’s 10th Guards Cavalry Division. The Soviets mounted another attack at 1400hrs against the center of the Tatar Wall with 30 tanks and 2,000 troops; they succeeded in getting both troops and tanks across the ditch. German flak guns knocked out four tanks and inflicted “bloody losses” on the attackers, but the Soviets succeeded in pushing a large salient into the center of the German defenses.[10] The next day, Millerov sent another 1,000 dismounted cavalrymen across the Tatar Wall, along with more tanks. However, by November 3, Pickert had brought up several 8.8cm flak batteries to reinforce the defense and Gruppe Konrad had arrived with seven StuG IIIs from 2./Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung and additional infantry. Luftflotte 4 was able to commit Stukas for ground-support missions at Perekop, despite intense Soviet air opposition, which enabled Gruppe Weber to stabilize their defense at Perekop by November 4. German flak and antitank troops claimed to have knocked out about 80 Soviet tanks at Perekop between November 1 and November 4, although Pickert’s flak gunners had suffered considerable losses, including five 8.8cm and four 2cm guns. When Stalin found out that the Soviet breakthrough at Perekop was not exploited in a timely manner, he had General-Lieutenant Nikolai Kirichenko relieved of command of the 4th Guards Cavalry Corps for failing to move up his troops quickly enough. Oddly, Vasil’ev, commander of the 19th Tank Corps, was awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union for the breakthrough at Perekop, although he had been slow to get the rest of his corps into the fight.
On November 6, reinforcements from the 50. Infanterie-Division had finally reached Gruppe Weber, and the Germans began an all-out attack against the Soviet salient from east, west, and south with six battalions. Although the Germans were able to recover the ancient Fort Perekop near the center of the line, they suffered very heavy losses and could not eliminate the Soviet salient. Hauptmann Streck, leading his FEB 81, was wounded for a fifth time, and this time he was sent home permanently – with the Ritterkreuz in recognition of his role in saving the line at Perekop. On November 7, Gruppe Weber shifted back to the defense and the front at Perekop stabilized, as it already had at Chongar and on the Arabat Spit. Although probing attacks would occur regularly, the front line settled into static, positional warfare for the next five months with little change. Gruppe Sixt from the 50. Infanterie-Division eventually took over the defenses at Perekop, while Gruppe Weber and the 336. Infanterie-Division took over the Sivash and Chongar sectors. The Axis had been extremely lucky, particularly at Perekop, but AOK 17 had been granted a temporary reprieve. However, AOK 17 was now isolated in the Crimea and completely dependent upon naval supply across the Black Sea from Romanian ports. Furthermore, just as the Axis were fending off this series of probing attacks by Tolbukhin’s 4th Ukrainian Front, they also had to confront an old, more familiar crisis – Petrov’s troops were crossing the Kerch Straits.
Jaenecke assigned General der Infanterie Karl Allmendinger’s V Armeekorps to defend the eastern Kerch Peninsula, although this was a very threadbare formation consisting solely of Generaleutnant Martin Gareis’s tired 98. Infanterie-Division. Gareis’ division had four battalions guarding 61 miles of coastline, with another four battalions in reserve.[11] Allmendinger had very little artillery support, but he had one ace up his sleeve: Hauptman Alfred Müller’s veteran Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 191, which had racked up an impressive combat record during the defensive fighting in the Kuban.[12] In addition, the Romanian Cavalry Corps was subordinated to Allmendinger’s, but only the 6th Cavalry Division and part of the 3rd Mountain Division were in the eastern Kerch Peninsula. Allmendinger could count on a fair amount of support from the Kriegsmarine in coastal defense, although German naval leaders wanted to conserve their strength for an evacuation operation. Luftflotte 4 still had about 185 combat aircraft in the Crimea, including 84 He-111H bombers in three Gruppen, 33 Bf-109G in I./JG 52, and 63 ground attack aircraft in II./StG 2 and III./SG3. All of the ground-attack aircraft were at Bagerovo airfield, within easy reach of potential landing beaches in the Kerch Peninsula. The Germans knew that Soviet amphibious capabilities were very limited due to heavy losses over the past two years, so Jaenecke was not particularly concerned about a Soviet attack across the Kerch Strait just yet. However, the Red Army did not always play by the book, and the Stavka was insistent that Petrov mount an amphibious operation at the same time as Tolbukhin’s forces reached Perekop and Chongar.
8
lc, Gefangenenvernehmung, AOK 17, November 1, 1943, NAM (National Archives Microfilm), Series T-312, Roll 741.
9
Anatoly N. Grylev,
10
Ic, Tatigkeitsbericht, Verteidigung der Nordzugange zur Krim, XXXXIX Gebirgs-Korps, October 30 – December 31, 1943, NAM (National Archives Microfilm), Series T-314, Roll 1226.
11
la, Anlage 1 z. KTB Nr. 8, Kriegsgliederungen der Armee, AOK 17, Oct 12–Dec 11, 1943, NAM (National Archives Microfilm), Series T-312, Roll 738.
12
Franz Kurowski,