General-Colonel Petrov had begun planning for a crossing operation over the Kerch Strait just three days after the last elements of AOK 17 evacuated the Kuban. His basic plan was to transport elements of the 18th and 56th Armies simultaneously across the strait and seize beachheads north and south of Kerch – which was quite similar to the December 1941 landing operation. Unfortunately, neither Gorshkov’s Azov Flotilla nor the Black Sea Fleet had the resources to mount a proper amphibious landing, and from the start, the operation later known as the “Kerch-Eltigen landing” was run on a shoestring and was more dependent upon luck than logistics. Relatively little shipping was available in the Caucasus and it consisted primarily of trawlers, fishing boats, tug boats, and barges. Gorshkov’s flotilla could provide coastal minesweepers, motor torpedo boats, and various gunboats. Amazingly, after three years of war, the Soviet Navy still did not have a proper landing craft available, particularly one that could transport tanks or heavy artillery. Nor did they have anything in the Black Sea comparable to the German MFPs. While the Western Allies did provide over 500 DUKW amphibious trucks that would have been perfect for crossing the Kerch Strait, they were sent elsewhere. Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevsky, chief of the Soviet General Staff, opposed Petrov’s under-resourced amphibious operation across the Kerch Strait since he assessed it as too risky, and instead advocated concentrating all effort against the northern entrances to the Crimea, but he was overruled.
While Gorshkov and Vice-Admiral Lev Vladimirsky gathered up all the available shipping, Petrov positioned virtually all the artillery from the 56th Army – over 400 guns – on the narrow Chushka Spit to support the main landing near Yenikale. A smaller artillery group with 50 howitzers from the 18th Army was deployed on the lower Taman Peninsula to assist the secondary landings at Eltigen. Petrov intended to first make his main landing with the 56th Army near Yenikale, northeast of Kerch, on October 31, but this effort was delayed due to a bungled loading process by the Azov Flotilla. Another effort on the morning of November 1 was aborted due to unexpected losses to enemy mines. Instead, the 18th Army’s secondary landing at Eltigen was the only one ready to go on the morning of November 1. Colonel A. D. Shiryaev’s 137th Rifle Regiment from the 318th Mountain Rifle Division loaded at Krotovka on the lower Taman Peninsula throughout the night of October 31/November 1 and proceeded into the Kerch Strait around 0100hrs in six small landing flotillas. Each vessel loaded as many troops as it could carry on its deck, and none of the Soviet troops were issued life jackets or any form of flotation device. Off Cape Panajia, the Soviet flotillas ran into a German minefield that sank two vessels, killing over 200 troops, including Shiryaev and most of his regimental staff. The Soviet formations became disordered in the darkness, and the different speeds of vessels – some troops were even rowing across in longboats – pulled the formations apart. In mid-crossing, the flotilla encountered the German K-12 barrage, which had 120 moored contact mines – causing several more Soviet vessels to blow up. Although the Germans had several coastal batteries from Marine-Artillerie-Abteilung 613 to cover the straits, they did not notice the explosions. The Kriegsmarine also had several S-Boats on alert, but none near the straits. Despite heavy losses, the battered Soviet flotillas continued their crossing.
Petrov’s staff had selected the sandy beach at Eltigen, south of the previous landing site of Kamysh Burun used in 1941, to land the assault elements of the 318th Rifle Division and the 386th Naval Infantry Battalion. Around 0330hrs, seven I-15 and two I-153 fighter-bombers from the VVS-ChF’s 62 IAP strafed and bombed the beach area around Eltigen. Two Il-4 bombers also dropped incendiary bombs near the beach to provide a beacon for the landing force. At 0420hrs, the artillery support group on the lower Taman Peninsula opened a 35-minute artillery preparation against the opposing shore. This would have been a good time for the Black Sea Fleet’s cruisers and destroyers to make an appearance and provide naval gunfire support, but the Stalin edict after the disaster of October 6, 1943, found them restricted to base. At 0450hrs, the first vessels approached the beaches at Eltigen. Due to lack of proper reconnaissance, Petrov’s staff had failed to note that there was a sandbar located about 50 yards from the shore, and the first wave of troops began disembarking on the sand bar. When they enthusiastically rushed forward in the darkness, troops fell into 3 yards of deep water, and many heavily laden soldiers drowned. Initially, there was no resistance, but the surf was rough and made beaching difficult. By 0505hrs, small groups of troops had made it to the beach, which was covered with barbed-wire obstacles, but no Germans fired on them. Most soldiers arrived on the beach in the dark with only their personal weapon, and in small squad-size gaggles.
The beach around Eltigen was guarded by 5. Kompanie from II./Grenadier-Regiment 282, but its level of alertness was woefully inadequate. It took about 15 minutes before they realized that there was activity on the beaches. Finally, someone noticed something and called for artillery to fire illumination rounds over the straits at 0520hrs. The flares revealed dozens of Soviet craft on the water, which provoked a barrage of German artillery fire. The 2. Batterie of Marine-Artillerie-Abteilung 613, with four 17cm cannon, was located a mile southwest of the Soviet landing, and it began firing large-caliber rounds into the flimsy Soviet flotillas. The coastal artillerymen inflicted tremendous losses on the landing force, including sinking the barges carrying the artillery battalion’s 12 76mm guns. Nevertheless, the Soviets managed to land enough troops to secure a lodgment, and a battalion from the 1339th Rifle Regiment and the 386th Naval Infantry Battalion managed to overrun a battery of two Romanian 75mm howitzers on the northern end of the beachhead. Another Soviet battalion from the 1331st Rifle Regiment landed too far south, near the German 17cm gun battery, but the Germans could not see the troops on the beach in front of them due to cliffs, and the Soviet troops marched along the shoreline to link up with the main landing force. Once the sun rose, the Soviets were forced to suspend further landings at Eltigen until the next night. It is estimated that no more than 2,900 Soviet troops landed at Eltigen out of 5,700 dispatched, and that only a few 45mm antitank guns and mortars reached the shore. At least one-third of the landing craft were sunk or damaged, and hundreds of troops had drowned.[13]
13
Andrei Kuznetsov,