In addition to partisan attacks, the Soviet VVS formations used their substantial superiority in air power to wear down the Axis forces in the Crimea with almost daily air attacks. Soviet bombers, mostly DB-3s and Pe-2s, began appearing over Sevastopol and Feodosiya in squadron-size strength in November 1943 and regularly pounded the harbor facilities, warehouses, and airfields. By December 1943, Luftflotte 4 decided to pull most of its bombers out of the Crimea, and then the Fliegerkorps I headquarters, which transferred to Romania. Oberst Joachim Bauer was left in charge of the remaining fighters and ground-attack aircraft based in the Crimea. Barkhorn’s II./JG 52 was blessed with an incredibly skilled cadre of Experten – 11 of its pilots had scored over 40 victories and three had over 100 – which enabled them to fend off an enemy who enjoyed a 10-1 numerical superiority over the Crimea.[22] Hauptman Werner Dörnback’s II./SG-2, equipped with Fw-190F ground-attack fighters, also played a critical role in defeating Soviet probes against the Crimea’s defenses during the winter of 1943/44. For his part, Hitler attempted to live up to his pledge that the forces in the Crimea would continue to receive adequate replacements, and Bauer’s squadrons received 120 replacement aircraft during the winter, while losing a similar number. Yet VVS strength had grown so overwhelming by the onset of spring 1944 that even the best Luftwaffe units, equipped with the best aircraft and flown by the best pilots, could no longer delay the inevitable.
Both sides used the winter to prepare for the battles in the spring. In January, the Soviets completed another bridge across the Sivash, capable of of handling tanks and heavy artillery. The Soviet lodgment across the Sivash was a miserable, muddy place, with cold winds and completely flat terrain. Troops could not dig trenches because the ground consisted of clay soaked with salty brine, making them particularly vulnerable to German artillery and air attacks. Troops remained cold and wet for days, leading to trench foot. General-Major Peter K. Koshevoi, commander of the 63rd Rife Corps, arrived in the lodgment and was shocked by the conditions:
Soon, the army commander [Kreizer] went with me to the south bank of the Sivash in order to get acquainted with the situation in the bridgehead. Here the picture was quite bleak. There was not a tree or bush… Around us stretched a boundless steppe as flat as a table and a drained white expanse of shallow salt lakes. There were not even any weeds visible. Only here and there was a sparse tuft of reddish-gray sage. We could see all the way to the horizon. It seemed that the troops were completely open to enemy observation and fire. To the south of our front line the enemy was located on ancient Scythian burial mounds … and our scouts have repeatedly noticed the gleaming glass of binoculars. Nor were there any sources of fresh water in the bridghead.[23]
The Germans were indeed watching and listening. German radio intercepts enabled Jaenecke to keep up with Soviet developments. He knew that Koshevoi’s 63rd Rifle Corps had reinforced the 10th Rifle Corps in the Sivash lodgment and that Petrov’s Coastal Army near Kerch was reinforced to eight rifle divisions and two tank brigades, with 75,000 troops and 80 tanks.[24] Jaenecke did succeed in rebuilding AOK 17’s units to some extent, although the overall balance was now so unfavorable that even full-strength units would have difficulty holding the Crimea. One of his efforts to create more effective combat units was the authorization of Gebirgs-Jäger-Regiment Krim (GJRK) in late March 1944; this three-battalion unit was formed under Major Walter Kopp from FEB 94 and FEB 125, plus remnants of the 4. Gebirgs-Division stranded in the Crimea.[25] Kopp’s regiment was assigned to Allmendinger’s V Armeekorps to provide it a real reserve, in case of more Soviet landings on the coast.
German intelligence estimates believed it was possible that the Soviets would attempt more amphibious landings on the Crimean coast when spring came, but concluded that the most dangerous threat was a breakout attack from their Sivash bridgehead, followed by an outflanking maneuver against the Perekop position. Although a German retreat to Ishun might have reduced this threat, Hitler refused to authorize any more withdrdawals in the Crimea. Instead, Jaenecke’s staff used the winter to begin work on a fallback position known as the Gneisenau Line, to protect the approaches to Sevastopol in case of a Soviet breakout from the Sivash, but this effort received little priority. By spring 1944, the Gneisenau Line consisted of seven company-size Stützpunkt, each armed with a few antitank guns and Romanian howitzers – at best, a delaying position.[26] Jaenecke and his chief of staff, Generalmajor Wolfdietrich Ritter von Xylander, also worked on a variety of evacuation schemes, renamed first Litzmann, then Rudderboot, then Gleiterboot, then Adler.[27] All these plans were designed to organize an emergency Dunkirk-style evacuation from the Crimea once an all-out Soviet offensive began in order to save as much of AOK 17 as possible, but they remained little more than staff studies since Hitler would not authorize an evacuation. Holding the Crimea was more important to him than the risk to AOK 17.
CHAPTER 9
German Defeat in the Crimea, 1944
“History shows that there are no invincible armies.”
Once spring weather arrived, the German goose in the Crimea was pretty well cooked. Tolbukhin and Eremenko had met with Stalin in Moscow during March to discuss the Crimea, and the basic plan of attack had been decided. Zakharov’s 2nd Guards Army would mount a strong deliberate offensive against Gruppe Konrad’s defenses at Perekop, while Kreizer’s 51st Army would stage a breakout attack from its Sivash bridgehead. Once the German front was broken, Vasil’ev’s 19th Tank Corps would exploit southward to Simferopol. Eremenko’s Coastal Army was intended merely to fix Allmendinger’s V Armeekorps at Kerch during the first phase of the Crimean Offensive and then exploit the situation as circumstances permitted.[1] Compared to previous Soviet offensives, the 1944 Crimean Offensive was very well planned and coordinated. Zakharov’s troops had spent the winter months training intensively on breach operations, and were well provided with wire cutters, sapper platoons, and plenty of support weapons. On the Perekop front, the 2nd Guards Army had been busy digging approach trenches, which narrowed the width of no man’s land from 700–1,000 yards to just 150–200 yards. From their trenches, the Germans watched apprehensively as the distance narrowed.
22
Christer Bergström,
23
Peter K. Koshevoi,
24
Ic, Anlage 4 z. Tätigkeitsbericht, January 1–March 31, 1944, AOK 17, NAM (National Archives Microfilm), Series T-312, Roll 748.
25
la, Anlage 5 z. KTB Nr. 9, Besondere Vorgange, January 1–March 31, 1944, AOK 17, NAM (National Archives Microfilm), Series T-312, Roll 747.
26
Ia, Sonderband Nr. 4, z. KTB Nr. 9, Unternehmen “Gneisenau,” January 8–March 23, 1944, AOK 17, NAM (National Archives Microfilm), Series T-312, March 1944, Roll 746.
27
Ia, Sonderband Nr. 5, z. KTB Nr. 9, Unternehmen “Litzmann,” November 13–24, 1943, AOK 17, NAM (National Archives Microfilm), Series T-312, Roll 746.
1
Anatoly N. Grylev,