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When I returned to Gutsa with the second half of the squadron, drums still pounding away every night and on my very first recce flight I was astounded by the changes that had occurred during our short absence. For the first five days I flew with each crew as before. All information was plotted onto plastic sheeting laid over our original map to highlight what had changed, and where. Of particular interest to me was the emergence of four routes that started miles apart on the Zambezi River and converged in stages to a common point a few hundred yards north of the border on the west bank of the Musengezi River. Parts of these routes had been plotted during the first recce training period but the clarity and continuity of the pathways showed unmistakably that they were now carrying heavier traffic. My crews were picking up more small camps with bashas this time round, mostly tribesmen in hiding, because the dry winter conditions had substantially reduced bush cover.

Technicians at Gutsa. The high ground is a low section of the Zambezi escarpment range which in winter is dry and bare of leaf.

Having flown with every crew, my interest turned southwards into Rhodesia where I was able to follow the single route out of Mozambique southward along the Musengezi River. The route alternated from one side of the river to the other and passed Gutsa Airfield on the opposite side of the river before climbing steeply up the escarpment to where St Albert’s Mission lay a short distance behind the lip of the high ground. I was totally convinced that ZANLA terrorists were active right there.

Bruce Hulley was still at Gutsa though his company was about to be replaced. We had long discussions on my findings and Bruce said his RAR troops had noticed increased traffic on the pathway along the river but it all seemed to be from barefooted tribesmen. Nevertheless Bruce said that his troops knew something was amiss because the locals were not behaving in the co-operative and friendly manner of the past.

Since his area of responsibilities lay on the valley floor, Bruce would not release troops to go up to St Albert’s Mission to check out that area. He said, however, that his own observations had been passed to Army HQ and that Special Branch, who had also found things greatly changed, had made this known to their own HQ.

On completion of our training I went to Air HQ to make a presentation of 4 Squadron’s findings. Although all the information signalled daily was plotted on the Ops Room map, it failed to convey what I was able to give verbally with emphasis and expansion on details. In particular I stressed the fact that terrorists were active in the St Albert’s Mission area of the Kandeya Tribal Trust Land (TTL) posing an immediate and serious threat to the Centenary farmers bordering on that area.

AVM Archie Wilson took the matter up at a meeting of the OCC and suggested that the Army Commander should get troops into the suspect area to check it out. However, because neither the Army Commander nor the Head of CIO knew of any reports from their own men, the matter was held over for the Prime Minister’s forthcoming National Defence Council Meeting.

At this meeting the results of 4 Squadron’s reconnaissance findings were presented, with stress given to my belief that terrorists had been active in the St Albert’s Mission for some time. The Army, Police and CIO agreed that the area should be checked without delay. But the Prime Minister wanted to know why the Department of Internal Affairs (INTAF), which was responsible for all matters in the TTLs, had not reported this matter. In answer, he received assurances fromSecretary of INTAF, Don Yardley, that no such activity could possibly occur without INTAF’s knowledge and a guarantee was given that not one single terrorist was anywhere near the Centenary farming area.

I was again summoned to Air HQ where I was told what had transpired and was given a serious telling-off for, “reading into the ground situations that simply do not exist” and for, “causing unnecessary alarm and despondency.” But then on 21 December ZANLA’s future commander, Solomon Mujuru (also Mutizwa and pseudo-named Rex Nhongo), led an attack on Altena Farm from his base camp close to St Albert’s Mission. When it was known that he and his ZANLA followers had been there indoctrinating the locals since May, no word was said about 4 Squadron having given ample warning of their presence five months earlier. By that time there was nothing to be gained in saying, “We told you so!” But it was bloody maddening!

I was in Air HQ a couple of weeks after the Altena Farm attack and was leaving the building when Air Commodore John Moss saw me and invited me into his office. Throughout my service time I had limited contact with him. Of medium build, good-looking and very popular with everyone, this silver-haired officer was well known for his even temper and softly spoken manner. All Air Force officers knew that John Moss was a raconteur of note, possessing that amazing ability to tell stories and jokes for many hours without pause. It was not that he enjoyed his own voice but simply that he could hold the attention of willing listeners and entertain without apparent effort.

John Moss obviously knew I had given accurate warning of ZANU’s routes and location and that all had been ignored. He did not exactly apologise but asked that I commend my squadron for a good performance and assure the men of better support in the future.

Preparing for bush ops

BACK AT THORNHILL I SET about improving 4 Squadron’s operational techniques and equipment. One idea I had, though unrelated to counter-insurgency warfare, was to assist Police identify ringleaders during mob riots. Rioting in Gwelo’s townships had continued throughout the day after the death of Guy Munton-Jackson and his technician when their helicopter broke up at night in bad weather when positioning to support the Gwelo Police. 4 Squadron pilots told me how they had been able to see the ringleaders quite clearly from the air, but these fomenters of trouble were always farthest from Police forces, stirring up trouble from behind the rioters. Once rioting ceased the police were unable to identify the ringleaders.

I decided to produce a tank to carry liquid dye that could be dumped on riot leaders to make their identity known long after rioting ceased. I sought help from Thornhill’s medical staff and selected Brilliant green because it was reputed to be harmless and very difficult to wash off skin and clothing. So far as I remember, Brilliant green was a water-soluble dye used to track bloodflow through the human body.

Once the tank I designed was working satisfactorily, I looked for opportunity to test the system on a live target to confirm delivery technique and the longevity of the dye. The Brilliant green crystals, being water soluble, turned the water in the tank to a dark blue-green colour with no mixing problems. So I placed the mixed liquid in a forty-four-gallon drum suitably elevated to fill the tank quickly when it was secured to the floor next to the rear door of a Trojan.

I was returning from a routine flight when I noticed a gang of prisoners working on a taxiway close to the threshold of grass runway 13. Gwelo Prison Services provided Thornhill with a limited labour service and had a small prison at Thornhill for the minor-offence prisoners who were about to become my target. The dump tank was fitted to a Trojan, chop chop, and charged with the liquid dye. I then got airborne on the pretext of needing low-level circuit practice. Once airborne I manoeuvred to pass over the prisoners in what would appear to the Air Traffic Controllers to be a low tight turn onto the runway. As the men came almost abreast of me on the outside of the turn the dye was dumped. Control Tower immediatelycalled to say a shower of green liquid had been seen to fall from my aircraft. I acknowledged this by saying the fluid had been dumped deliberately and that I was returning to the squadron.