Because it was important to mark bang on time I planned my final orbit line to be farthest from the jet attack line. In this way I was able to make adjustments in response to the strike leader’s calls. If I was running late I could turn in early, and if running early, turn in late. There were other important reasons to be on the side opposite to the jet attack direction.
The Trojan noise covered that of the approaching jets and its presence drew terrorist attention away from the direction of their approach. In earlier times I was seldom aware of enemy fire though I knew it was happening because of the odd hole in my aircraft; but any ground fire directed at me provided additional noise cover and a perfect distraction.
The camouflage paint on all of our aircraft was incredibly effective. This made it very difficult, even impossible, for high-flying jets to spot the FAC aircraft before reaching target. A variety of visual aids were tried. These included flashing strobe lights but only one worked reasonably well. This was a huge white ‘T’ painted on the top surface of the Trojan’s fuselage and wings. To make the ‘T’ clearly visible to the leading jet was another reason for marking towards the jets.
The Squadron Commander of Hunters in the period 1973-4 was Rob Gaunt. Flying FAC for him was quite an experience. Unlike other leaders, Rob favoured a procedure that worked well for him. He descended from the IP to run in at low level about one minute out from target. In this way he always picked up my aircraft flying at 2,000 feet before he pulled up to his ‘perch’ point, keeping me visual all the way.
As I pulled up to roll over into the dive, Rob had his nose pointing towards the target, finger on trigger. Just by watching my dive, Rob placed his gunsight pipper at the point he expected to see the marker rockets. On three occasions I recall seeing Rob’s 30mm cannon shells exploding bang on target just before my phosphorus rockets reached ground. The white markers looked puny in the centre of the large area covered by his 30mm cannon shell flashes that rippled through target at forty rounds per second. This was very spectacular but I always tensed my buttocks expecting Rob to collide with me. There was really no danger at all; his Hunter always flashed through well below me.
There was seldom need to call corrections to succeeding pilots, usually three of them, who placed their strikes to cover the target area without overlaps. When all was over, the jets returned to base and I continued recce, seldom to know what results had been achieved. Occasionally I saw individuals running during my marker attack, then nothing until the last Hunter had run through target. There were always bashas burning furiously with much black smoke and dust drifting on the wind before any human movement was observed. On occasions secondary explosions removed any doubts I might have experienced when no persons were seen.
I continued to deeply regret not being able to work in the SAS areas of operations. Had this been allowed, no airstrike would have been made without SAS verification of ZANLA or FRELIMO presence. Following an airstrike the SAS would have been able to capitalise on enemy confusion and the Air Force would have known what results had been achieved. Many months were to pass before SAS moved in immediately after every air action. In the meanwhile, the SAS created havoc on the ground using no more than twenty-four men in six sticks of four men each. It took FRELIMO some time to realise what was happening and then they themselves started employing large forces to search for the elusive SAS; a kind of terrorist war in reverse!
A pathfinder group making a free-fall parachute descent at last light from a Dakota flying high-level over unpopulated territory usually preceded deployment of the main SAS force. The four-man pathfinder group would then search for a suitable site to receive twenty men who would be flown in the following night.
At their selected DZ (drop zone) the pathfinders provided pilots with the QFE (altimeter setting for zero height at the DZ) and guided the Dakota captain by VHF radio directly towards the DZ. Flying at 500 to 800 feet above ground, the pilot was told when to switch on ‘red light’ (standby) and when to switch on ‘green light’ (go); whereupon twenty men would launch themselves into the black. The reason for such low-level drops was to minimise the possibility of paratroopers drifting beyond the DZ. With the advent of anti-collision aids for aircraft known as strobe lights, their highly visible flashes provided perfect beacons for pilots to home on. To screen a strobe light’s potent flashes, SAS set them up in such a way as to make them visible only to the para-Dakota.
By daybreak all parachutes and stores had been cached and, following a final briefing, all six sticks split up into four-man patrols and dispersed to their allocated areas. During the following six weeks the sticks operated independently, except when a target required them to rendezvous to strike in strength. Otherwise regrouping occurred at fortnightly intervals to receive night deliveries of rations and munitions from a Dakota that would, again, be controlled from the ground.
Back at Macombe, the Provosts and Alouettes remained on immediate standby. Calls for support always involved a long wait for the SAS men working a long way from Macombe. Brian Robinson often accompanied Provost pilots, not only to talk to his men directly but because he was crazy about flying. Helicopters were often called for casualty evacuation or ‘hot extraction’. Provosts usually accompanied these helicopters and were also called upon to provide close fire support to any callsign being harassed by large FRELIMO forces. Considering the vastness of the territory and the minimal effects of Provost machine-gun and 37mm Sneb rocket strikes, there was little more that one or a pair of Provost pilots could do other than provide distraction and interfering fire to give the SAS a chance to break contact.
Hot extraction by helicopters necessitated great courage by the helicopter crews who almost always came under enemy fire before, during and after snatching breathless soldiers away to safety. With little or no time to find suitable LZs, and under stress from enemy attention, many helicopters suffered minor damage to rotor blades as they sliced their way into extra-tight landing spots before struggling upward with the extra weight of troops.
Hoisting gear was seldom fitted to helicopters on operations because of the weight penalty they imposed. In any case the cable took ages to reach ground and was slow in lifting one or two men at a time; an absolute no-no for hot extraction! So an alternative device was employed. Where landing was not possible, a fixed length tethered cable with a crude bar arrangement at its end was thrown over the side to lift a maximum of four soldiers out of hot spots. Once well clear of the enemy, the soldiers were put down where the helicopter could either land to bring them inside or leave them to continue their work. But use of the hot extraction cable was a last resort. When a helicopter is hovering close to the ground, it is flying ‘in ground effect’ which means that the cushion of air caused by backpressure from the ground assists in producing lift. In this condition the power required to remain airborne is a great deal less at any given weight than when the helicopter is hovering high ‘out of ground effect’ at the same weight.
When the hot extraction device was used to lift only two soldiers, power demand was usually close to maximum. With four soldiers clinging to the hot bar the power demand was always above gearbox maximum allowance, causing rapid overheating of the main rotor gearbox. Because of this, a pilot lifting more than two soldiers needed to get into forward flight as quickly as possible to bring down the load on gears. In so doing, soldiers were sometimes dragged through bushes and trees during lift-off from the ground. Landing them was easier because the pilot could choose his ground away from enemy attention.