In the meanwhile the number of armed contacts with ZANLA groups was rising. In one of these, Air Lieutenant Dave Rowe had a lucky escape thanks to cool thinking between himself and his technician, Sergeant Carl de Beer. Dave’s right arm and right leg were instantly incapacitated by enemy fire during an approach to land troops. Transferring his left hand to the cyclic control column Dave was able to hold direction but he needed Carl to manage the collective control lever. Once full control was established with the aircraft level at cruising speed, Carl turned up the friction knob to hold the collective lever in position so that he could safely leave it and attend to Dave’s wounds. Having repositioned the troops that were still on board. Carl worked from an awkward angle behind Dave’s seat to stem the flow of blood. On arrival at base Dave and Carl co-ordinated their control movements for a roll-on landing that, to the relief of the troops, was a safe one.
Strela missiles
RUSSIAN ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES (NATO codename Grail but better known as Strela) were known to be in FRELIMO’s possession so, late in 1973, I made a request to Air HQ to take steps to protect our aircraft from these ‘heat seeking’ weapons. It was only a matter of time before one of my squadron’s aircraft would be shot down and I was acutely aware that I was the most likely candidate because I was exposed to FRELIMO forces for many hours on end, flying at heights perfectly suited to Strela.
Apart from myself, I worried about my Provost pilots acting in support of the SAS in FRELIMO-dominated territory, particularly when they conducted strikes on the enemy. The helicopters, though vulnerable at height, always flew just above the trees to give them best protection against all types of enemy fire except when hovering, landing or lifting off.
Months passed but no action was forthcoming from Air HQ or the technical boffins at CSIR (Council for Scientific and Industrial Research) in South Africa. During a visit to Air HQ I raised the matter again and was told that counter-missile work could not be undertaken, as this had not been catered for in the Air Force budget. Instead I was instructed to include Strela protection in 4 Squadron’s 1975 bids. Being really upset by this standard response, I expressed the view that we would have to lose aircraft and crews to Strela before any action was taken. Unhappily I was proven right.
Crop-spraying in Tete
IN JANUARY 1974 I NOTICED that maize crops, which had not been grown in Tete south of the Zambezi for the past two years, were flourishing. This meant ZANLA would be able to feed off the local people who were obviously returning to areas from which they had fled in 1972. Most of these people, then living in small hidden camps, appeared to have come out of the Portuguese aldeamento at Macombe. However, the benefit that would derive to ZANLA from the availability of maize meal was unacceptable and a decision was made to destroy the crops and force the civilians to return to the aldeamento.
A Cordon Sanitaire was still being constructed along the northeastern borderline where thousands of anti-personnel mines were laid between two electrified fences. Between and either side of these fences, a chemical defoliant had been sprayed to destroy vegetation. The defoliant had worked well on bush but its effectiveness against crops was not known. Nevertheless it was decided to use the same stuff because ample stocks were immediately available.
Only one civilian crop-sprayer pilot was prepared to take on the job in hostile Tete. I cannot recall the name of the well-built pilot I briefed at Mount Hampden Airport. He calculated the amount of fluid he required and this was positioned at the RAR Tac HQ at Musengezi Mission. I provided top cover and guided the pilot from field to field. Once he saw each field, or complex of fields, he did his own planning and meticulously covered the awkwardly shaped crops whilst I looked on from above.
On return to Musengezi after his fourth flight to recharge his tanks, he experienced difficulty in keeping his twin-Comanche on the runway. A bullet strike to the aircraft had punctured a main wheel tyre but little other damage had occurred. As soon as a replacement wheel from Salisbury was fitted the pilot got airborne again and we completed the job on 19 January 1974. Fortunately the rain held off long enough for the spray to be absorbed by the maize plants and in five days browning of the crops confirmed that the spray had worked.
Chris Weinmann joins 4 Squadron
BECAUSE I SPENT MOST OF my time in the operational areas, I placed great reliance on Rob Tasker and Bruce Collocott to manage the squadron at Thornhill. However, we started experiencing some discipline difficulties amongst a handful of young pilots because Rob and Bruce, though excellent officers, were too gentle in nature to handle them. Another problem I had was that 4 Squadron had no qualified PAI to ensure pilot proficiency in weapons delivery at a time when we most needed this. Until this time we had been reliant on John Blythe-Wood and myself, both unqualified substitutes.
Air HQ approval was given to my request for Chris Weinmann to replace Bruce Collocott. Flight Lieutenant Chris Weinmann seemed to be the ideal man for our needs because he was a qualified PAI who struck me as being a no-nonsense disciplinarian. Rob Tasker, being the only instructor beside myself, remained essential.
Chris had flown Trojans when they first arrived in Rhodesia but was then flying Hunters In November 1973 he was posted to 4 Squadron and Bruce went to 3 (Transport) Squadron. Whereas Bruce was openly delighted with his posting Chris secretly hated having to leave the glory of Hunters to step down to slow piston-driven machines. Typically, he put his personal desires aside and settled to his new responsibilities with the determination I had expected from him. As soon as Rob re-familiarised him on Trojans and Provosts, Chris got stuck into improving weapons proficiency amongst all pilots, myself included. Thanks to him, disciplinary difficulties that had existed at junior pilot level ceased.
Night casevacs
4 SQUADRON PILOTS WERE FACED WITH major problems operating Trojans into remote airstrips at night in response to calls for casevac or urgent re-supply. This was because no facilities existed to clearly demarcate runway boundaries for take-off and landing.
On grass runways at main and established Forward Airfields, gooseneck flares were placed on the 100-metre markers along one side of the runway. Two flares at start and end of the runway, on the side opposite to the flare line, defined where runway centre-line lay. This assisted pilots to clearly identify the runway and to judge their landing approach angle and hold-off height for touch down.
A gooseneck flare was something like a squat domestic watering can with carrying handle. A thick wick in the spout was exposed for about four inches outside the spout with the other end lying in raw paraffin inside the can. The wick fitted tightly in the spout to ensure that flame at the lighted end did not transfer to paraffin in the can.