With spirits so high, the brigadier and his assault force officers were confounded by the criticisms levelled against them by Rob Gaunt and me. We noticed, however, that the six Portuguese Air Force gunship and Puma pilots took kindly to our observations and that they were very keen to respond to suggested tactical improvements.
We had too many targets lined up for the assault force so it was decided to let the main line of bases settle down for a couple of days. Lesser targets were to be used to test and modify tactics during the next three days with only one being attended to each day. These were small enough for groups to be placed in stop positions on three sides to cover CTs escaping from the fourth group as it swept through target.
All three bases turned out to be FRELIMO regional bases supporting small numbers of men, most of which were away from base at the time of the assaults. The results in FRELIMO killed and captured were disappointing to the Rhodesian contingent but the brigadier and all of his staff were delighted, particularly with the quantities of weapons and landmines captured. All structures that had not been ignited by Sneb rockets or gunship fire were set alight by the troops. The brigadier acknowledged that he owed me three bottles of Antiqua.
Thursday 11 April was the day chosen to take on the main line of bases which, on the Ops Room map, were numbered from the first base we struck as (1) and ascending up the communication line to base (5).
Rob Gaunt and I were keen to take the assault force onto Base (5) then put in airstrikes on the other bases (2, 3 and 4) in that sequence. After their move through Base (5), the assault troops were to set up numerous ambushes both north and south. The southern ambushes were for FRELIMO moving up from the bases attacked by aircraft; the northern ambushes were to cater for FRELIMO coming down on normal resupply or to investigate air and ground activities of the previous day.
Unfortunately the Portuguese would not accept the plan or the idea of leaving forces in the field overnight (something to do with fresh bread). Instead, the assault force was to take on base (2) with Rhodesian Air Force jet-strikes on bases (3 and 5). The Portuguese Air Force would strike Base (4) with Fiat jet fighter-bombers; to which end English-speaking PAF officer Major Vizlha would fly with me to communicate with the Fiat pilots of Scorpion Formation.
I led the assault force to Base (2) for a strike at 09:00. This time two Pumas placed troops about 100 metres apart at one end of the base and two Pumas landed troops east and west to cater for lateral breakout. The northern end of the base was to be contained by the gunships. This time marking was by two rockets only to retain plenty for the forthcoming FAC marking runs for jet strikes. I had contemplated bringing in Kevin and Mark to take on opportunity targets with their Sneb rockets before proceeding to their recce areas but dropped the idea to avoid any confusion that might arise through language difficulties, I regretted the decision immediately because FRELIMO, seeming to believe the Pumas had surrounded them with troops, milled about in the opening several seconds presenting many good and concentrated Sneb targets.
Again the two gunships, which were active at the northern end of the camp, did not see the bigger target opportunities in the base centre. I had not seen 20mm cannon fire from helicopters before Op Marble and was impressed with the visual effects of the exploding shells. However, considering the low kill-rate that had been achieved in the four previous bases, I moved above one gunship and watched it fire at dispersed individuals. In spite of the large flashes that were really close to running FRELIMO, the shells seemed to have little effect on them. Some FRELIMO tumbled but got up and ran on, probably slightly wounded and certainly shaken.
Then two running men went down when a couple of shells exploded halfway up the wall of a pole and dagga building they were passing. They dropped immediately and lay dead where they had fallen. Seeing this, Major Vizlha and I agreed that the shells landing on soft ground were exploding below surface causing them to lose shrapnel effect. (When we acquired 20mm cannons for our own helicopters later in the month, the neutralising effect of soft ground became well known. Because of this, many of our gunners became expert at using rocks and trees to gain airbursts for maximum lethal effect.)
At midday I marked Base (3) sited in a mountainous area. It was not the crisp operation I had hoped to show Major Vizlha because of localised low cloud at 1,500 feet agl and a fifteen-second error in my understanding of Rick Culpan’s intended strike time.
Part of the Air Strike Report submitted by 5 Squadron reads:
From the IP to the final turn onto the target it became evident that the jet formation was too close to the marker aircraft. Speed was reduced to 200 kts. In spite of this the jets arrived too early and turned on to heading 225 deg M. This resulted in all the aircraft being in line astern formation with the marker aircraft leading.(Note: This must have been short-lived because:-) The target was marked and appeared at 90 deg to the formation 2000 yards away. The Hunters turned in and released their weapons on a heading 120 deg M. This was too close for the Canberras to bomb and they were forced to follow the Hunters for a restrike on the planned heading of 210 deg M.
Rob Gaunt had passed command of 1 Squadron to Rich Brand but for some reason he did not lead this attack. For a short while the timings of lead Hunter strike on FAC mark were not as crisp as I had become used to. In spite of this, all strikes were on target with the exception of one 500-pound bomb that must have hung up temporarily. It exploded directly below our Trojan giving Major Vizlha and me quite a shake up.
Digressing for a moment—The Board of Inquiry into the loss of the Canberra just seven days prior to this attack had concluded that an arming cap vane from one 28-pound bomb had managed to reach deep into the nose casing of a following bomb. In doing so it activated the pistol’s reversible diaphragm causing the detonation that set off the whole bomb load. (A reversible diaphragm was used to achieve an airburst just above ground level when backpressure from the ground caused the pressure-sensitive diaphragm to reverse and fire the cap that detonated the bomb.) The Rhodesian-designed and manufactured 28lb fragmentation bomb system was withdrawn from service leaving 250-pound, 500-pound and 1000-pound bombs as the only weapons available for Canberra strikes, hence the use of 500-pound bombs on this strike.
Major Vizlha was amazed to see each one of our jets passing through target and asked me if the pilots knew there were Strela missiles in the area. I responded by saying we were all acutely aware of this before he told me how fearful he was to be flying with me. He said the Portuguese Air Force dared not operate above 100 feet and below 15,000 feet because of the missile threat between these heights.
We could not stick around to watch for movement in the Base where some buildings were burning furiously because Scorpion formation checked in way too early just as the Hunters and Canberras cleared target. This forced us to move on to Base (4) earlier than planned.
It was pleasing to hear the Portuguese transmissions between Scorpion leader and Major Vizlha. I understood nothing of what was being said until I was told that three Fiats were holding at 30,000 feet over the cloud-free target, each carrying four 250-pound bombs and awaiting my markers. This distressed me because I was still ten minutes away and I knew that FRELIMO would certainly hear and see the jets. Nevertheless, there was nothing I could do but run straight to target, pitch up and roll over into the dive to fire the marker rockets. Major Vizlha gave a running commentary on our progress and reported the mark.