8. During this engagement I had recalled Yellow 5 & 6 from Dotito and they had uplifted sticks 4 and 6 and flown them in to reinforce stick 2. Yellow 5 had been recalled from Darwin with a doctor to tend to the wounded (2 terrs died before he arrived) and to take care of the casevac (Lt. Bax).
9. I then directed the callsigns onto the bodies and we found that Stick 2 had killed 3 ters at……… and Stick 3 had killed 2. I then returned to base.
As OC FAF 4, Tol Janeke had this to say:
a. This was a first class operation in every respect. The co-operation between air and ground was good and at no time was there any confusion. The movement and deployment of troops was handled by Maj. Lambert from the ‘K’ car. This personal contact with his sticks paid dividends.
b. The entire group of terrorists was accounted for in this contact. This would probably have not been the case if the ‘K’ Car had not been available. It would certainly be a great loss to the operational effectiveness of the fire force if we should run out of ammunition.
c. Pre-briefing of the Trojan to act as noise cover was also successful. The callsign which had reported the presence commented that he had not heard the helicopters until they were within 1000 metres of the area. This tactic will be used when possible but it will no doubt soon become known to the terrorists.
d. The ‘K’ Car on occasions fired within 50 metres of our troops but discussion with these troops indicated that they considered it safe under the circumstances. The ‘K’ Car, having deployed the sticks was fully aware of their positions on the ground at all times.
The term ‘Fireforce’ (my underlining above) was used for the first time in this ASR and Major Lambert was the first ‘official’ airborne Army Fireforce commander. However, as previously stated, control of ground troops by Army commanders flying in helicopters had been used previously. Tol Janeke referred to a shortage of 20mm ammunition for our gunships. This problem applied to many other critical commodities and the reasons for this will become clear later. What is not made clear was the decision to move back-up troops and fuel forward to Dotito (a small village) by road at the same time that the main force flew out of Mount Darwin. This became fairly standard procedure for many Fireforce operations that followed to reduce reaction time.
In all actions the K-Car orbited to the left because the 20mm cannon, whose long barrel protruded out into the airflow, was mounted on the port side. The gunner needed maximum traverse of his cannon, which was difficult in the confines of the cabin. This would have made an airborne Army commander’s presence intolerable if he had occupied a standard forward-facing seat. To resolve this difficulty, his seat was reversed and secured in the front left-hand corner of the cabin. Although this meant having to face backwards, Army Fire Force commanders had an unrestricted view of the ground that concerned them and most mastered with ease the problem of ‘flying backwards’.
Whereas a pilot’s view was totally unrestricted in a right-hand turn, this was not the case in the offensive left-hand orbit. The presence of the Army officer, the instrument console, the cabin floor and the gunner, particularly when he was firing, restricted a K-Car pilot’s visual freedom. Nevertheless, by having control of the aircraft flight path and bank angle, K-Car pilots managed very well indeed.
Détente
ACROSS THE ZAMBEZI RIVER TO our north, Zambia continued to be openly hostile to Rhodesia. The Portuguese were already passing control of Mozambique to the unprepared leadership of their former enemy who would soon give ZANLA open access to Rhodesia’s entire eastern flank. To the west Botswana was showing increasing signs of willingness to allow ZIPRA access to our entire western flank and, to our south the Government of South Africa seemed to be pressurising Ian Smith by deliberately interfering with the free flow of vital imports. So, all around us the signs were ominous as 1974 drew to its close.
Within Rhodesia the score in CTs killed and captured was mounting rapidly, though there was absolutely no room for complacency and, as already stated, our war supplies were often too low for comfort. It was only a matter of weeks before Mozambique’s ports would be lost to Rhodesia and, being a landlocked country, this left us totally dependent on South African for all our imports and exports. This new situation brought with it very unpleasant changes in South Africa’s political posture, not that the South African Defence Forces or the general public of South African ever wavered in their support to Rhodesia.
Following the collapse of the Portuguese, détente became the tool by which Prime Minister Vorster and a limited number of his party faithful intended to gain favour with Black Africa’s political leaders. Détente was the route by which Vorster hoped to reduce African antagonism toward his party’s apartheid policies. Furthermore, he seemed to have written off the Zambezi River as a natural defence line against communism now that half of its previously useful length was lost. The longstanding relationship between South Africa and Rhodesia, one of unquestioning friendship and co-operation, was changing to one in which Rhodesia had become the vital pawn in Vorster’s détente game.
This situation forces me to run a little ahead in time, because détente would surpass every political danger Rhodesia had ever faced in its fight to retain responsible government. For the likes of me, first signs of serious trouble came in early August 1975 with the sudden withdrawal of the majority of South African Police units. This suggested to us that Vorster was being outmanoeuvred by black governments, yet his obsession with détente continued. If senior military commanders understood what was going on, it was not being passed down the line to operators in the field. The loss of the SAP impacted badly on our own overstretched forces and I guess it must have angered those SA Policemen who served in Rhodesia. Nevertheless there was for us no alternative but to keep our noses to the grindstone.
From the outset men of the South African Police forces that were sent to Rhodesia were totally untrained in bush warfare and this never really improved because South Africa’s move to assist us was heavily motivated by self-interest. Men trained for riot control and other policing duties in South Africa were sent to Rhodesia to gain on-the-job training in counter-insurgency operations. As soon as they became proficient, they were substituted by a new batch of men. Nevertheless, their numbers had been of great assistance and they were sorely missed. The removal of the SAP through acquiescence of politically manipulated Police commanders was one thing, but the South African armed services’ reaction to political pressure seems to have been very different.
Even before the withdrawal of the SAP, SAAF had increased helicopter and crew levels in a scheme known as Operation Polo. The substantial improvement in helicopter numbers was to help offset the loss of over 2,000 South African Police, but again, it suited South Africa to have its aircrews gain ‘on-the-job’ operational experience. No criticism is intended because this was a sensible line to follow and Rhodesians were only too pleased to build on strong bonds that already existed with the SAAF.
Initially an Air Force major headed the Op Polo crews but he made a bit of a mess of things when he forced rank to flying K-Car lead before gaining any Fireforce experience. This caused such a nonsense with the Army that, thereafter, only captains and lieutenants remained to fly Z-Cars until, at a later time, the Op Polo crews on detachment wore Rhodesian Air Force uniforms and ranks.