All that remained to be done was to modify the aircraft for their armed role. Work on this started the day after the first flight arrived. Mainplanes had been especially stressed during manufacture to cater for increased ‘G’ loads. Under-wing pylon mountings were installed at New Sarum to allow for the carriage of SNEB rocket pods, bombs, Frantans, flares and teargas. Within a week all 4 Squadron’s pilots had been converted onto type. Fitment of machine-guns had been considered but this was held over for the moment. It is a great credit to all participating technicians and pilots that these aircraft did a marvellous job for the Rhodesian war effort. The Lynx came at the right time and its selection had been a good one.
The first record of a Lynx accompanying Fireforce was on 7 March 1976, though Flight Lieutenant Ed Potterton did not use weapons on that occasion. Fitment of guns came later.
Fireforces back in action
ZIPRA, HAVING BEEN DEALT A few severe blows by SAS inside Zambia in late 1974, and again during 1975, did not seem to be ready to rush into any major offensive actions simply to keep up with ZANLA. Nevertheless its existence necessitated ongoing patrolling in the west. All of ZANLA’s effort was concentrated in the east.
Following their return in January 1976, ZANLA groups moved with great caution into their original sectors Nehanda, Chaminuka and Takawira taking pains not to draw attention to themselves before they were re-established amongst the locals. By early February the game was on once more. ZANLA’s intention to launch on all three fronts had been delayed as previously mentioned, but their presence just across the mountain border near the Mozambican town of Espungabera brought the newly formed Chipinga Fireforce, led by Mike Litson, into its first action on 7 February. Two months later, penetrations in the southernmost sector meant the RSF was tied up along the entire Mozambican border.
Back in the Op Hurricane area, Wing Commander Tol Janeke had anticipated that his Fireforce might be called to action in the rough terrain of the Zambezi escarpment some thirty kilometres northwest of Mount Darwin. So on 6 February, with the concurrence of his Army counterpart, he moved the whole Fireforce to Stacey’s Farm to cut down reaction time.
To help follow the ASR below, the helicopter pilots were Flight Lieutenant Rob McGregor flying K-Car; Yellow 1, 2 and 3 were, respectively, Air Lieutenant Jo Syslo, Air SubLieutenant Venter (Op Polo) and Flight Lieutenant George Sole.
Air Lieutenant Norman (Bambam) Maasdorp, N4, flew the Provost. The Police Reserve Air Wing pilot, Copper 08, was Hamie Dax whom I have already identified as the most successful of the PRAW recce pilots. The abbreviation PATU stands for Police Anti-Terrorist Unit and c/s is the abbreviation for callsign.
Rob McGregor’s illustration, cut from a 1:50,000-scale map is reproduced to assist the reader in following his ASR. It reads:
On Fri. 6 FEB 76 at approximately 1030B Fire Force Mt. Darwin was tasked to position at Stacey’s Farm in support of a PATU stick c/s BX who was on tracks of approximately 10 terrorists at TS 983757 (A on map). After positioning at the farm, PRAW aircraft c/s Copper 08 got airborne to establish communications with BX and attempt to track the terrorists from the air. At the same time N4 was airborne in a Provost in order to provide armed support if required. After making contact with BX, Copper 08 was able to track the terrorists to position C where a very distinctive path was picked up and followed down the mountain to the valley floor. At the bottom a hut was seen at position B and movement was observed in the vicinity of the hut.
It was then decided to put two sticks with trackers in at position B to attempt to pick up tracks. This was done and at the same time K-Car got airborne to give cover. The trackers were unable to locate any tracks of any significance at position B. Copper 08 and N4 then talked K-Car back up the line to position C. It was noted that the tracks were very distinctive from position C to D but then tended to break up so it was decided to bring in 2 more sticks (c/s 23/25) with trackers and to drop them on tracks at D. They were to track down towards the hut where the initial sticks were left to act as stop groups. At this stage K-Car and Yellow formation returned to Stacey’s Farm and left N4 as top cover.
Tracks were followed to point E where it was decided to leapfrog c/s 25, 23A and the trackers to catch up time. This was done by Yellow 3 to point F. About fifteen minutes later at 1545B c/s 25 called contact. Fireforce immediately proceeded to the scene from Staceys. On arrival in the contact area c/s 25 reported he was being mortared and that the line of flight of the terrorists was down the river-line towards position B. He estimated he had contacted a group of 20 terrorists (8 were killed in the initial contact). K-Car then saw 3 terrorists at position H and engaged them. They ran into thick bush on the river-line where further terrorists were seen and engaged. At this time the K-Car came under heavy fire from the ground. K-Car then called on N4 in the Provost to carry out a strike into the area of the K-Car attack to attempt to flush the terrorists out. N4 carried out 2 attacks with Sneb and Frantans and strikes were observed to be in the area of the target. (5 dead terrorists were later found in the area of K-Car and Provost air strikes.)
During this time c/s 25 had followed up and killed a further 2 terrorists in the riverbed. Very little movement could be seen from the air and K-Car instructed Yellow 1 to carry out dummy drops to the east and west of the river line to attempt to keep the terrorists in the river line and force then towards the stop groups at position B. Shortly after this c/s 23 in the stop group reported contacting one terrorist who was killed. c/s 23 also reported movement in the area of position G which appeared to be terrorists attempting to break over the ridge line. Yellow 1 was then instructed to fire into the thick bush in that area to attempt to flush out anyone who may be there. The following day it was reported that Yellow 1 came under fire but at the time he had heard nothing and the ground forces had not reported anything.
The light was now fading fast and follow-up and mopping-up operations continued until last light with no further contact with terrorists.
Wing Commander Janeke’s report reads:
a. This is a splendid example of success resulting from first class cooperation between air and ground forces. The entire operation lasted over a period of eight hours. At no time was there any unnecessary confusion or delay. A total of 17 out of a probable 22 ters were accounted for.
b. The decision to move the Fireforce with air support to Stacey’s Farm was a wise one as it reduced reaction and ferry time to less than ten minutes.
c. Flt Lt McGregor, together with Air Lt Maasdorp, contributed towards the professional control of operations. De-brief of the crews also highlighted the excellent work done by 2nd Lt Nigel Theron of 2 Commando RLI, whose personal leadership and courage led to more than half of the kills. Any Army recommendation for an award to this officer would be strongly supported.
Squadron Leader Harold Griffiths as OC of the helicopter squadron wrote:
I agree with FAF Cdr’s comments re the splendid effort of all forces concerned in this highly successful operation. It is very pleasing to see that such methods as aerial tracking, leapfrogging, positioning of forward stops and dummy drops were used and obviously contributing to the overall successes. A well-written report which is easy to follow.