Wing Commander Roy Morris commanded Air Detachment Thrasher initially and was relieved by Squadron Leader Cyril White, after he relinquished command of 4 Squadron to Squadron Leader Dag Jones. Wing Commander Rob Gaunt had been the first commander of Air Detachment Repulse but was replaced by Wing Commander Tol Janeke in August. Tol’s proven successes during his time at Mount Darwin were needed in what was considered to be the most critical of all the operational areas. This was because Rhodesia’s road and rail lifelines to South Africa, running through the Op Repulse area, were known to be ZANLA’s top priority targets.
Op Hurricane Fireforces were being employed on a daily basis, whereas within the Thrasher and Repulse areas the forces were used less frequently in the first half of 1976. This was partly due to the terrain and more so because the CT groups were still trying to establish themselves amongst the local population. Consequently, almost all of the early contacts in Thrasher and Repulse occurred along the border with Mozambique and, initially, succeeded in severely hampering ZANLA planning.
At that time ZIPRA’s long-term intentions were not known. It was clear, however, that it was preparing a large conventional army and only committing small irregular units into the Op Tangent and Splinter areas to keep the Frontline States happy. It was presumed that ZIPRA’s long-term objectives were to let ZANLA take a beating whilst wearing down the RSF. It would then launch massive effort against Rhodesia, and probably more so against ZANLA. Whatever ZIPRA’s true intentions, Rhodesia would have been stretched beyond limit had ZIPRA come over in strength at the same time as ZANLA, because ZANLA alone was tying up most of our air and ground effort. No 7 Squadron faced many difficulties in providing helicopters and crews to the Hurricane, Thrasher and Repulse areas. There were also others needed to support lower-intensity operations against ZIPRA in the Op Splinter (Kariba Lake), Op Tangent (western border and western Zambezi River) plus Op Grapple (Midlands area).
Harold Griffiths commanded a squadron that was four times larger than a standard squadron. Although it was an Air HQ task to decide on the actual allocation of helicopters, Griff, his flight commanders and squadron warrant officer had to continuously juggle aircraft and crews to meet these allocations whilst also being committed to increased levels in major and minor servicing schedules and the repairing of battle damaged aircraft. At the same time they had to train new crews and maintain standards amongst the operational pilots and technicians who moved in and out daily. The very nature of operational flying invariably involved harsh handling which made it necessary to re-hone pilot and technician skills every time they returned to base.
Seldom did a day go by when 7 Squadron did not have to re-plan for unexpected issues such as wounded aircrew and aircraft damage. There was always a need for some immediate remedial action to be taken. For Griff and his senior men there was such high stress at base that they looked forward to their own field deployments that, though loaded with periods of extreme tension and danger, afforded them some degree of respite.
The jet and transport squadrons were regular-sized units and their personnel for the most part were base-bound, so they did not suffer the high stresses of the bush squadrons. Like 7 Squadron, 4 Squadron’s crews spent most of their time in the operational areas but their problems were of a different nature. 4 Squadron’s greatest difficulty was the never-ending loss of experienced pilots and technicians to meet increasing needs for helicopter crews. With each crop of brand-new pilots off training, 4 Squadron had virtually no chance of providing adequate guidance to youngsters by seasoned operators. In fact, 4 Squadron was sometimes so short of aircrew that retired officers, unkindly referred to as ‘retread pilots’, were re-called to duty to make up numbers in the field. The retired officers I remember operating Lynx included Group Captain Charles Paxton, Wing Commander John Mussell, Squadron Leader Mike Saunders, Flight Lieutenant Dickie Dives and even Squadron Leader Ted Brent was borrowed from 5 Squadron for a while. Flight Lieutenant Don Northcroft (Sword of Honour student of No 19 PTC) who was a bright gentle-natured man had returned to farming was another of the retread pilots until a gang of CTs gunned him down whilst he was inspecting his lands.
It was at about this time that the members of my training course, 10 SSU, came together for a re-union party. Unfortunately Gordon and Faith Wright chose not to attend, whereas Ian and Helena Ferguson took the trouble to leave their farming business and drive seven hours to be with us. It was a very happy occasion in spite of all the troubles that surrounded us.
SO Plans
IN MARCH 1976, I WAS promoted to the rank of wing commander in the Air Staff post of Staff Officer Planning. Air Marshal Mick McLaren as Commander of the Air Force altered the terms of reference for this post to allow me to assume responsibility for all Air Force projects and to commence the weapons development work I had been pressing for over the years.
So Plans was the only post in the Air Force that allowed the incumbent officer direct access to the Commander without the approval of DG Ops and the Chief of Air Staff. Though this was very useful, I never once used the privilege without first advising Air Vice-Marshal Frank Mussell or Air Commodore Chris Dams about the project details I needed to discuss with the Commander. I will discuss the project work shortly because it was delayed a while.
In June I was pulled away from my post to assist 4 Squadron, yet again, with recce training. I was very put out by this as I had spent more than fourteen months in the field during my eighteen months as Ops I in Air Staff. Fortunately Cocky Benecke was made available to cut down on training time and advantage was taken of my presence at Mount Darwin to allow OC FAF 4 to take some well-earned leave.
This period of training was for the new OC 4 Squadron and some of his pilots. It was also my first experience in teaching from the rear seat so that I could see ground on Dag Jones’s side of the aircraft. During our second sortie on 11 June 1976 we were aerial-tracking a strong trail that led us to a brand-new CT camp. We immediately called for a depleted Fireforce of K-Car plus two G-Cars. Being passenger caused me to see the action from a new perspective that turned out to be very useful for reasons still clear in my mind.
Firstly, I had not seen a fresh base for a long time. Secondly I could see that, as in many actions past, there were insufficient troops immediately available to Kip Donald, the RLI Fireforce commander. I knew there were plenty of troops available at Mount Darwin and that a Dakota, then available on the ground at FAF 4, could have brought them across at the same time that the helicopters arrived; but none of these troops was para-trained.