Sgt Jarvie was visual with the target(s) & was briefed to fire at targets of his own choosing. Very accurate fire was brought to bear and the ters were seen to start moving around at high speed in great confusion.
The group broke into two parts, the majority breaking along the river line to the south & a smaller group along the river line to the NNW.
I instructed Black section to engage the northern group & continued engaging the main group with K-Car. Sgt. Jarvie was bringing very accurate fire to bear & several characters were being knocked down.
# Stop 2 were warned that business was coming their way & when they were visual with the ters were able to bring fire to bear that caused the ters to go to ground. As things were stabilising I sent Black 2 for reinforcing sticks & Black Lead for ammunition. Conversation with # Stop 2 resulted in them marking a target for K-Car. A further series of brief but final contacts ensued.
# Stop 2 were reinforced with # Stop 3 & # Stop 4 were deployed in the area VP 504525. # Stop 1 was instructed to start sweeping south towards the original contact area. They soon encountered ters who were trying to ease their way northwards & a brief contact ensued before K-Car became visual with the ters & engaged them which resulted in a couple more characters falling down.
At this stage K-Car was out of ammunition, but M4, previously requested, was running into the area.
Before moving # Stops 2,3 & 4, I wanted a couple of areas softened & directed M4 in a series of strikes, using Frantan in two South to North attacks onto a bush area in the river line at VP506534, a Sneb rocket attack East to West into bush area in the river line at VP505533 and a Sneb rocket attack North to south into bush area in the river line at VP505532.
Airborne control was handed over to Black Lead whilst K-Car departed to refuel & rearm.
At 1710B, before K-Car returned, Black 2 was directed to recover bodies adjacent to # Stop 1’s position at VP505539 and was shot at by ters who were also adjacent, resulting in a gunshot wound to the gunner & extensive damage to the aircraft which exited the area to our refuelling point nearby from where it will be recovered by road. As Black Lead had the picture of the scene airborne control of M4 was left to him to direct two Frantan strikes delivered south to North on the area VP 505539 before K-Car resumed airborne control. Before the strikes were delivered, # Stop 1 had been removed to a safe position & FLOT indicated to M4 by orange smoke.
As conditions were now becoming fairly dark M4 was dispatched home, a quick ammunition supply for the ground troops was arranged, # Stops 1,2,3, & 4 were joined up in the area VP 506538 & told to arrange ambush positions, & # Sparrow 1 were deployed in the original contact area & told to ambush there for the night. Sweeping operations will commence at first light tomorrow.
Please note that trying to operate a ‘fire force’ of two troopers is probably going to cause severe casualties to security forces before long.
Thirteen CTs were killed in this action, two of which were accounted for by the ground troops. Had there been more soldiers available to Borlace in the opening minutes the CTs would have fared even worse than they did. Notice that Mike said CTs were wearing “a green top shirt”. Under that would have been more shirts to facilitate change of visual appearance and identification.
A week later, Mike Borlace, flying K-Car with Henry Jarvie, ran into heavy fire. This occurred in an action that was so close to the Mozambican border that at times the Fireforce, and a pair of Hunters which came to assist, had fire brought to bear on them by FRELIMO forces firing from a store across the border.
Part of Mike’s ASR reads,
We came under substantial automatic small arms fire which unfortunately smashed the sight glass of the 20mm cannon. K-Car pilot was visual with the ters who were running towards thick bush to the East. Without sighting information it was difficult for the gunner to bring the gun to bear, but several accurate bursts were delivered and one ter was seen to drop and stay down.
Wing Commander Roy Morris, as OC Air Detatchment Thrasher, revealed what Mike did not record in his pilot’s report. Part of Roy’s report reads, Flt Lt Borlace’s performance is to be commended. Although wounded in the left leg above the knee, at the very beginning of this action, he continued in the K-Car and directed Lynx and Hunter strikes with a great deal of efficiency. His dedication to duty is unquestionably praiseworthy. It took OC Air Det. Thrasher to finally go to RUDA and extricate Flt. Lt. Borlace from the damaged K-Car and organised Air Lt. Dickinson to take command.
Eighteen months had elapsed since I left 4 Squadron; yet only Cocky Benecke remained when Dag Jones took over command from Cyril White. Although he clearly deserved a posting to helicopters, as had occurred with all of his PTC colleagues, Cocky had been left on 4 Squadron because his unique talents were best suited to fixed-wing operations. Funnily enough Cocky was pleased with this. Because of the relatively low cost of flying light strike aircraft, Cocky felt he could pursue his talent and his desire for action just as far as his passion drove him. Again I say, “What a change in attitude from those days when I struggled to get him interested in recce.”
The number of Fireforce successes directly attributable to 4 Squadron recce pilots, especially Cocky Benecke, was astounding. In spite of its limited strength in machines and operationally seasoned men, 4 Squadron was the most cost-effective military unit in Rhodesia. This statement in no way detracts from the undeniable potency of our squadrons, the SAS, Selous Scouts, RLI or any other unit. It simply conveys the undeniable fact that a small complement of pilots, ably supported by an equally small group of dedicated technicians, induced and participated effectively in more actions, pro rata, than any other Rhodesian unit.
Cocky displayed his talents, courage and aggressiveness for the umpteenth time in a lone action in the Op Repulse area. This occurred just after Tol Janeke was posted there. On 2 August 1976, Cocky was sent to provide top cover to c/s 143 of H Coy 1RR, a Territorial Army tracker unit, that was following blood-spoor from a contact with CTs earlier in the day.
Having established the position of the trackers and the direction in which the CTs were heading, Cocky commenced a recce forward of the troops over flat, featureless terrain. He soon found a group of people sitting under shade at the edge of a bushy patch that was set well away from local villages. It is unlikely that any other pilot would have seen them.
He was asking the trackers what colour clothing the CTs had been wearing when he came under fire and saw two CTs break from the group. Cocky attacked immediately and took them both out with rockets. Fire continued so he turned and attacked the main group that was breaking up. Having expended all rockets, Cocky still had one CT in sight.
Part of Cocky’s ASR reads,
Owing to having no troops or aircraft to assist me, and my rockets were finished, I was not prepared to put my aircraft in a dangerous situation by attacking a lone ter who fired 4 standard magazines and one of tracer at me.
Cocky was wise not to attack with Frantans as his aircraft was not fitted with machine-guns to give him covering fire, and there was no way of knowing if more CTs were still around. The fact that he could see, from height, precisely how many magazines of ammunition had been expended was yet another example of this man’s intriguing talent.