I am convinced he was wounded and would not get too far. Had I had front guns to protect me, I would have been prepared to attack with Frantans.
Apart from four CTs killed, five females, hidden in the bush too close to the CTs, also died when Cocky made his second rocket attack. The loss of civilian lives in these circumstances, though deeply regretted, was inevitable when CTs failed to send women away before initiating offensive action. Happily, there were many other occasions where women saved themselves by moving into the open so that soldiers and airmen could identify them by dress. But even in these situations care had to be taken to ensure that they were not being used by CTs as human shields.
Continuing with Cocky for the moment. He was in the Hurricane area with me during my short stay at FAF 4. Whilst I was instructing Dag Jones, Cocky was also teaching recce to Bill Stevens. Day after day he had been leading successful Fireforce actions, one of which occurred so close to FAF 4 that it caused me, as acting OC FAF 4, to comment:
a. Excellent work by Benecke who was still wide-awake to the need to cover ground, even with wheels down on approach for landing. He was returning from an instructional sortie in recce for Air Lt. Stevens.
b. Of group strength 28-30 ters reported by Benecke only 3 were seen and contacted resulting in one killed and one captured wounded by K-Car fire. Though this was a disappointing score the close proximity of the action to FAF 4 assisted greatly in occupying the attention of the Prime Minister who was visiting JOC with the OCC.
K-Car pilots recorded most ASRs covering actions in which Cocky was involved. His own ASRs were therefore those in which Fireforce was not involved. His thirtieth ASR reports the situations arising from actions of 17 August 1976 when he was tasked to provide top cover to an Army tracker callsign of 2 Independent Company that was following fresh tracks of a large group of CTs that had broken through the Cordon Sanitaire minefield. Cocky’s own callsign was H4 and Mike Delport, who was flying with him, was G4. His ASR reads:
H4 had been tasked to assist c/s 71G who was on tracks of approximately 50. G4 was in the aircraft with me as I intended to demonstrate aerial tracking to him. As we were approaching the callsign, I thought I had heard shots going past the aircraft. I turned around and G4 said he saw two figures running in a NE direction. Tracer was observed passing very close to the aircraft and c/s 71G confirmed that he could hear heavy firing. We then observed large explosions on the ground. There also appeared to be several flak bursts exploding underneath the aircraft. We were at approximately 1,500 feet AGL and the bursts were about 500 feet below us. I called for Fireforce and passed on a sitrep about the explosions and apparent flak bursts.
I then saw a ter running south down a path away from the explosions. I commenced a rocket attack on this ter. Heavy ground fire was experienced on numerous occasions but more so during this attack.
I then saw about 15 ters moving through some trees and commenced an attack. The rockets were on target and as I commenced a pull out I heard a loud bang and felt a strike on my left thigh. I informed G4 who immediately took control of the aircraft whilst I inspected my thigh for damage.
We discovered that we had no aileron control and were in a severe yaw and rolling. G4 righted the aircraft with the use of rudders and we commenced a slow climb.
I then jettisoned the Frantans and the rocket carriers and carried out a quick inspection of the aircraft for damage.
The ailerons were both observed to be stuck in the upright position.
G4 commenced a slow yawed turn towards Salisbury whilst settling elevator trim and power settings.
We informed Darwin of our predicament and intentions. A strong smell of fuel was experienced and we opened the DV panel and fed both motors from the starboard tank. At this stage we had full left trim and a fair amount of rudder to remain wings level. G4 had control of the aircraft so I left him to continue the flight.
As we approached Salisbury I noticed a large amount of fuel on the floor and discovered the fuel leak to be right next to where I was sitting. I extracted the fire extinguisher and moved into the back seat so as to be able to direct the fire extinguisher onto the fuel in case of fire and rearranged loose articles in the rear of the cabin.
A perfect landing, under the circumstances, was carried out by G4 and the motors were closed down immediately after touch down together with mags and all electrics. We abandoned the aircraft as the fire-fighting crew arrived on the scene.
Cocky was lucky to have only been badly bruised by a chuck of airframe debris from a heavy-calibre bullet strike, and Mike Delport did a great job in getting the aircraft back to Salisbury.
Because of the long distance involved, Fireforce arrived a long time after Cocky and Mike had cleared target. Two trooper helicopters took hits that resulted in the death of Corporal Titlestad and continuous fire from a heavy machine-gun relentlessly followed the K-Car flown by Flight Lieutenant Terence Murphy (ex-British Marines helicopter pilot) but without scoring any hits. Due to fading light and some confusion caused by many widely spread enemy firing positions with troops in between, K-Car was reluctant to bring down any air attacks and the airborne commander, OC Support Commando RLI, had no choice but to issue orders for night ambushes.
Although there were no proven kills, this operation happened to be very successful because the CTs lost everything but their personal weapons. The group of about fifty had come in with a large re-supply of equipment which included an STM heavy machine-gun, a type 56 recoilless rifle, RPG launchers with many rockets, TM46 landmines and piles of 7.62mm ammunition; all of which was added to Rhodesia’s growing supply of captured equipment.
The reason for the ground explosions and apparent flak bursts that Cocky reported was explained by the discovery and capture of ‘air ambush’ (CT term) equipment. The CT group had come into Rhodesia with their new ‘air ambush’ weapon system that they had confidently rigged to protect their re-supply equipment against air attack. It consisted of many TNT charges planted in small holes in the ground with a stick grenade placed above each charge with its firing pin tethered to a ground peg. The TNT and stick grenade combinations were set in clusters, each cluster being linked by Cordtex to be fired simultaneously. Upon firing each cluster of TNT (the ground explosions Cocky reported) the stick grenades were propelled vertically to withdraw firing pins and detonated four seconds later at around 1,000 feet above ground (the suspected flak).
Having lost all of their ‘air ambush’ equipment during their very first day in the country, the CTs must have lost confidence in the system because I cannot recall another incident of this type inside Rhodesia. Occasionally they were employed in Mozambique. Long before this incident, I had read of an antiaircraft system, which Mao Tse Tung developed and named ‘ground cannon’. Later I will discuss my own tests of this crazy, crude and effective system.
Down in the southeast, on 27 August, a Grey’s Scouts callsign on horseback was following tracks of a large group heading straight for the Mozambican border. Tol Janeke called upon the Chiredzi Fireforce to join up with his Repulse Fireforce and placed the joint force close to the area of anticipated action.
Tol amalgamated forces whenever he judged it necessary, which is why in my opinion he was a particularly successful field commander. Every officer had been taught the ‘Ten Principles of War’; one of which is the all-important need for concentration of forces. Few heeded this in the great spread of activities where too few aircraft were called upon to meet too many needs. Tol not only practised this principle, he ensured that the concentrated force was correctly placed for immediate use.