Rob Warraker flew with me to Boli airstrip in a Cessna 185 where we were collected by the G-Car that took us the short distance to meet up with Schulie and twenty RLI paratroopers who had been dropped at 05:00. Just before landing at Boli, Rob and I had seen the Dakota that had dropped the RLI paratroopers passing us on its way back to Buffalo Range.
We inspected the Alpha strike from the air and on the ground and saw that all bomblets had landed on target. Schulie was satisfied with his side of the exercise but said that, although he had received Randy loud and clear on his radio when the Canberra formation was approaching at high altitude, there had been difficulty in hearing Randy’s instruction to light the outer flare during the low-level run toward the target. We decided that this would not be a problem for Madula Pan because the fourth Canberra could act as a radio relay back-up between Randy and Schulie. This extra Canberra could also light the inner marker RAMS if Randy was unable to do so.
From the practice site, Schulie accompanied Rob and me for the short helicopter ride back to my Cessna at Boli. Both Rob and Schulie were huge men and Schulie also had his parachute and heavy Bergen. My aircraft was carrying a high fuel load because we had planned to fly directly to New Sarum for a debriefing with 5 Squadron. But even the nippy little Cessna struggled to make take-off speed with so much weight on board and I had a few anxious moments skimming very low over trees with the speed failing to build up in the very hot conditions that prevailed. A gentle fall of ground helped us slip off the ‘drag step’ and we were soon climbing comfortably on course for Salisbury.
When I checked in with FAF 7 to say we were climbing out, I was asked if I had heard or seen the Dakota, then three hours overdue. We diverted to Buffalo Range immediately to participate in the air search that was being mounted. I had just reached the airfield when we were told that a survivor had just reached a working party in the sugar-cane fields and reported that the Dakota had crashed on the banks of a large river; presumably the Lundi.
I dropped Rob and Schulie off at the Selous Scouts Fort at Buffalo Range and turned back immediately to search the Lundi River. It did not take long to find the Dakota on the south bank. The aircraft was broken in two with the cockpit smashed to bits and its rear fuselage lying under a large tree.
On recall from his civilian job for ‘retread’ duties, Squadron Leader Peter Barnett, the previous OC of 3 Squadron, had been second ‘dickey’ to Flight Lieutenant Dave Mallet who had joined our Air Force from the RAF. According to survivors, Peter had objected when Dave descended to fly lowlevel just above the surface of the Lundi. Whatever the verbal exchanges, heavy electrical power-lines running across the river from unseen pylons amongst trees on both high banks, sliced through the cockpit windscreen and decapitated both pilots.
Two bulkheads immediately behind the pilots’ seats arrested the cables. This saved the life of the flight engineer who was standing behind the pilots. The aircraft decelerated down to stalling speed before the power-lines on the starboard side sheared, causing the aircraft to be dragged left by the binding cable into trees above the riverbank. Fortunately there was no fire, but Army Corporal A. Bradley was killed in the ensuing crash. Four men survived with relatively minor injuries due to the fact that the aircraft had cleared the riverbank itself and had been subject to sufficient bush-drag to soften deceleration.
Madula Pan attack
ON THE NIGHT OF 10 JANUARY, Schulie and Steven did a HALO descent well to the south of Madula Pan and made their initial approach to target before dawn. They lay in hiding for the day then, under cover of darkness before moonrise, made a final approach for Steven to crawl right up to the edge of the base to ensure that ZANLA was in residence. Having listened to many noisy conversations, all spoken in Shona, Steven moved back to Schulie who passed the word back to Scouts HQ.
Schulie positioned the RAMS flare without difculty. Around about 03:00 he was close to calling for a postponement of the strike because he could not find the selected clump of trees for the second flare. With little time to spare he eventually identified the spot and set up.
Flying his Canberra at about 30,000 feet, Flight Lieutenant Ian Donaldson with the callsign Green 4, made radio contact with Schulie at 03:45 and received confirmation that all systems were ‘go’. Flying with Don were his navigator, Dave Hawkes, and Captain Rob Warraker the Selous Scouts operations co-ordinator. Ian had taken off from Buffalo Range where he was currently part of the local Fireforce. Green Leader with Green 2 and 3 had taken off from New Sarum and were flying 20,000 feet lower than Ian.
Randy du Rand was leading with Mike Ronnie, No 2 was Al Bruce with Doug Pasea and No 3 was Ted Brent with Jim Russell. Randy’s ASR reads:
FLOT DETAILS: Two Selous Scouts more than 2,000 metres away.
CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS: c/s 55 on channel 21.
WEATHER: Wisps of stratus at about 1,500 feet AGL. Half moon fairly high in the sky giving good visibility.
NARRATIVE:
1. Four Canberras each carrying 300 x Mk 2 FRAGS (Alpha bombs) were briefed for this strike. The first three were to run in on a first run attack at low-level using marker flares correctly placed on the ground to indicate target and direction of attack. The attack was planned for night time using low level offset bombing technique. The fourth aircraft was positioned at high level to ensure communications with the ground force and act as top cover for the helicopter assault due to occur at first light. This aircraft was based at Buffalo Range.
2. Route to the Target. The route chosen was via Fort Victoria and Chiredzi NDBs and then to the Nuanetsi/Mozambique border which was the initial point (IP) for the bomb run. The aircraft took off at 15-second intervals and routed at Flight levels 100, 105 and 110 to top of descent near Mabalauta. A gradual descent was made to 2,000 feet AGL to the IP maintaining a ground speed of 300 knots.
3. Run from IP to Target. The IP was overflown at 2,000 feet AGL and six minutes from the target the ground party was warned to light the flare in one minute’s time. At five minutes from target the ground party was instructed to light the manually operated flare and 15 seconds later the fuse was reported burning. The aircraft descended to 1,000 Feet AGL. At two minutes out the manual flare ignited and was observed by all three aircraft. Speed was increased to 350 knots ground speed and all descended to their bombing heights of 300, 400 and 500 feet respectively. As the lead aircraft was about to pass the first flare the second flare (RAMS) was initiated. Final heading corrections were made and all the bombs dropped in the target area. This was reported by c/s 55 and later proven by photography. No sign of any activity was seen by any of the aircraft.
4. Recovery. The three aircraft recovered to base at FL 250. After landing it was discovered that Green Leader and Green 3 had 50 hang-ups each.
5. Green 4. Green 4 was heard relaying messages from high altitude during the run-up to target and subsequently as Green 1, 2 and 3 returned to base. He was last heard still at high altitude awaiting the helicopter assault.