This was a great pity because from 4,000 feet one could clearly distinguish between an FN rifle and an AK-47. The only airman who showed any interest in the unit was Sergeant Pete McCabe who was also the only man I knew who used standard binoculars in flight. How Pete managed to see anything through binoculars when flying in helicopters that vibrated so much I do not know; but he was as successful with them as he was firing his machine-gun or cannon.
Having been designed for security surveillance, the night-vision unit worked wonderfully on the ground. In flight, there were too many problems in trying to match what one could see through the bright night-vision unit with one’s dimly lit map. Only regular pathways through open ground could be seen but all hills and bush lacked any perception in depth.
The US bulletproof vests were better than the few we had previously acquired from some other source although one of these had saved Vic Cook’s technician. The American vests were subjected to destructive testing from our own FN rifles and a variety of communist rifles and machine-guns firing 7.62 mm ammunition. Though the vests gave no protection against armour-piercing rounds they were considered both suitable and essential for Fireforce aircrew and airborne Army commanders. Thanks to Bob and his US contacts, our order for these life-saving items was met and became standard operational wear for aircrew and airborne Army commanders. Many men owed their lives to these vests.
I was keen to develop better ceramic platelets to produce our own protective vests and to use as protective cladding on helicopter engines. Doctor Patrick Grubb of the University of Rhodesia took up my challenge and succeeded in producing ceramic platelets that gave full protection against armour-piecing rounds fired from 100 metres. He was still negotiating with a manufacturer to produce them on a large scale when our war came to an end. For his efforts Pat Grubb was given clearance to use the technology for his own benefit but, so far as I know, this was another successful Rhodesian development that faded to nothing.
COMPOS established
FROM THE MID 1960S UNTIL MARCH 1977, overall control of operations vested with the Operations Co-ordinating Committee whose secretarial arm was the Joint Planning Staff. The OCC still comprised the Commanders of Army and Air Force, the Commissioner of Police, and the Director of Central Intelligence Organisation. The Chairman of JPS acted as secretary and he was responsible for the execution of all joint service decisions and directives emanating from OCC, whereas individual heads handled single service matters. Because service in the top posts of the Army and Air Force was limited to four years and the Police to five years, only Ken Flower of CIO served continuously on the OCC.
Under OCC were the Provincial Joint Operations Centres, JOC Hurricane (Bindura), JOC Thrasher (Umtali), JOC Repulse (Fort Victoria), JOC Tangent (Bulawayo) JOC Grapple (Gwelo) and JOC Splinter (Binga). At each JOC the Provincial Head of Internal Affairs was a permanent member. Other government departments, such as road and telecommunications, could be co-opted on an ad hoc basis. Below each JOC there were two or more Sub-JOCs. For instance, under command of JOC Hurricane were Sub-JOCs Sipolilo, Centenary, Mount Darwin and Mtoko.
At no level was there a recognised supremo. Chairing of JOC meetings was done in rotation between the Army, Air force and Police. This style of command and control expected “Reasonable men to act responsibly in co-operation with one another”. So long as we were experiencing total successes against ZIPRA and ZANLA in the years prior to 1974, the system worked remarkably well. However, by late 1976 it had become clear to everyone that ZANLA was gaining ascendancy and that Rhodesia’s resources were being stretched to the limits. It was also clear that, whereas ZANLA was working to a specific strategy, JOCs and sub JOCs were doing their own thing in the absence of clearly defined political and military strategies upon which to formulate plans and tactics.
Considerable enterprise was shown at every level in all services; but these unco-ordinated initiatives were not all good for the country. In the absence of a supreme commander with a staff of top line planners to give executive direction, it was not surprising that strong initiatives by men and units, all driven by frustration and the will to win, too often achieved negative results.
From my viewpoint, the most obvious of these was the negative mindset of many Army and Police officers towards the Selous Scouts, even though the Scouts were directly responsible for the majority of our internal counter-insurgency successes. Much of this arose from a lack of understanding of pseudo operations, and more so because Selous Scouts had to fight red tape and prejudice for everything they needed in terms of men and equipment. Ron Reid-Daly’s fiery character and deep-seated secretive manner did little to help this situation.
It appeared to me that only the RLI, Air Force and Special Branch gave the Selous Scouts support and credit for the incredible work they were doing. Like others, I was often niggled by Selous Scouts ‘freezing’ areas in which pseudo teams were working when I myself had planned to operate over those same areas. But the reason for disallowing any security forces into the ‘frozen areas’ was so obviously intended to avoid misidentification and unnecessary casualties that one learned to live with the situation. Besides, I repeat, most of our successes were coming from the ‘frozen areas’.
I believe the real reason for the Air Force’s positive attitude was that, almost from the start, helicopter crews deployed and recovered pseudo operators to and from their screened-of ‘forts’, so they got to know the Scouts operators personally and were involved in most of their pseudo successes. Apart from this, the Air Force was totally unaffected by Selous Scouts manpower and equipment needs.
A major problem in not having a national military strategy was the periodic misuse of the SAS due to differences in opinions on how the specialist unit should be employed. When made available to JOC Hurricane, the SAS were correctly used to disrupt ZANLA’s external communication routes. When detached to JOC Repulse, they were often used incorrectly on internal Fireforce tasks.
Another weakness in not having an executive command was that a general lack of co-ordination and co-operation went counter to ensuring the optimum utilisation of resources. Provincial JOCs hung jealously to whatever was theirs, often showing a marked reluctance to assist in matters outside of their boundaries—even though ZANLA’s operational zones overlapped our provincial boundaries.
The consequence of all this, and ZANLA’s ever-increasing numbers, was that an air of depression set in and many Rhodesians were emigrating in what was unkindly referred to as ‘the chicken run’. Almost every able-bodied white male was involved in military call-up and everyone could see that the political assurance that Rhodesia would win through was no more than a smoke screen. The Rhodesian press and radio boasted high successes against ZANLA, but studiously avoided telling the civilian population that, for every ZANLA killed or captured two or more replacements flowed in. There was clearly a need to turn things around and indications that such action was about to be taken came when Ian Smith was seen moving around the op areas more than usual.
