We chose Sebakwe Dam where a bright orange floating target was anchored 200 metres from the shoreline on which my party of observers and photographers was positioned. Ted Brent and his bomb-aimer, Doug Pasea, released the unit and confirmed, “bomb falling”. On the ground we focused on the floating target and were aware of the Canberra passing over our position, but nothing happened out on the water for another few seconds. We had just started to comment on the possibility of aiming error when a sound like leaking, high-pressure air surrounded us just before 4,500 darts ruffled the water surface right up to our position. Had we placed the target any closer our ground party would undoubtedly have suffered casualties. The potential for flechette strikes at night was proven to be a possibility but we never used it offensively, because of the international ruling.
‘Know your enemy’
SOME TIME AROUND MID-1977 I learned that a Mr Tony Dalton of the ‘Shepherd Group’ was looking for me. I had no clue who Dalton was or what his business was about. When Tony found me at Mtoko he introduced himself and asked if I was willing to let him pick my brain on a subject that concerned him deeply.
He told me that the Shepherd Group, including himself, comprised of three top-level commercial salesmen. Ian Shepherd had set up the small team to consider what should be done to rectify a transparent failing in Rhodesia’s handling of tribesmen who were being subjected to intense ZANLA propaganda with no obvious Rhodesian counter-action. I was immediately interested because this was a ‘hearts and minds’ issue that I thought should have been COMOPS’ highest priority.
Tony outlined the Shepherd Group’s thinking and asked for my comments. I cannot recall details, but remember offering a number of opinions that Tony considered important. I found him to be a thoroughly likeable man who understood the fundamental differences between ZANLA and RSF handling of the local people far better than the politicians, Internal Affairs or the military. In a nutshell, ZANLA expended 95% of its efforts on politicising the people and 5% against the Rhodesian establishment. The RSF, on the other hand, was forced to expend 95% of its effort in response to ZANLA activity with a mere 5% given to badly misdirected psychological action.
Whereas the Shepherd Group eventually broke up because of the lack of interest shown by the authorities, Tony felt so strongly about the need to lead and direct psychological operations that he gave up his successful civilian job to join the regular Army. For his efforts he received little more than lip service from COMOPS who, I say again, should have been leading the action in the first place.
One issue that really troubled Tony Dalton and me was how little we knew about our enemies. Though CIO and SB knew much, Rhodesian secrecy phobias blocked important information from flowing through to the fighting men. So, with Ron Reid-Daly’s active support and participation, Tony arranged a presentation entitled ‘Know your enemy’. Surprisingly few high-ranking officers took the trouble to attend this presentation, which was held in the RLI hall.
Those of us who were there were treated to an eye-opening intelligence briefing on ZANLA and ZIPRA command and field structures and were exposed to first-hand experiences given by two ex-CTs serving with Selous Scouts. One was a recently captured ZANLA detachment commander who told us simple things we should have known, but didn’t. The other was from ZIPRA. As with so many other issues that begged attention, Tony’s theories and plans were initially ignored then rushed into ineffective action when it was too late to gain any worthwhile benefits.
Salisbury recce
IN AUGUST 1977, ZANLA LAUNCHED an ineffective long-range mortar attack against New Sarum Air Base. It was so badly conducted that the nearest bomb fell more than 500 metres short of the base. Nevertheless, this was the closest action to Salisbury city and confirmed suspicions that CTs had moved into the Chimanda Tribal Trust Land on the northern side of the capital. The question arose as to whether or not CTs were based in the Seki Reserve south of New Sarum or at any location within or around Salisbury itself.
I was asked to have a look around and was surprised to find many locations that looked similar to CT bases. There were also many other places that attracted my attention and all were plotted and passed to the SB and Salisbury Police who systematically checked them out. Instead of finding terrorists, the Police made numerous arrests because I had put them onto places where illegal activities were taking place. These included stolen vehicle strip-down joints, temporary hiding-places for stolen goods and illicit liquor-producing stills.
First employment of flechettes
ON 26 OCTOBER 1977, JOHN BLYTHE-WOOD, who had been posted to Hunters, together with ‘Spook’ Geraty responded to an Army callsign who reported a large female feeding-party attending CTs in a section of riverine bush between two hill features. The target description fitted the grid-reference given and first strikes went in. But then the ground callsign told the pilots they had struck the wrong point. By the time John realised that the ground callsign had misread his map and switched his attack across to the correct target, a parallel river between two hills 700 metres away, the birds had flown.
Two days later, a Selous Scouts’ observation team on a high feature spotted this group again. The Scouts radioed that they could see 150 CTs moving northwest along the Pesu River, ten kilometres from the South African border. The Repulse Fireforce manned by the SAS responded. The K-Car, piloted by Ken Newman with OC SAS, Brian Robinson as airborne commander, called for Hunter airstrike. John Blythe-Wood and his wingman Air Lieutenant Lowrie were scrambled with Lowrie’s aircraft carrying a pair of flechette dispensers.
Ken Newman’s ASR is given in his rather unusual style. It reads:
The call-out was initiated by c/s 72B (chl 22). The sequence of events was as follows:
1. FF (1 K-Car + 4 Gs + E4) airborne from Malapati arrange for c/s A5 (Canberra) to bomb grid reference passed by c/s 72A and 72B at 30:10:02B. FF to arrive overhead at 10:03B. A5 does not identify target and does not bomb.
2. K-Car overhead area ‘A’ sees ters and opens fire. Pink Section (G-Cars) told to drop sticks to surround area ‘A’. Heavy ground fire directed at K-Car.
3. Lynx c/s E4 (Flt Lt Mienie) does 2 x Frantan/.303 attacks West to East in area ‘A’. A5 does two bomb runs on area ‘A’. K-Car calls for Hunters. Pink returns to Malapati for more troops.
4. Heavy fire still directed at K-Car now hit several times. Second Canberra (C5) on airborne standby bombs area ‘B’.
5. Hunters strafe area ‘A’ along both sides of river. 4 more stops arrive. Para-Dak (F3) arrives from FAF 8 and drops Eagle callsigns in area shown. CTs return fire and K-Car hit several times. Cannon jams. K-Car pulls back H4 attacks W.
6. Second pair of Hunters on standby. Heavy fire directed at K-Car. At no time did K-Car/K-Car commander see 150 ters. Presume advance group of 30-40 contacted in immediate area.