Rhodesians had become accustomed to the attitude of so-called friendly governments; though none of us ever understood why they were so determined to destroy what Ian Smith termed ‘responsible government’. They aimed only at appeasing black governments that had wrecked their once prosperous countries. This we had become used to, but the West’s total disinterest in the Viscount disaster was sickening.
Dean of Salisbury’s Anglican Cathedral, John de Costa, conducted a highly emotional memorial service for the victims of the Viscount disaster during which he expressed the feelings of all anti-communist Rhodesians in a sermon that highlighted the ‘deafening silence’ from our very kith and kin in the West. “Nobody who holds sacred the dignity of human life can be anything but sickened at the events attending the Viscount… this bestiality stinks in the nostrils of Heaven. But are we deafened with the voice of protest from nations who call themselves civilised? We are not! Like men in the story of the good Samaritan, they pass by on the other side.”
Ian Smith had continued in his attempts to involve Joshua Nkomo and his ZAPU party in the new order of government. Following the Viscount disaster however, anger within his party and the Rhodesian people as a whole made further attempts impossible. Everyone wanted Nkomo’s blood together with those CTs responsible for mindless murder. One week after the Viscount disaster, a grim-faced Ian Smith addressed the nation and introduced martial law in selected areas. He also gave clear warning to neighbouring territories that they must bear the consequences of any defensive strikes we might direct at CT bases within their territories. This was no idle threat because over-border strikes into Mozambique and Zambia commenced one week later.
Before Air Rhodesia had completed preliminary work to provide Viscounts with anti-Strela shielding, a second Viscount was shot down on 12 February 1979, again by ZIPRA. For some reason the scheduled departure of this Viscount, again from Kariba to Salisbury, was running a little late. Inexplicably, instead of climbing out over the lake, the skipper decided to take off in the opposite direction. Turning for Salisbury in its climb over land, the aircraft was critically damaged by a Strela missile that sent it plunging into heavy bush in very rough terrain. No one survived this time.
Subsequent to the second disaster, Air Rhodesia succeeded in shrouding Viscount exhaust pipes and painting the aircraft with the appropriate low-radiation paint. The Air Force’s modified Strela test-bed was unable to detect Viscounts flying above 2,000 feet. If any other Strela missiles were fired at Viscounts, they passed unnoticed.
Return to Chimoio
TEN MONTHS HAD PASSED SINCE Chimoio was destroyed, leaving ZANLA in a state of chaos until re-established in their New Chimoio complex east of the original site. SB had put together intelligence which, when linked to photo recce, revealed what was believed to be the whole of the target area.
Four white abductees were being held prisoner by ZANLA in this new base when Operation Snoopy was launched on 20 September 1978, again by SAS, RLI and Air Force. Photos of the base showed it to be more widespread than the original Chimoio base but an attack plan similar to Op Dingo was put into effect. Heavy haze conditions, covering Mozambique from ground level all the way up to 30,000 feet, had set in earlier than usual, but the jet pilots managed to find their targets for the opening strikes. When the troops and K-Cars moved in, it became obvious that the camps they were dealing with contained nothing like as many CTs as had been expected.
Then a Lynx pilot, conducting reconnaissance in depth, attracted very heavy fire from positions over thirty kilometres south of the attended area. Only then was it realised that ZANLA camps were spread within an elliptically shaped area exceeding 200 square kilometres in extent. Immediately the whole complex became known as the ‘Chimoio Circle’.
Troops were moved down from the northern sector of Chimoio Circle to the south where they came into contact with ZANLA in many different positions, resulting in some serious but unco-ordinated firefights. Jet and K-Car strikes criss-crossed over a multitude of targets that were surrounded by extensive trench systems incorporating many AA guns. Fighting and camp destruction operations continued into the second day before FRELIMO decided to enter the area with tanks, but apart from making a lot of noise and bumbling around in the dark, they were of no value to ZANLA who, though taking many casualties, were offering stiffer resistance than had been experienced on any previous occasion.
The haze problem worsened progressively due to huge amounts of smoke generated by hundreds of burning structures. So dense was the haze that an SAS-controlled Hunter strike, directed against the highest point of an adjacent granite hill, ended up on the same hill as the SAS callsign. Fortunately the Golf bombs detonated on the highest point over 100 metres from the callsign, but even this was too close and shrapnel mortally wounded Trooper Donnelly. The pilot, Vic Wightman, was very distressed by this unfortunate incident but, considering the amount of ordnance being put down in response to calls from the ground, it says much for the efficiency of pilots that no other soldiers were hurt in the awful conditions that prevailed. The error Vic Wightman made arose from the fact that the whaleback granite feature he was asked to attack looked much the same as any other of a number of such features within the Chimoio Circle, and they were all aligned in the same direction. Had the haze not so severely restricted visibility of the ground to a small patch directly below the aircraft, cross-referencing on river-lines would have eliminated any chance of this pilot error. The SAS quickly put the Air Force at ease by letting it be known that they fully understood the jet pilots’ problems and accepted the attendant dangers.
For the Hunters and Canberras there were other dangers. Strela missiles were being launched and two of these found their mark. One Canberra crew was aware of a substantial bump on their aircraft as they were clearing target for New Sarum. Back at base they discovered this had been from a missile that detonated at the very rear of the jet pipe and sent a shower of shrapnel into the fuselage, rupturing one fuel tank. Dave Bourhill was in a climbing turn for re-strike when a missile narrowly missed his Hunter’s jet pipe but exploded under the starboard mainplane leaving a huge hole in it. Back on the ground the damaged Hunter drew attention away from the damaged Canberra parked on the next concrete hard standing.
There was considerable disappointment in not finding the four white abductees the troops had hoped to rescue. However, amongst piles and piles of captured documents, SB came upon records dated three weeks earlier in which the four captured whites were listed as:
John HERNLEY. Place of residence—Bulawayo. Date of capture—5.2.78. (Note: ZANLA had erred in their spelling. It should have been Kennerley.)
Johannes Hendrik MAARTENS. Place of residence—Maringoyi Farm, Headlands. Date of captured—18.5.78.
Thomas WIGGLESWORTH. Place of residence—Odzani, Umtali. Date of capture—2.8.78.
James BLACK. Place of residence—Martin Forest, Melsetter. Date of capture—19.8.78.
Military ribbons and medals belonging to Thomas Wigglesworth were recovered from the personal belongings of a CT in Nehanda camp; the location known to have been where the abductees had been held. Fortunately, sufficient evidence was obtained for Red Cross International to bring about the release of these men from the Tembue area where they had been taken.