Captain Peter Stanton, having transferred from the Special Branch to the Selous Scouts, spent the night interrogating a captured CT who turned out to be the man responsible for ZANLA’s base defences. Again the Rhodesians had managed to secure a key man at a critical time. From him, Peter Stanton acquired all the details of the ZANLA defences, which were then passed to unit commanders before they launched into action on Day Three. The first of these involved clearing all the defences of a long ridge south of Casino (commencing at 072039 and extending well off the photograph through 077028).
Also revealed by the captured CT was the fact that Rex Nhongo had been at the base when the first airstrikes went in on Day One. He had crashed his Land Cruiser (around photo grid 050110) in his hurry to get away. He had then taken another vehicle and departed for Chimoio. The Selous Scouts found the crashed vehicle exactly where Peter Stanton said it would be and, following temporary repairs, it was brought back to Rhodesia at the conclusion of the operation.
Hunter strikes were placed on each defended position before Scouts moved in to secure them. In a series of surprisingly smooth-flowing actions, the entire ridge was cleared. Ack-Ack Hill was all but neutralised by Hunters delivering Golf bombs before troops overran it. These actions made it possible to mount a second attempt on Monte Casino.
When the assault took place, however, the troops were amazed to find the mountaintop deserted. Survivors had left behind many of their dead in trenches and crevasses. Wrecked guns lay strewn about the pulverised ground, which had been totally denuded of vegetation. The fact that the trees immediately outside of the anti-aircraft gun sites were still standing bore testimony to the accuracy of ground and airstrikes.
Incredibly, the soldiers came upon Jamie and Amie off to one side of the devastated area. The two baboons immediately settled down when the Scouts took them into their care. Also taken into care were a few surviving anti-aircraft guns that had been moved but then abandoned.
Following sharp actions that neutralised odd pockets of resistance, all the bases had been overrun by the end of Day Three. As they progressed through the bases burning and destroying all structures, the troops could see how well the defences and bunker systems had been prepared. Huge quantities of cooked food, found uneaten in the large kitchens, confirmed the estimated occupancy on Day One to be somewhere between 6,000 and 10,000 male and female CTs.
The great majority of ZANLA had left the area in what appeared to be an ordered easterly withdrawal. Had this been anticipated, more troops would have been positioned east of the base. As it was, the gaps between the RLI ambush locations were too wide to prevent the outflow, though many CTs had fallen to the sharp-shooting soldiers.
Thought was immediately given to mounting a new operation as it seemed certain there would be many vehicles moving along the main tar road running north from Vanduzi to collect fleeing ZANLA. The Selous Scouts’ mobile column could be expected to have a fine time if diverted to this new task, but it was too late to do this as Day Three drew to its close.
During the night of Day Three, an early-warning callsign posted to the south reported FRELIMO tanks with deployed infantry advancing towards them along the narrow vehicle track leading to the base. The 25-pounder guns were given appropriate co-ordinates and commenced firing. Following two corrections, the guns straddled the tanks with a full salvo. This had the desired effect. The infantry scattered and the tanks, one trailing smoke, high-tailed back from whence they had come.
Unfortunately no details were available to undertake a follow-up operation on fleeing CTs with any degree of certainty. In the meantime, our eavesdropping services reported considerable FRELIMO radio traffic that showed FRELIMO was moving in strength towards the ZANLA base. The risks involved in pursuing ZANLA outweighed the advantages to be gained because, by driving ZANLA from its main base and substantially disrupting its incursion plans, Op Miracle’s primary objectives had already been achieved. It was decided instead to recover forces in daylight on Day Four with small stay-behind parties remaining in hiding to watch for opportunity air targets.
The stay-behind units remained on the high ground around the base to observe activities throughout the following week. During the morning of 3 October 1979, Day Five, they reported the presence of a large FRELIMO armoured column that had interrupted its northbound journey towards Cruzamento village to give Monte Casino a thorough going-over with accurately placed cannon fire.
At Cruzamento village the armoured column based up and was joined by additional FRELIMO forces that came in from the east. There was a great deal of activity amongst the men and vehicles of the concentrated force, which appeared to be preparing to launch a night-time retaliatory attack against the nearby RSF permanent base at Ruda. In COMOPS we decided it was important to break up the force to drive FRELIMO back east. The Air Force was tasked to do this.
First strikes went in at around 13:00 against concentrated men and vehicles. First over target were Canberras flying low and fast to deliver Alpha bombs against exposed personnel. Next came Hunters attacking with Golf bombs, Matra rockets and 30mm cannons. The strikes inflicted high casualties with the destruction of a number of vehicles, but this only had the effect of bringing about a limited dispersion of the force.
A heavy haze lay over the entire area due to smoke still drifting from the ZANLA base and dense black smoke rising from burning vehicles. Although these conditions made observation of FRELIMO’s activities difficult, the Scouts OPs could see enough to establish that FRELIMO was regrouping in preparation for their planned action. The Air Force returned as soon as the jets had rearmed; but this time disaster struck in consequence of poor visibility caused by smoke and heavy haze.
It started when Flight Lieutenant Kevin Peinke and his navigator, Flight Lieutenant ‘JJ’ Strydom, struck one section of FRELIMO forces that were straddled either side of a section of road. They were on top of the first men and vehicles before seeing them but managed to release half of the bomb load amongst others ahead. Kevin decided to reverse direction and, using the dust and smoke from his first strike, bomb that part of the target he had seen first. This was an unusual and fatal error of judgement. Other enemy elements concentrated close by had seen the Canberra turning back and were fully prepared with every gun when the bombs were released.
The Canberra lost both engines, forcing Kevin to convert excess speed to height for a powerless glide towards the border. It can only be assumed that Kevin waited for ‘JJ’ to get from his bomb-aimer position in the aircraft nose back to his ejector seat, but time was too short. Both men died when the Canberra crashed short of the border.
Hunter pilots flying that afternoon said they had experienced great difficulty in judging their height above ground due to the appalling haze. This is possibly why Air Lieutenant Brian Gordon was seen to fly into the ground when making a rocket attack against armoured vehicles. His recovery from the dive was either made a fraction too late or he may have been hit. The sad facts were that we had lost another fine airman and our Hunter fleet was now reduced to eight aircraft.
Op Miracle had been successful but the cost to Rhodesia was unacceptably high. Two airmen and an RLI officer had been lost, together with an Alouette, in the high-density operation performed in direct support of Op Miracle. One Selous Scout was killed whilst clearing trenches on Day One. Another was killed and three seriously injured on Day Three when a captured weapon exploded as it was being made safe. Then on Day Five the Air Force suffered the loss of three officers, a Canberra and a Hunter.