Chambeshi bridges-Zambia
PRIOR TO MY ARRIVAL IN COMOPS, plans had been made to pressurise Zambia into making better use of its southern rail route through Rhodesia to the ports of South African. Although an economics issue, it fitted well with military plans to deny ZIPRA the rail and road facilities needed to transport war equipment from Dar es Salaam to Lusaka. The plan involved the destruction of the Tanzam rail and road bridges across the Chambeshi River situated a great distance northeast of Lusaka. Whereas the SAS had been fully prepared for this task, it had been shelved because ‘political repercussions’ remained a big concern at that time.
By August 1979, there had been substantial changes in political thinking and, because world reaction to our recent external operations had been less than expected, Operation ‘Cheese’, was on the action board again. Although there were other externals on the go, Op Cheese was the most exciting one to follow because it was so audacious and was the longest-range operation ever undertaken by any of our ground forces. The two Chambeshi bridges, lying half a kilometre apart, were almost 800 kilometres from the still-secret Air Force base at Fylde from which the operation was launched.
We were still getting over the shock of the Canberra and Hunter losses that day when Jack Malloch set off from Fylde to drop a four-man SAS free-fall pathfinder team from his DC7 into the target area. Things did not work out as planned near the bridges because one parachute failed to open, costing the team the loss of its canoes. In consequence, there was a long walk to recce the bridges and an equally long walk back to the rendezvous point to take the night drop of another twelve men.
This drop was successfully conducted when the DC7 returned around midnight on 8 October. From there the sixteen-man team had to make its way upstream to the bridges in heavily laden canoes and a powered inflatable dinghy. The Chambeshi River was flowing more swiftly than expected and this delayed arrival at the targets until the night of 11 October. Once there, the bridges were rigged for demolition in the manner the SAS had pre-planned and practised. Whilst the explosive charges were being placed, two of the team members set up a roadblock to hijack a suitably large vehicle. This was necessary to transport the whole team with canoes and dinghy to a remote position in far-off Luangwa Game Reserve for uplift to Rhodesia by Cheetah helicopters.
The hijacking of a twenty-ton truck driven by its white owner was successful but became complicated when the brother of the driver, noticing that the twenty-tonner was no longer following his own truck, turned back to investigate. This man refused to leave his brother.
In the meanwhile, a third white man stopped, believing the twenty-ton truck had broken down. As if this was not bad enough, a ten-year-old white boy was accompanying one of the brothers, his uncle, as a special birthday treat. Consequently, for security reasons, the SAS had to hold captive the three white men, two black co-drivers and the ten-year-old birthday boy. Once the charges were set and fuses lit, the twenty-ton truck carrying twenty-two people with canoes and dinghy set off down the main road towards Lusaka. Some way from the bridges the satisfying sound of a single huge explosion reached the men; but they had no way of knowing if the bridges were down. When dawn was breaking a little short of the small town of Serenje, the truck turned south down a secondary road towards the Luangwa Game Reserve.
Unhappily they came upon a power station in the middle of nowhere and the SAS were forced to shoot security guards who came to investigate their presence. From there they managed to bundu-bash their way to a position where the Cheetahs collected them, captives and all. By this time the SAS team was relieved to get the news via their HF radio that Canberra reconnaissance had confirmed both bridges were down.
The hapless Zambians were noticeably apprehensive about their own safety right up to the moment they were ushered into the Cheetahs. Thereafter they relaxed and were treated to Rhodesian hospitality until suitable arrangements were made for their safe return to Zambia.
Moatize bridges
THE OP MANACLE PLAN TO destroy all Mozambique’s bridges was initiated with the downing of three rail bridges on the line north of the Zambezi River. Apart from denying ZANLA any rail transport for men and munitions from Beira to Tete Province, severing the line at this particular time complemented the cutting of the Tanzam rail at the Chambeshi River. With this rail line also cut, Zambia would have no Mozambican outlet as an alternative to the South African ports.
Ten months had passed since the SAS destroyed the Mecito bridge and the train that was crossing it. No attempt had been made to repair the bridge or recover the engine that remained nose down in the riverbed, but trains were being run to each side of the river to transfer passengers and porter goods from one train to another. The destruction of another three widely separated bridges would put an end to this practice.
Dakotas delivered three SAS teams to the bridges during the evening of 12 October 1979. Early next morning, Cheetahs brought in the heavy explosive packs and the three bridges were dropped in daylight on the same day.
FRELIMO guards at the biggest bridge had fled when their fire was answered with overwhelming aggression. Apart from this, no opposition occurred save from a swarm of bees. Stirred to anger by detonation pressure waves, thousands of bees attacked all the members of one team, causing two to be hospitalised. Also stirred to anger was the FRELIMO Government.
Improved methods of packaging and laying demolition charges had worked so well for the SAS on the five bridges in Mozambique and Zambia that the same principles were adopted and tailored for each of the bridges assigned for destruction during Op Manacle. When all was ready however, the Mozambican op was postponed at short notice. The SAS were about to launch from Chipinda Pools in southeast Rhodesia when analysis of intelligence confirmed the imminence of a ZIPRA invasion. Understandably the SAS Regiment was incensed by the eleventh hour deferral of an operation for which they were so well prepared. It had happened many times before but, in this case, there was a general belief amongst the SAS officers that there were sinister reasons for calling off their biggest job which, for the first time ever, involved every available member of the SAS.
Encounter with conventional ZIPRA forces
FOR SOME TIME SELOUS SCOUTS teams had been operating inside Zambia on recce and disruption tasks south of the main road from Lusaka to Livingstone. Helicopters were used for all deployments and recoveries and a limited amount of assistance was given to Scouts by Lynx pilots making visual recce sorties to assist in the selection of unpopulated routes.
First indications of a ZIPRA conventional force in the remote dry country northwest of Kariba came from one Lynx pilot who reported encountering heavy anti-aircraft gunfire when he was returning to base from a recce task. Little notice was taken of this until two helicopter pilots were subjected to the same treatment from precisely the same location.
The Canberra tasked to photograph the spot did so at midday on 10 October when the sun was directly above the aircraft. The Kariba area had remained completely dry in spite of heavy rains in the eastern areas of the country. In consequence, the dry white soil of the region reflected the sun’s rays so strongly that images on the photographs blended all features in a manner that made distinguishing between rocks, scrub and open ground difficult—even through stereoscopic viewers.