Most of the deep gorge below the Victoria Falls had been ignored in regular Border Control operations. This was partly due to a shortage of troops but more so because that stretch of the border was considered safe. The bone-dry, unpopulated rough country on the Zambian side of the Zambezi River plus steep-sided gorges and fast-flowing turbulent water with many crocodiles all appeared to form a perfect barrier. But this crossing awakened us to the fact that we had been focusing too much on ZANU’s infiltration methods that involved the use of vehicles to reach the Zambezi River and fishermen’s canoes to cross it.
ZAPU’s Russian advisers had obviously studied our Border Control coverage and techniques and had selected the Batoka Gorge as being the last place we would expect a crossing to occur. Employing a system of ropes, pulleys and two rubber dinghies, men and equipment were ferried from north to south bank on and above the raging water.
The process started at sunset and was completed before dawn. The group rested up on the south bank until late afternoon then commenced the difficult climb up to the high ground. Avoiding all habitation, the group bypassed Wankie town then turned south to intercept the railway line. Terrorist presence was first reported from Matetsi Mission but the report gave no indication of numbers.
We were to learn that one third of the force comprised ZAPU men with the balance being South African ANC terrorists. There was significance in this, the largest crossing to date. It had been jointly planned and launched by James Chikerema who was deputy to ZAPU’s leader and Oliver Tambo, the external leader of the SAANC. (ZAPU’s leader, Joshua Nkomo, was in detention in Rhodesia.) A few days after hurriedly launching their joint force, they signed a military alliance that remained in effect throughout the Rhodesian war.
The force was four times larger than any ZANU group and all its men were substantially better trained. Mistakenly, Chikerema and Tambo considered their joint force to be strong enough to fight off any Rhodesian Security Force (RSF) it might encounter. The force was tasked to establish a safe passage through N’debele territory down the western flank of Rhodesia, right up to the Limpopo River, to give SAANC a permanent route to South Africa.
The whole group was resting in the shade of heavy riverine bush covering both sides of the small Inyatue River where they encountered surface water for the first time since leaving the Zambezi. Close to their position was the Inyatue railway bridge on the line from Victoria Falls to Bulawayo. Having followed the winter-dry riverbed, the terrorists had passed under the railway bridge before locating the shaded water point three kilometres farther upstream. Here they split the force either side of their entry tracks as a precaution against armed follow-up.
It was in response to a railway repair party’s report that a mixed tracker-combat group of RAR and Police moved in. Led by Major Peter Hoskins it comprised twenty men, which was considered a strong force at the time. Tracks of many men led the Rhodesians along the river-line up to the railway bridge. The Rhodesians opened into extended line to cross the high railway embankment and continued forward until they encountered thick riverine bush. Concentrating on the bush ahead, they moved with caution until they came under fire at close range. The Rhodesian’s were lucky not to suffer serious casualties immediately.
When after some time Major Hoskins attempted a flanking movement, Acting Corporal Davison and Private Karomi were killed and the major was wounded. He lay unable to move for something like ten hours before being dragged to safety by his daring Regimental Sergeant-Major, Aubrey Corb. Three separate firefights developed with the terrorists using searching fire on the line of men who, though pinned down, had crawled into cover. With so much fire in an environment of deep shade and brilliant sunlight, where visual penetration into the bush was less than three meters in most places, it proved impossible to detect actual points of enemy fire or judge the terrorist force disposition and strength. What was patently clear was that reinforcements were needed in a hurry.
Flight Lieutenant Mick Grier with Bob Whyte as his gunner brought these in then expended all their ammunition into the unseen terrorist positions before returned to FAF 1 to refuel and re-arm. A Provost flown by Prop Geldenhuysremained overhead the contact scene until after dark to serve as a radio relay (Telstar) back to Brigade HQ in Wankie. Since Peter Hoskins had been separated from his radio, there was concern for his safety. Before sunset one group of SF had led a lateral skirmish towards other SF with a view to consolidating defence and firepower. During this move, a radio was put out of action by machine-gun fire. Prop received a request for a replacement radio and was able to pick up the position of a white map laid out in an open patch of ground on the right flank where troops with the defunct radio had moved.
Bob Whyte, son of Group Captain Doug Whyte, had the replacement radio. Having dropped off troops, Mick Grier located the men waiting for the radio. As he landed the helicopter came under heavy fire. Mick lifted away immediately, but Bob Whyte had already leapt out onto the ground where he immediately attracted terrorist fire that forced him to go to ground.
Lying on his belly in a small depression, Bob realised he was out of the terrorists’ direct view but he could not move. Bob could see the troops who required the radio but he could not get to them. Bob’s quandary was that he had a serviceable radio without an aerial and the troops with a serviceable aerial were just too far away to throw it to him.
After some thought Bob reached into his flying overalls for a screwdriver, which he thrust against the radio’s aerial jack point and tried a transmission to Mick Grier watching him helplessly from above. To Bob’s amazement and relief, he received a reply and was able to make further transmissions when called upon to do so. The benefit of having a working radio outweighed the discomfort of receiving a sharp electrical belt down his arm each time he transmitted. With extra troops now available, covering fire was given for the troops to get to Bob.
The firefight continued until darkness fell but at some stage Inspector Phillips of the BSAP, who had come in with reinforcements, received a bullet wound to his head that would commit him to a wheelchair for life. Any ground movement attracted heavy fire from terrorists who everyone could hear talking Zulu, the same language as N’debele. RSM Aubrey Corb, who had also come in with the reinforcement force, called for but received no answer from Major Hoskins. Everything remained quiet so long as troops stayed in situ. Since movement or sound drew immediate enemy response, Aubrey Corb knew that Peter Hoskins, if still alive, would remain silent unless he was absolutely certain of friendly force positions. At about 22:00 the RSM was on high ground at the edge of the contact site. From this position he fired an Icarus flare knowing that Peter Hoskins would recognise it as having come from an RAR position. Peter recognised the distinctive plume almost directly above him and immediately called from the darkness. During his descent to retrieve the major, Aubrey Corb accidentally discovered seriously wounded Inspector Phillips.
Apart from the blackness of the night, it was decided that casualty evacuation by Mick Grier in the only available helicopter was too dangerous because its landing light would undoubtedly attract enemy fire; so the alternate option of a motorised rail car was used to reach the remote area. But this involved carrying the casualties three kilometres from the contact area across rough ground on a pitch-black night. Major Hoskins insisted that Inspector Phillips be given the only available stretcher because he considered the policeman’s condition to be more serious than his own. Hoskins himself was in deep trouble having been hit in the upper thigh right next to the femoral artery. He had managed to stuff fabric into the wound to stem the high flow of blood but had lost so much during his long wait that he was barely conscious during his ride on a crude makeshift stretcher.