ZAPU and ZANU both claimed to have the majority following of black Rhodesians yet both organisations resorted to destroying the very infrastructures intended for the good of the people they claimed to lead. Schools were burned down and cattle dips were either destroyed or the tribesmen were instructed not to observe Rhodesian Government efforts designed to protect their primary measure of wealth, cattle, from deadly tickborne diseases. Contouring of agricultural land to prevent soil erosion also received negative attention.
Bored and unemployed youths were excited into destructive activities that turned youths against their parents and parents against their children. This resulted in the banning of ZAPU and ZANU with many leaders being imprisoned or escaping into political exile. Despite their early efforts ZAPU and ZANU exiles, having turned to arms, became deeply frustrated when they realised both urban and rural folks preferred the benevolence of their white government to fighting for a vote that could not be eaten, sold or screwed.
Inside the country the majority of black people were content, showing no desire to leave home for military training in foreign lands before returning to fight a war they neither wanted nor understood. Consequently ZANU and ZAPUresorted to press-ganging Rhodesian youths who had gone to Zambia for higher education. Many black expatriates returned to Rhodesia, allowing our intelligence services to draw up detailed lists of those outside the country. Special Branch also took opportunity to send trained agents to Zambia, posing as students, to be press-ganged into ZAPU and ZANU ranks.
Josiah Tongogara of ZANU was a prime mover in bringing about the changes that led him to become overall commander of the military arm of ZANU (this was ZANLA—Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army). He headed the fourth ZANU intake at Itubi Training Camp in Tanzania where he showed his determination to improve training and redirect ZANU’s military efforts towards something more worthwhile than had been achieved by party politicians. He realised from the outset that prospects for joint action with ZAPU were dim. ZANU was essentially a Shona organisation and was trained by Chinese communists, whereas ZAPU were N’debele-led and Russian-trained.
Joshua Nkomo was the leader of ZAPU and was generally, but mistakenly, hailed by the leaders of Africa to be father of the Zimbabwean (Rhodesian) nation. In consequence, President of Zambia, Doctor Kenneth Kaunda, being related to Nkomo by marriage, favoured ZAPU and paid little attention to its rival ZANU. Initially FRELIMO also favoured ZAPU to keep in Kaunda’s good books in a quest for unrestricted use of Zambia as a rear base. This is why FRELIMO repeatedly offered ZAPU free passage through Tete to reach the Rhodesian population, believing implicitly that Joshua Nkomo was the true leader of all Rhodesia’s black people. But ZAPU kept stalling on this offer.
ZANU’s Tongogara faced enormous problems that any lesser leader would not have overcome. He knew that only through improved performance in Rhodesia could ZANU gain the support of African leaders and receive financial assistance from the OAU’s liberation funds. However, having led his organisation into improved preparedness for military operations, he faced difficulties in transiting men and materials through hostile Zambia. This was overcome with FRELIMO’s secret and somewhat reluctant connivance to allow ZANU men and equipment, dressed and assigned in FRELIMO’s name, to transit Zambia.
Even as late as 1970 ZANU was still committed to the ‘no win’ routes across the Zambezi River where Rhodesian forces blocked all hopes of turning in an improved performance. Tongogara realised that ZANU’s salvation lay with FRELIMO for unimpeded access via the Tete Province, which FRELIMO now controlled, to the black population that straddled theRhodesia/Mozambican border.
A meeting between FRELIMO and ZANU eventually took place in mid-1970 when FRELIMO agreed to assist ZANU. This was because FRELIMO had finally realised that ZAPU was not going to accept the long-standing offer of assistance. Despite Nkomo’s claims, FRELIMO had made contact with the Shona people inside Rhodesia and learned that ZAPU had absolutely no support outside of N’debele territory. Also established was that ZANU enjoyed much wider support in Rhodesia. Yet of greater importance to FRELIMO was ZANU’s obvious and urgent desire to prosecute a war of liberation in the manner FRELIMO supported, understood and practised—the Chinese communist way. Nevertheless cooperation started on a small scale.
Tongogara sent four of his senior men to report to FRELIMO’s Jose Moyane, Commander of the Tete Front. They were integrated into FRELIMO’s ranks for the purpose of gaining first-hand knowledge of FRELIMO’s war against the Portuguese, their control of local tribesmen, their handling of recruits, caching of arms and so on. The lessons learned were passed back to Tongogara who sent increasing numbers of his men to learn from FRELIMO.
A few men within ZANU’s ranks had received Russian training before crossing over from ZAPU to ZANU. This caused differences in opinions between the advocates of Russian and Maoist philosophies. In a nutshell the Russians believed in direct confrontation for a quick result whereas the Chinese approach accepted that a long period was needed to adequately prepare the ground for widespread insurrection and protracted armed action. Whereas the Russians relied on arms, the Chinese relied on people.
FRELIMO settled the matter by insisting that only the Maoist approach would work. ZANU were given directions on how they had to prepare their firm support base amongst the people for recruits, security, intelligence and the subsistence needed to support large numbers of fighters on a continuous basis over a protracted period.
In the meanwhile many ZANU men were being prepared for combat at Mgagao in Tanzania. This new training base had replaced Itubi in 1971. It was in this year too that our doubts about Portuguese forces’ ability to contain FRELIMO were confirmed when Rhodesian forces came into contact with FRELIMO forces along our border during an operation codenamed ‘Lobster’. By early 1972 ZANU was ready to make its first reconnaissance probes into Rhodesia, FRELIMO having secured the ground right up to the border and having also concluded preliminary arrangements with some tribal chiefs inside Rhodesia.
Special Branch detective Section Officer Peter Stanton, who I would come to know quite well, had warned of ZANLA’s imminent arrival in the northeastern sector of Rhodesia. First indications from sources inside Zambia showed that ZANLA would be probing on a wide front. Then civilians coming over our border seeking refuge from FRELIMO domination told Peter that ZANLA reconnaissance units were based near the border east of Mukumbura. In late March they named one location as Matimbe base. This was confirmed when the SAS (Special Air Service) mounted an operation that resulted in a number of kills. All the bodies were dressed in FRELIMO uniforms but documents confirmed most were ZANLA men.
Documents captured at Matimbe base revealed two important things. One was that indoctrination of headmenwithin Rhodesia had already succeeded in obtaining willing recruits to swell ZANLA’s numbers, thus eliminating any further need to press-gang for recruits in Zambia. The other confirmed that ZANLA intended to infiltrate on a wide front to spread Rhodesian forces and interrupt the smooth running of the economy by forcing an increase in the call-up of Territorial Army soldiers.