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In April 1931, Elsas was appointed Deputy-Mayor of Berlin. He served with distinction, but for all his successes, the changing political landscape worried him deeply. The dismal failure of the democratic experiment paved the way for the autocratic rule of General von Schleicher and Franz von Papen. These short-lived authoritarian administrations made a Hitler dictatorship possible. In a diary entry dated 27 February 1933, Elsas contemplated the end of his political career:

I am trying to find out from Steiniger what is going to happen after the elections. For two days there has been a rumour that a decree is being prepared in the Prussian Ministry of the Interior which will allow for the suspension of public officials. If it is true, then we are all out.

On 14 February 1933, Elsas applied for leave in order to be spared the ignominy of dismissal. Nonetheless, he was forced to resign from his post six months later. Although he had been hounded out of politics, Elsas was at least spared some of the state’s more repressive measures due to his mixed-marriage status.

Elsas used his skills to reinvent himself as a business and foreign exchange expert. He went on to provide valuable services to German-Jewish citizens fleeing Hitler’s oppressive policies. During this time, he also joined a resistance group led by District Judge Ernst Strassmann and businessman Hans Robinsohn. Like many of his associates in the Strassmann-Robinsohn group, Elsas was a left-wing libertarian. His liberal outlook was however tinged with a measure of romanticised nationalism. For Elsas, a ‘dictatorship of the centre’ was preferable to either a Communist or Nazi state.

Elsas’ foreign currency dealings came to the attention of the Gestapo in July 1937. However, a thorough search failed to uncover any incriminating evidence. Nonetheless, he was still charged with violating the strict codes that restricted the flow of currency in and out of Nazi Germany. Following a prolonged period of interrogation, he was sentenced to a term of five months imprisonment in Berlin’s Moabit prison. The investigation cost Elsas his secretary, his client base, and ultimately his business. After serving his time with quiet dignity, he returned to the modest Berlin-Dahlem apartment where he lived with his wife Maria.

Imprisonment and the subsequent trauma of the so-called ‘Night of the Broken Glass’ had a profound effect on Elsas. The outbreak of war in September 1939 provided a further stimulus for the intensification of his resistance activities. Elsas worked closely with the former Mayor of Leipzig, Carl Friedrich Goerdeler. Anticipating a post-Hitler Germany, he and Goerdeler worked on framing a proclamation which would be broadcast to the public in the event of a successful coup. Elsas also developed contacts with many of the leading players in the 20 July plot. These leading conservatives trusted this German-Jewish liberal implicitly. His active involvement in the resistance movement hints at the lack of conviction of the German social, political and military elite towards Nazi anti-Semitic policies.

For Elsas, the dangers of active resistance were very real. In her diary, the White Russian exile Marie Vassiltchikov noted that, ‘The warrant for Goerdeler’s arrest had been issued before the coup, on 17 July’. Goerdeler was twice given shelter by Elsas. However, his lack of discretion finally led to his arrest in Marienwerder on 12 August 1944 (following a tip-off from an innkeeper named Lisbeth Schwaerzel). During his interrogations, Goerdeler overloaded the authorities with information in a bid to buy time for his fellow conspirators.

The authorities eventually saw through Goerdeler’s time wasting tactics. Unbeknown to him, the net had already began closing in on his fellow conspirators. Elsas had been picked up by the authorities two days earlier, and taken to the prison on Lehrter Strasse. Here, he underwent harsh interrogation and torture. Despite this rough handling, Elsas refused to cooperate. As a result, he remained in solitary confinement until his transfer to Sachsenhausen in December. On 4 January 1945, the former Deputy Mayor of Berlin was executed without due legal process at Sachsenhausen’s Station Z shooting facility. Two weeks later, the Deutsch Reichsanzeiger newspaper announced the confiscation of his estate. Under the kin liability laws, his wife, son, and two daughters were imprisoned. His son was sent to Buchenwald, whilst his wife and two daughters were sent to Ravensbruck. By some miracle, all four survived the war.

On 20 July 1954 (ten years to the day since the failed assassination attempt at Hitler’s Rastenburg HQ), Elsas was remembered at a commemorative event in Berlin, during which a street was named in his honour. Since then there have been many events commemorating both the anti-Nazi resistance movements and individuals engaged in resistance activities. Following a commemorative event at Berlin’s Plotzensee Prison in 2015, Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen posed the following questions:

Did the majority of Germans lose their sense of humanity? Were they too afraid to help? Were they convinced Nazis? Did they hope to profit from the regime? Or did they tell themselves that everything would turn out OK? All of these will have played a part.

In a few short words, the Defence Minister articulated the thorny issue of why more Germans didn’t resist. People are individuals, each with their own drives, desires or fears. Elsas was a driven individual. To begin with, his overriding drive was to serve. Later, as the iniquities of the Nazi state became apparent, his focus switched to resistance. There were others like him, brave men and women who chose a noble path. They were the real heroes.

Chapter Two

Miracle on the Oder

Preparations for the Soviet offensive against Berlin were completed by early December 1944. The massive mechanised Red Army formations stood ready for the final assault on Hitler’s Reich. At the Magnuszew bridgehead, Marshal Georgy Zhukov concentrated Colonel General Vasily Chuikov’s 8th Guards Army, Colonel General P.A. Belov’s 61st Army, and Lieutenant General N.E. Bezarin’s 5th Shock Army for the initial thrust against the German 9th Army. The task assigned to these forces was to penetrate German defences up to a depth of thirty kilometres, thereby opening up their lines for tactical exploitation by Colonel General Mikhail Katukov’s 1st Guards Tank Army, Colonel General Semyon Bogdanov’s 2nd Guards Tank Army, and Lieutenant General Vladimir Kruikov’s 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps. To the south, Zhukov massed additional forces at the Pulawy bridgehead. These forces were comprised of Colonel General Vladimir Kolpakchi’s 69th Army and Colonel General Viacheslav Tsetaev’s 33rd Army. These formations were reinforced with substantial tank forces, whose mobility would facilitate the rapid link up with neighbouring forces to the west.

At front level, the normal pre-offensive preparations went ahead. In the crucial sector of operations, Zhukov had at his disposal eight combined-arms armies, two tank armies, two guards cavalry corps, and an air army. Supplying such a massive force created huge logistical problems, Zhukov later recalling that the colossal quantities of stores required, ‘had to be brought up as close as possible to the front line, to give us the necessary conditions for a breakthrough in depth’. Zhukov’s problems were compounded by a lack of partisan intelligence and the threat of hostile activities which threatened his lines of supply. It was also clear to him that the vanguard of 1st Belorussian Front would meet strong German resistance in their westward drive towards Berlin. Though convinced of ultimate victory, Zhukov knew that the coming battle would be a tough struggle.