A second Soviet Front was concentrated to the south of Zhukov’s forces at the Baranow and Sandomierz bridgeheads. Effective deception measures (Maskirovka) served to convince the German High Command that the main thrust of Marshal Ivan Konev’s 1st Ukrainian Front would be towards Krakow. However, his real intention was to advance from Baranow towards Kielce, destroying any German forces barring his way. His troops would then continue their advance towards the Oder near the Silesian capital of Breslau. For the initial assault, he could deploy three armies and six breakthrough artillery divisions. The second echelon standing ready to exploit the initial breakthrough would consist of General Pavel Rybalko’s 3rd Guards Tank Army and General Dmitry Lelyushenko’s 4th Guards Tank Army. Konev enjoyed considerably more space for operational manoeuvre than his colleague and rival Zhukov. However, he too knew that his forces faced the prospect of a hard fight against skilful and determined opponents.
Like a gigantic coiled spring, the two massive Soviet Fronts tensed themselves to unleash their pent up energy. The only thing holding them back was the weather which was unseasonably mild and wet. On 8 January, the forecasters predicted that colder weather promising firmer going was expected in Poland. This came as good news to Stalin, as only two days before, the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had sent an urgent message requesting an acceleration of Soviet offensive plans in order to relieve the burden on the Western Front. Without delay, Stalin charged his head of operations, General Aleksei Antonov with making the necessary arrangements for the accelerated offensive schedule with the front commanders. Whist this late change made Stalin appear more than accommodating, it placed a huge strain on already overstretched logistic services. The planned Vistula-Oder and East Prussian operations would now have to be launched consecutively rather than simultaneously. Notwithstanding, the difficulties caused by the speeding up of his offensive timetable, Stalin could be well satisfied that the Allies would look favourably on his willingness to come to their aid.
On 12 January 1945, Konev launched his assault from the Baranow bridgehead against General Fritz-Hubert Graeser’s 4th Panzer Army. Poor weather had grounded his aircraft, yet despite this setback he remained confident of victory. On the first day of the offensive, Konev’s mechanised forces made good progress. However, the pace slackened as German resistance stiffened in the Kielce-Chmielnik area. Reacting quickly, Konev committed some of his mechanised reserves. These additional forces then enabled him to achieve a breakthrough into open country. On 17 January, the Warte was crossed, opening the way to the conquest of the valuable industrial area around Katowice. Konev intentionally left the German forces a ‘Golden Bridge’ as an escape route, thus ensuring that the mines and factories would be taken intact.
To the north, Zhukov launched his main attack from the Magnuszew bridgehead on 14 January, two days after Konev’s attack. The assault was preceded by a thunderous artillery barrage which as General Vasily Chuikov noted, ‘Made the earth heave and shake as if in fever’. In total, some 315,000 rounds were dumped on positions occupied by the German 9th Army. The attack went in immediately after the barrage was lifted, and quickly succeeded in opening up gaps in the German defence. By the end of the first day, forward elements had crossed the Pilica. A twelve kilometre deep wedge had been driven into the German lines.
Zhukov’s secondary attack launched from the Pulawy bridgehead was even more of a success, with troops crossing the Zwolenka and penetrating German defences up to a depth of twenty-two kilometres on the first day. As German forces were locked into a battle for Radom, General Heinz Guderian warned Hitler that the Eastern Front could not hold out without major reinforcements. There were none forthcoming, Hitler making it clear that for the time being, the Eastern Front would have to take care of itself. On 15 January, Soviet fighter-bombers and anti-tank units broke up a determined German counter-attack by the 19th and 25th Panzer Divisions aimed at relieving the shattered remnants facing the Magnuszew bridgehead. After successfully blunting the German attack, Zhukov’s troops broke out to threaten the Polish capital. Like a steamroller, the advance crushed everything in its path, General Kurt von Tippelskirch reporting that, ‘Units of the 9th Army still holding on the Vistula near Warsaw and south of it were in grave danger’. The shattered Polish capital would fall to the Red Army within days.
Hitler responded to the loss of Warsaw by lashing out at his own commanders. He was wholly convinced that German reverses on the battlefront were due to a lack of will. To remedy this situation, he sought to impose his own iron will upon the crumbling Eastern Front by increasingly interfering in the conduct of operations. This irrational approach robbed the German defence of tactical flexibility. By insisting on holding onto ground everywhere, Hitler doomed his defending formations to encirclement and destruction.
Whilst Hitler’s behaviour becoming ever more irrational, Stalin’s became increasingly cautious. For the supreme Soviet warlord, the fruits of victory appeared to be tumbling into his hands too quickly. Stalin was conscious that defeat had been snatched from the jaws of victory during the Battle of Warsaw in 1920. As such, he was determined that overconfidence should not once more lead to disaster. A Stavka (Soviet High Command) directive issued on 17 January redefined the objectives for the two main fronts involved in the Berlin Strategic Operation. Zhukov’s front was to secure the Poznan-Bydgozcz line no later than 2-4 February. Meanwhile, Konev’s forces were to advance towards Breslau, reaching the River Oder no later than 30 January. However, events soon overtook the latest directive.
The collapsing German battlefront reduced 4th Panzer Army and 9th Army to a drifting mass of men. Thousands of beleaguered troops organised themselves into ‘Roving Cauldrons’ in an attempt to hold off the Red Army and gain the comparative safety of the reorganised German lines. On 20 January, forward elements of Konev’s forces crossed the German frontier at Namslau. Two days later, 5th Guards Tank Army seized a bridgehead on the western bank of the Oder near Oppeln. The following night, 16th Guards Mechanised Brigade reached the Oder north of Steinau. By the evening of 23 January, Bromberg had been cleared of German troops, thereby opening the road into Hitler’s Reich.
Caution dominated Stalin’s thinking again on 25 January, following an intimation by Zhukov that he intended to continue his advance towards Kustrin. Stalin expressed concern that this advance would widen the gap between the two advancing fronts. Notwithstanding the supreme warlord’s concerns, Zhukov went on to persuasively argue his case, pointing out that by delaying, ‘It will become more difficult to penetrate the Miedzyrzecz fortified line’. Stalin agreed to think things over. Meanwhile, events took over following the capture of a group of German officers and men by a reconnaissance group from 1st Guards Tank Army. Interrogation of the prisoners revealed that the line was not yet fully manned and that units were still in the process of moving in to fill the gaps. After appraising Stalin of the situation, Zhukov was given permission to continue his advance, with the proviso that he safeguard his right flank. German resistance was quickly overcome. The last major water obstacle before Berlin was now in Zhukov’s sights.