62 Yeltsin in his memoirs (Zapiski, 247) refers to Burbulis as “de facto the head of the Cabinet of Ministers” in the early months. Gaidar soon replaced him as the same. Yeltsin once or twice interceded at cabinet meetings on narrow points. At a session in December 1992, he criticized Andrei Vorob’ëv, the aging health minister, who passed out. Yeltsin fired him days later. Vorob’ëv was to help treat Yeltsin’s heart condition in 1996. Sergei Kolesnikov, Chernomyrdin’s head speech writer, interview with the author (June 8, 2000).
63 Gennadii Burbulis, third interview, conducted by Yevgeniya Al’bats (August 31, 2001). The State Council replaced a Political Consultative Council Burbulis set up for Yeltsin as head of the Russian parliament in 1990. Besides informing Yeltsin, this earlier body was designed to help him outbid Gorbachev for the affections of the Moscow intelligentsia.
64 The cabinet ministers were Eduard Dneprov (minister of education), Nikolai Fëdorov (justice), Andrei Kozyrev (foreign affairs), Valerii Makharadze (deputy premier), and Aleksandr Shokhin (deputy premier and labor minister). Shakhrai retained the title of state counselor when he became a deputy premier in December 1991.
65 “The creators of the new structure . . . are inspired by the idea of ‘the constructive state,’ which they juxtapose to ‘the corrupting state’ based on apparatus ‘moves,’ ‘corridor pragmatism,’ and the system of personal connections and mutual favors. To all appearances, the leaders of the State Council see the source of this evil in the old apparatus of the Russian Council of Ministers.” Burbulis antagonized others by trying to get a clause in the State Council’s charter giving it the right to review all draft presidential decrees. Mikhail Leont’ev, “Rossiya bez pravitel’stva” (Russia without a government), Nezavisimaya gazeta, October 5, 1991.
66 Sergei Stankevich, interview with the author (May 29, 2001). The same point was emphasized by Sergei Shakhrai, second interview with the author (January 24, 2001).
67 Yel’tsin, Zapiski, 242.
68 Stankevich was to be accused of corruption for an incident in 1993. He fled the country in 1995 and returned in 1999 after the charges were dropped. A group of ten or eleven presidential advisers, most of them unpaid, remained on the roster until the end of 1993. They had very little say collectively or individually. Yeltsin retained a few individuals with that rank in later years.
69 Kostikov, Roman s prezidentom, 322. Most speculation about a supercoordinator fastened on the Security Council. Its founding secretary, Skokov, and Aleksandr Lebed, who directed it briefly in 1996, used it as a political bandstand, but its ability to coordinate was slight.
70 See Korzhakov, Boris Yel’tsin, 140–50, who says Yeltsin wanted the house to contain a common laundry and an apartment where all the residents would have social events (neither was built). Yeltsin’s daughter has said he “spent literally a couple of nights” at the flat between 1994 and 2000. Tat’yana D’yachenko, “Papa khotel otprazdnovat’ yubilei po-domashnemu” (Papa wanted to celebrate his birthday home-style), Komsomol’skaya pravda, February 1, 2001. Vladimir Shevchenko (Povsednevnaya zhizn’ Kremlya pri prezidentakh [The everyday life of the Kremlin under the presidents] [Moscow: Molodaya gvardiya, 2004], 36) describes the aversion to the house in the same terms Yeltsin in his memoirs used to describe his overexposure to Gennadii Burbulis: “Psychologically, it was very difficult and untenable to see and converse with the very same people at home and at work.”
71 Yel’tsin, Zapiski, 341.
72 According to Korzhakov, Yeltsin was “categorically against” admitting Chernomyrdin. Korzhakov convinced him, pointing out that several deputy premiers had been accepted. Aleksandr Korzhakov, Boris Yel’tsin: ot rassveta do zakata; poslesloviye (Boris Yeltsin: from dawn to dusk; epilogue) (Moscow: Detektiv-press, 2004), 35.
73 When I spoke to Berezovskii about Yeltsin, one of his opening points was that the president had acknowledged his worth by bringing him into the club. Berezovskii, interview with the author (March 8, 2002). Rybkin also spoke fondly about it, and a half-decade after its dissolution was still carrying a member’s card in his wallet (interview, May 29, 2001). The bylaws reserved expulsion for one offense only: betrayal (predatel’stvo), which was to be decided by unanimous vote of the members. When Korzhakov lost his job in June 1996, he was evicted from the club in simpler fashion. Chernomyrdin, a member at Korzhakov’s insistence, phoned him and told him not to come around any more. “There was nothing to do. I packed up my things and went to exercise somewhere else.” Korzhakov, Boris Yel’tsin, 36.
74 Quotation from Valentin Yumashev, fourth interview with the author (January 22, 2007). Membership figure from Shamil’ Tarpishchev, Samyi dolgii match (The longest match) (Moscow: VAGRIUS, 1999), 294.
75 Yurii Petrov, first and second interviews with the author (May 25, 2000, and February 1, 2002).
76 Yeltsin emphasized his unhappiness at Petrov’s tactics in Zapiski, 297.
77 Quotation from Yel’tsin, Marafon, 257.
78 Huskey, Presidential Power in Russia, 58–59.
79 In addition to three or four other policy-specific assistants, the group included service providers such as Yeltsin’s protocol chief, head of chancery, and speech writers. The guitar-strumming Lev Sukhanov, who began with Yeltsin in Gosstroi in 1988, remained until 1997. His interest in the occult made him a marginal presence in his last several years in the Kremlin.
80 Baturin et al., Epokha, 210. Although Filatov’s organization was much bigger, the physical setup privileged Ilyushin. Filatov had his office in Kremlin Building No. 14 and Ilyushin his in Building No. 1, several doors from Yeltsin.
81 For example, on the morning commute with Yeltsin, Korzhakov noted the first secretary’s comments about stores they had inspected along the way. He would then telephone the party secretary for trade and services, Alla Nizovtseva, with a report. Nizovtseva, says Korzhakov, did not object to these calls, but Viktor Ilyushin, then the senior aide to Yeltsin in the gorkom, did object and accused Korzhakov of sticking his nose in other people’s business. Ilyushin was further annoyed when Korzhakov and Yeltsin developed their friendship in the summer of 1986. “He became more and more nervous when Boris Nikolayevich assigned me business falling outside the jurisdiction of the guard service.” Korzhakov, Boris Yel’tsin, 63.
82 Aleksandr Korzhakov, interview with the author (January 28, 2002).
83 Filatov, Sovershenno nesekretno, 233. The eavesdropping and its targets, which included Filatov and his family, Viktor Ilyushin, and members of the Chernomyrdin machine, are detailed in Igor’ Korotchenko, “Kompromat” (Compromising material), Nezavisimaya gazeta, October 12, 1996; and Valerii Streletskii, Mrakobesiye (Obscurantism) (Moscow: Detektiv-Press, 1998). The head of research of the Kremlin’s executive office was surprised when the surveillance began, associating it with Soviet ways, but thought it deterred the leaking and sale of sensitive information. Mark Urnov, interview with the author (May 26, 2000).
84 Third Yeltsin interview.
85 The outstanding example is Korzhakov’s letter to Chernomyrdin of November 30, 1994, about Russian oil exports, in which he advised him to turn over supervision to Soskovets. See Korzhakov, Boris Yel’tsin, 406–10; and Irina Savvateyeva, “Kto upravlyayet stranoi—Yel’tsin, Chernomyrdin ili General Korzhakov?” (Who governs Russia—Yeltsin, Chernomyrdin, or General Korzhakov?), Izvestiya, December 22, 1994.