What made the party pursue Yeltsin were his production accomplishments. In remembrances of the building industry, he credited them to a grueling schedule and ramrod organizational techniques. He was, he says, “exacting” (trebovatel’nyi): “I required people to keep strict discipline and to stick to their word. Since I never used profanity and… did my best not to raise my loud and piercing voice in front of people, my arguments in the fight for discipline were my own dedication to the job, my unflagging high standards and checking on the work done, plus people’s trust in the fairness of what I was doing. Whoever worked better would live better.”61 There is a truth to this chesty self-description. Eyewitnesses are in agreement that Yeltsin worked marathon days (and six of them a week), ran a tight ship, and stayed away from the swear words that sprinkled workplace communication in the industry. He was unfailingly punctual and levied fines for truancy and malingering. He accepted criticism, so long as it was made to his face. And he valued effort: He gave morning pep talks that singled out productive employees, dispensed yearly incentive pay, and, after his promotion in 1965, issued workers overalls lettered with “DSK,” the Cyrillic initials for House-Building Combine.62 At the combine, which because of its importance was staffed by older engineers and foremen, “At first no one perceived Yeltsin as a serious person—he was ‘a young whippersnapper.’ But, by demonstrating his competency, he very soon compelled people to take notice of him. Many listened to him more and more.”63 This regard was as common below as at the top: “Yes, he was feared, but we respected him for his fairness and attention toward people. He knew every crew leader by name. He demanded discipline from all and forced each to put his shoulder to the wheel, while sparing no effort himself.”64
Yeltsin’s rise was meritocratic, made without the windfall of a well-connected parent, spouse, or friend. The measure of merit was performance within the Soviet administrative system. For all managers in the USSR, the motto was “Fulfill the Plan!”—which meant “Fulfill the Plan or Else!” Fulfillment was computed in inelastic physical indicators—for housing, it was square meters completed—while quality, durability, and monetary cost were subsidiary. Leaders who met their targets were recompensed and promoted; those who did not were penalized or demoted. In the construction sector, the visibility of the product, unpredictable weather, and a lackadaisical labor force made for a notoriously campaign-driven work ethos. Two pieces of Soviet slang express the culture of the industry: shturmovshchina or “storming” to complete a project on time; and avral, a hard-to-translate term for “all hands on deck” or “hurry up and finish.” Thirty to forty percent of the entire annual housing plan in Sverdlovsk was completed in December.
Given what is known of his behavior as a student and athlete, Yeltsin was well suited by character to the frenetic aspect of the Soviet construction business. One afternoon in 1959, about to commission a worsted-wool mill, he discovered that SU-13 had not built a fifty-yard tunnel between two buildings and had mislaid the drawings. By six the next morning, he and his charges redid the drawings, excavated the passageway, and poured the concrete. In 1962–63 Yeltsin formed a model brigade (work crew) consisting of about one tenth of SU-13’s personnel. He opened up a cache of scarce construction supplies to the workers and enabled the brigade to shine and to set a USSR record by doubling its rate of completion. It was another feather in Yeltsin’s cap: As much a tutelary as a production feat, it got him and the brigade accolades in the Sverdlovsk press.65
The pattern continued in the house-building combine from 1963 to 1968. Yeltsin himself writes of the mad dash to finish the plan and of how he was in his element in it: “The hardest part of building housing came at the end of the year and at the end of a quarter, when we had to work practically twenty-four hours. Often, especially on the night shifts, I visited the work crews, mostly the female ones.”66 Without self-consciousness, he discloses that as head engineer he sponsored a successful “experiment” to slap up a five-story apartment house in five days flat. The building yard was equipped with three cranes, a network of transport rails, and large stocks of pre-positioned materials; it was the “industrial equivalent of street theater.”67 In March 1966, in his first year as director, a five-story building being completed by the DSK on Moscow Street keeled over. A slipshod subcontractor had not correctly gauged the time needed to allow the foundation to set in the winter months. There was a criminal probe; no charges were laid and Yeltsin was not held culpable. But plans to give him an Order of Lenin for his work were scrubbed, and in April the Sverdlovsk party committee hit him with a formal reprimand. The combine hauled off the detritus and did the building a second time. It was known from then on as the desyatietazhka—Ten-Story House.68
Yeltsin’s evolving relationships within the layer of CPSU appointees, or nomenklatura, of the post-Stalin Soviet system brought him advantage and vulnerability both. In no time, he learned how to deploy and manipulate incentives. Yakov Ryabov, the first secretary of the party gorkom (city committee) since 1963, was impressed at how he jawboned Sverdlovsk factory directors into lending hundreds of workers to the combine every year to help it meet its housing plan. The Soviet rules required that the resource quotas for any apartments not finished by December 31 be deleted from the coming year’s plan. Yeltsin cagily made the directors see they would be better off assigning the labor and getting housing in exchange. They received their apartments; Yeltsin and his employees met their plans and pocketed year-end bonuses.69
At the same time, Yeltsin raised hackles. He scrapped tirelessly with Nikolai Sitnikov, his boss in SU-13, who had ordered him to give up volleyball coaching. They stayed at the feud when Sitnikov went on to higher things and Yeltsin succeeded him in the directorate. Ryabov and his second secretary, Fëdor Morshchakov, the official behind the creation of the DSK, were sympathetic to Yeltsin, seeing him as a diamond in the rough. They did not write him off when he received his party reprimand in 1966. Ryabov saw to it that Yeltsin was put on the list to be granted a Badge of Honor, his first state award.